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ABSTRACT
German unification has altered the fundamentals of
European and Atlantic security. The present thesis analyzes
the past, present, and future of German power, paying
particular attention to the evolution of diplomacy and
statecraft between Germany and the great powers in the
V
period 1987-1990. This analysis is based, however, on a
thorough examination of the role of Germany in the European
states system from 1648 until the present. For no
understanding of German power is possible without an astute
appreciation of the impact of the past on the present and
future.
The main focus of the thesis thereafter falls upon the
so-called "two plus four" diplomacy that got underway
shortly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and reached
its climax in July 1990. The final portion of the thesis
analyzes such issues of contemporary policy as: Germany and
NATO; the future of nuclear and conventional weapons;
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); a!,d
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At 12:00 midnight on 3 October 1990, amid the light of
fireworks, fanfares of classical choral overtures, splashes
of champagne and one million German revelers, the city of
Berlin celebrated the unification of Germany and the end to
45 years of German and European division. In the New York
Times the festivities captured the headlines, but the story
was overshadowed by other articles on the front page
covering a troubled world of the U.S. budget crisis and
events in the Persian Gulf. Strangely, the editorial page
did not proclaim the event, and not one letter to the editor
was printed addressing the pros and cons of the new power in
Central Europe. Yet one familiar with the Cold War probably
could not fail to suppress the emotions of elation, hope,
and apprehension concerning the future of Europe which began
with the fall of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989 and
culminated with the unification celebration at the Reichstag
and Brandenburg Gate on 3 October 1990. The story of the
German question, however, has not reached its conclusion.
The events of 1989 and 1990 signal a new era in European
statecraft. The Cold War--the decades-long struggle between
East and West which rose and fell since 1945--appears to be
over. Bipolar Europe has vanished and the traditional roles
of the United States and Europe are in flux. What will be
the new security order? What does the future hold if the
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) is dead, and what lies
ahead for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
its strategy? How will the Conference on Security and
Cooperation (CSCE) fit into the European security equation?
Will bilateral and multilateral relations change
significantly? Possible answers to these questions may hold
the key to how the United States should react in this new
era of peace emerging in Europe.
These questions elude an easy answer during this period
of profound and rapid change. This fact requires an
analysis of the centerpiece of change in Europe (begun by
the Soviet Union and now increasingly controlled by the
Germans): how a united Germany will fit into Europe and the
world. The role that the Germans play in European and world
relations will determine the appropriate U.S. policy options
in Europe over the next ten years.
This thesis addresses Germany's new position as a
European power and growing world power by examining the "two
plus four" process, the diplomatic exchanges between the two
Germanys and the "big four" (the United States, USSR,
France, and United Kingdom) which led to unification, and
the effects of that process on the future of European
security. The analysis of the "two plus four" process will
primarily be on the national and institutional levels. On
the national level, the security positions advanced by
Germany and the "big four" governments will be tnoroughly
examined. On the institutional-level, German political
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party and ministerial positions (such as the Defense and
Foreign Ministries) will be analyzed as well as assessments
by specialists in European politics and history.
This case study reveals that the Germans, led by the
Federal Republic in Bonn, have exercised a great degree of
leadership during the events of 1989 and 1990 and during the
"two plus four" process. Germany's political positions in
this process have already had an impact on security
arrangements in Europe as well as the speed of unification.
In addition, the first all-German elections scheduled for
December 1990 will have strong implications for the future
of European security in the post-Cold War era.
The following study is divided into five chapters: 1)
an historical overview, 2) Germany's emergence as a European
and world leader, 3) a case study of "two plus four" in
Germany and German positions on security, 4) the positions
and roles of the "big four" during "two plus four", and 5)
conclusions and recommendations for the United States on
future European defense strategy. Also included in chapter
five are some recommendations for further study.
Firzt, an analysis of Germany and "two plus four"
requires more +nhln an understanding of the present and the
future. It must begin in the past as history provides the
necessary perspective to understand the role Germany has
played in European statecraft since 1648. The past also
exposes the restraints of the Cold War over the last 45
years which hindered Germany's ability to influence events
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in Europe commensurate fully with Germany's size, location,
and population. At the same time, the past 45 years
produced a Germany which has steadily increased its ability
to influence European events through the establishment of an
economy which towers above most of the other European
Community countries. At a tine (which may now be at hand)
when economic strength appears to be the basis of power in
Europe rather than pure military strength, the Germans are
indeed in a position to influence events in Europe anL the
world. One need only view the events in late 1990 in the
Persian Gulf to understand that Germany has both a European
and world role to nlay. The historical analysis briefly
traces Germany's role in Europe from 1648 through World War
II and also includes an examination of the Cold War politics
of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) from 1945 to 1985
and its ability to recover from World War II and function in
bipolar EuropL.
Second, an analysis of Germany must include its
emergence as a power with the ability and willingness to
actually influence events in Europe. This new leadership
role was first revealed after the ascension of Gorbachev in
the Soviet Union in 1985, but the rise in this new era of
German leadership has been most evident in the events of
1989 and 1990--from Gorbachev's visit to the Federal
Republic in May 1989 to the unification of Germany in
October 1990 and all-German Parliamentary elections
scheduled for December 1990.
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Third, if one accepts the importance of Germany's new
role in Europe, the next objective is to understand how the
Germans view the present and future of European security.
This goal can be accomplished by examining the German
political party and leadership positions during the "two
plus four" process in the following areas of concern over
the next five to ten years: the pace of unification; NATO
and neutrality; NATO strategy, nuclear weapons, and troop
levels; the role of CSCE in European security; and possible
new multilateral or bilateral relations (in particular the
role of the European Community, Western European Union, and
possibly a new era in relations with the United States,
Soviets, French, and British.) The German political party
and leadership positions also are important because the
winners in future all-German elections may eventually
determine the structure of German and European security.
One cannot understand German foreign and security policy
without comprehending the complexities of German domestic
politics, because German domestic politics provide the
foundation upon which foreign and security policy is
constructed in Germany.
Fourth, the position of the "big four" (the United
States, the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom)
during the "two plus four" process must also be considered.
The Germans have regained sovereignty, and the influence of
the "big four" has already decreased dramatically, but the
influence of all of these nations will still have an impact
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on European security. The analysis of the platforms of the
"big four" concentrates on government positions during the
"two plus four" process and the relative influence of each
of the countries over the next few years. The analysis of
the "big four" positions covers the same categories of
interest covered in the German analysis in Chapter Four.
Finally, after determining where the Germans and the
"big four" stand on security issues, the United States--in
order to truly be a leader among equals--can devise a
strategy to ensure a continued role in Europe which is
compatible with German objectives and U.S. interests. It is
clear that the U.S. must push for profound changes in the
priorities and strategies of NATO which the Bush
Administration has already begun to implement.
Some of these changes include the U.S. emphasis on
making NATO more political; the reevaluation and change of
NATO strategy, nuclear weapons policy, and troop
deployments; U.S. support for and envisioned role of CSCE;
and the U.S. approach to possible new bilateral and
multilateral relations between Germany and the other
European countries. An emphasis on the political aspect of
NATO (as originally espoused in the Atlantic Charter) is
essential as the WTO threat disappears and a reduction of
tensions and military force levels take place in Europe. A
change in NATO strategy, nuclear weapons policy, and troop
levels also is required to correspond with the emerging
political realities in Europe and budget realities in the
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United States. Changes in NATO strategy are already
underway and MC-14/4 (NATO Military Committee directive)
should be published soon. The United States must continue
to support the CSCE process in arms control, human rights,
and economic cooperation, but a cooperative security role
for CSCE remains a distant goal and must be approached with
caution at the present time. Finally, the United States
must continue to maintain meaningful and productive
multilateral and bilateral relations with the European
Community and individual countries of Europe. The special
relationship that has existed between Great Britain and the
United States must apply equally to Germany, the centerpiece
of Central European security.
A U.S. failure to adjust to change in Europe and accept
alterations in the status quo could result in Europe
alienating the United States from active participation in
the construction of a new European order. The consequence
of a possible U.S. disengagement from Europe may even result
in a new (yet familiar) instability on the Continent. The
United States still has a stabilizing role to play in
Europe, and a disregard for those duties would be
irresponsible.
There has been a wide range of both optimism and
pessimism on the subject of stability in Europe as the Cold
War ends. Some experts view this new era in European
relations as an opportunity to introduce innovative
collective security systems while predicting a speedy end to
7
the present alliance system.' At least this view of
collective security displays a certain degree of optimism
concerning Europe's future, but the view also borders on
utopianism considering the poor record of collective
security in the past. The present crisis in the Persian
Gulf does portray a high degree of hope for a new world
order based on international law and collective security,
but the results of the effort are yet to be realized.
What seems more troubling is the air of pessimism that
appears to surround some views about the future of German
unity in Europe. John Mearsheimer, in an extreme view, has
stated that the West will soon miss the Cold War and has a
vested interest in attempting to continue the East-West
antagonism:
The West has an interest in maintaining peace in Europe.
It therefore has an interest in maintaining the Cold War
order, and hence has an interest in continuing the Cold
War confrontation.2
This statement seems doubtful given the present crisis in
the Persian Gulf and the need to address emerging global
issues which do not fit the old Cold War context.
Others suggest that German unity will transform that
country into some terrible beast aspiring for unparalleled
hegemony in Europe. Nicholas Ridley, the United Kingdom's
'Malcolm Chalmers, "Beyond the Alliance System," World
Policy Journal 7, no. 2 (Spring 1990): pp. 215-250.
2John Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,"
The Atlantic Community Quarterly (August 1990): p. 47.
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Trade Secretary, even compared Chancellor Helmut Kohl and a
united Germany to Adolf Hitler:
This is all a German racket [European monetary
union], designed to take over the whole of Europe. This
rushed takeover by the Germans on the worst possible
basis, with the French behaving like poodles to the
Germans, is absolutely intolerable.
• -.I'm not against giving up sovereignty in
principle, but not to this lot. You might just as well
give it to Adolf Hitler, frankly. 3
Such statements do not contribute to the forging of a new
European order and suggest that there are legitimate
parallels to the situation that existed in 1914 and 1939.
Although this new era in East-West relations is not
without danger and possible instability, it is not 1919 or
1939 all over again. Germany's foreign and security policy
and the international environment in which those policies
existed before World War I and II were different from
present-day Germany. Some sketchy comparisons might be made
between the Germany of today and the Germany under Kaiser
Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler, but the Federal Republic's
post-World War II experience and present rise as a European
and possibly a world power is not the same. Therefore, to
understand Germany's present role and responsibilities it is
important to view Germany's position in Europe from an
historical perspective.
3
"It is all a German Racket," interview of Nicholas
Ridley by Dominic Lawson in The Spectator and reprinted in
The Dailey Telegraph, 13 July 1990.
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II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Thoughts of the German past normally conjure up bloody
images of four years of trench warfare in World War I and
Hitler's Wehrmacht marching across Europe and Africa in
World War II. One must, however, search beyond the
emotional works of Erich Marie Remarque's All Quiet On the
Western Front and numerous black and white documentaries
showing the Luftwaffe raining bombs on London in order to
grasp the Prussian and German role in European statecraft.
This brief historical analysis covers the emergence of
the Great Powers from 1648 to 1815, three variations of the
balance of power system in Europe from 1815 to 1914 (which
includes the causes of World War I), German foreign policy
and the causes of World War II (1918 to 1939), and the
Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) foreign and security
policy from 1945 to 1985. It is apparent that the Germans
had an active role in the responsibility of World War I and
II, but the international environment and the other European
countries also share some of the blame for those two 20th
Century disasters.
The FRG, constrained by the bipolar nature of Europe for
45 years, slowly built a degree of maneuvering room in its
foreign and security policy and established a workable
democracy which created a stable base for Germany's
emergence as a leader from 1985 to 1990. There is no doubt
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that unification will have problems and produce hardships on
many of the German people, but the responsible European role
that the FRG played during the Cold War and the promise that
unified Germany will continue that responsible role is in
sharp contrast to the situation that existed prior to World
War I and II--a situation which had its origin during the
emergence of the great powers after 1648. 4
A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE GREAT POWERS, 1648-1815
Europe was devastated by the Thirty Years War between
1618 and 1648. The House of Hapsburg in Austria was
debilitated and ceased to be the undisputed leader on the
Continent, and Spain threw away Europe's finest infantry in
battles which bled Europe dry. However, nowhere was the
destruction in Europe worse than in Prussia and the German
states. One third of Prussia's population was lost as
armies marched across Central Europe as though it were a
parade ground in the last of the Continent's religious wars.
Out of the ashes of the 30-year disaster the best
organized of the European states proved themselves during
and after the crushing struggle for mastery in Europe. The
4 This discussion is indebted to the historical
perspectives of Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two
World Wars (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981),
translated by William C. Kirby; Gordon Craig, Europe, 1815-
1914, 3rd ed., and Europe Since 1914, 3rd ed. (Hinsdale,
Illinois: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1972); and Gordon Craig
and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic
Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press,
1983).
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emergence of the great powers (Great Britain, France,
Russia, Prussia, and Austria) had three characteristics in
common: "effective armed forces, able bureaucracies, and a
theory of state which restrained dynastic exuberance and
maintained realistic political objectives. ''5
Prussia was in serious trouble until Frederick William
(the Great Elector) assumed the throne in 1640. A realist,
he recognized Prussia's survival in Central Europe was
dependent on a centralized state, an efficient bureaucracy,
and a strong army. For Frederick, the last factor was the
key to the whole, and he provided his successors, Frederick
I (1688-1713), Frederick William I (1713-1740), and
Frederick II (1740-1786), with the necessary foundations to
consolidate the Prussian state and prevent it from being
swallowed by its neighbors--not an easy task given Prussia's
central location in Europe. Prussia, therefore, established
itself as an active member of the great powers.
By the early 18th Century the great powers had emerged
and were recognized unofficially by the leaders of Europe.6
There was a general feeling of commonality among the states
exemplified in family relations, religion, and historical
tradition. More important was an underlying belief (which
was not institutionalized) that the five great powers must
exist, war would be subject to regulation, and the principle
5 Craig, Force and Statecraft, p. 9.
Ibid., p. 11.
12
of a balance of power must be maintained. 7 The principle of
a balance of power took two forms: first, there was
vigilance against any attempt at European domination by one
state; second, any gains by one country required
compensation to another. All of the great powers required
their own "piece of the pie."
At best this theory of a balance of power was in the
minds of the great-power leaders, and real cooperative
action was not realized until the threat posed by the French
Revolution (1789-1815) and Napoleon's bid for hegemony in
Europe. The new balance of power system existed in various
forms from 1815 to 1914 and both Prussia and Germany played
pivotal roles in its success and eventual failure.
B. THE BALANCE OF POWER, 1815-1914
The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars shook the
foundations of the Ancien Regimes upon which European
statecraft was built. The Continent again was embroiled in
war as armies marched and retreated repeatedly across Europe
between 1789 and 1815. The map of Europe was drawn and
redrawn, but by 1815 peace was finally restored. Order was
established out of the chaos, and a new system of European
peace was established which lasted until World War I.
The new balance of power took three forms--each
different from the other, and each form separated by a
transitional period: the Congress of Vienna system (1815-
'Ibid., p. 22-25.
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1854), the Bismarckian system (1870-1890), and finally, a
desperate bipolar alliance system established by the
diplomats of Europe just prior to World War I (1907-1914).
Prussia and Germany played a central role in all three
systems.
1. The Congress of Vienna Balance of Power, 1815-1854
Once again Prussia became the parade ground for the
armies of Europe between 1789 and 1815. Prussia did not,
however, suffer the threat of total extinction alone. There
were periods during the Napoleonic Wars when the British
stood isolated against Napoleon and his bid for hegemony in
Europe. The French Revolution followed by Napoleon's
attempt to establish a universal monarchy in Europe finally
forced organized collaboration among the great powers
opposing France. This collaborative effort to defeat
Napoleon continued after the restoration of peace and
contributed to the rebuilding of a new European order.*
Under the leadership of Lord Robert Stewart
Castlereagh (foreign minister of Great Britain) and Count
Klemens von Metternich (foreign minister of Austria) at the
Congress of Vienna in 1815, the principles of a concert and
balance of power were institutionalized on behalf of a
higher European objective: peace. The Congress of Vienna
was unique because it was more than just a gathering by the
OGordon Craig, Europe, 1815-1914, 3rd ed., (Hinsdale,
Illinois, 1973), 11; Craig, Force and Statecraft, pp. 25-27.
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victors to divide the spoils of war. A primary, long-range
goal to maintain a balance of power in Europe was
established. Territorial gains and losses (the compensatory
technique) were not abandoned, but such territorial gains
did not take place at the expense of the new balance of
power system. There was no desire by the victors to destroy
France, and France was recognized as a major participant in
the balance of power system. Germany (and Prussia) was used
as a territorial "shock absorber" to maintain a buffer
between the great powers--a role that proved vital in the
maintenance of the balance of power system but which also
fomented German nationalism.
The Congress of Vienna system worked effectively for
several reasons. Three factors stand out in the system's
success and also play a role in the later balance of power
systems. First, European statecraft was not pressured by
internal problems which later forced governments to take
actions that aroused the suspicions and fears of the other
great powers. The leadership did not have to worry about
public opinion, economic or industrial lobbies, or agitation
by the military establishments for more armaments.
Second, there were no serious ideological
differences between the great powers. They all spoke the
same diplomatic language. There were some problems between
1830 and 1854 with liberal France and Britain, but the great
powers ignored the ideological differences more than they
observed them. In short, ideological lines were not so
15
rigid as to prevent flexibility and the common goal of peace
in Europe.
Finally, general differences were overshadowed by
the high degree of consensus among the great powers. It was
agreed that no increase in possessions or territory would
take place without the consent of the other powers. The key
to consensus was common cultural, diplomatic, and historical
conditions. All three factors which contributed to the
success of the Congress of Vienna system (ideological
tolerance, consensus, and a lack of internal problems),
eventually proved to be too fragile a foundation for the
long-term European peace. The Congress of Vienna system
gave way to the Bismarckian balance of power system.'
2. The Bismarckian System, 1870-1890
The Congress of Vienna system was seriously weakened
by the revolutions of 1848 which introduced new diplomats no
longer content with the principles of collaboration. The
Crimean War (1853-1856) signaled the end of the Congress of
Vienna system. For the first time since 1815, several of
the great powers engaged in a war against each other (France
and Great Britain against Russia).
The aftermath of the Crimean War produced more great
powers interested in revising rather than preserving the
balance of power. The Concert of Vienna was no longer able
to contain aggression as four wars took place between 1859
'Craig, Force and Statecraft, pp. 32-35.
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and 1870 (one for Italian unification and three for German
unification). After German unification under Prussian
leadership, the flexible German "shock absorber" was gone,
free trade gave way to neo-merchantilism, the rise of
imperialism, and tariff wars. In addition, a psychology of
hypersensitive nationalism emerged, and there was not a
relaxation of tensions in Europe as nad occurred in 1815.
Finally, governments were forced to react to internal
pressures such as public opinion, organized economic and
industrial interests, and war offices that demanded more and
higher technology weapons. There was little hope that the
Congress of Vienna system could ever work again. 1
Out of this transitional period emerged a master
statesman in Germany. Otto von Bismarck (minister president
of Prussia and later Chancellor of Germany) stands virtually
without equal as a master of political maneuver in German
history. He united Germany between 1864 and 1871 but
recognized that Germany's survival in Central Europe was
questionable as the Congress of Vienna system disappeared
and Central European alliances became unreliable. Bismarck
had to keep revanchist France isolated after the Franco-
Prussian War (1870-1871) while maintaining tenuous alliances
"
0 For the effects of the 1848 Revolutions and the
Crimean War on the Vienna Concert see, Craig, Force and
Statecraft, pp. 35-37; Craig, Europe, 1815-1914, pp. 153-
167; A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe,
1848-1918 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 1-
80.
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(especially with Russia) in order to hold onto Germany's
great power status in the center of Europe.
Germany was in a precarious dilemma, but Bismarck
managed the situation by balancing Germany's position in
Central Europe through Schaukelpolitik (a "see-saw" policy).
The system established by Bismarck was different from the
Concert system forqed by Castlereagh and Metternich in 1815
for several reasons. Bismarck's answer to the German
dilemma was an elaborate system of secret alliances to
prevent German isolation and keep the French from forming an
entente with Russia. In addition, the alliances prevented
both Russia and Austro-Hungary from becoming too aggressive.
In the Bismarckian system all powers (except France) were
bound to Berlin in some way and on Bismarck's terms.
Bismarck never denounced war as a method for
political gain, but clearly he saw that Germany's great-
power status after unification could only be assured by the
maintenance of European peace. The system created oy
Bismarck produced stability in Europe for 12 years but had a
critical weakness: the system was too complicated for any
person other than Bismarck to manage, and it is unlikely
that the system could have survived after 1890.21
'
1 For background on German unification and the
Bismarckian balance of power system see Craig, Force and
Statecraft, pp. 35-40; Taylor, pp. 142-169, 255-303; and
Robert Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf), pp. 511-519, 572-574.
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3. The Bipolar Alliance System, 1907-1914
The final balance of power in Europe prior to World
War I was a system in which all of the great powers sided in
two opposing coalitions. It was a last and desperate
attempt by the diplomats of the time to maintain European
peace, but the system proved to be too rigid to prevent
catastrophe in 1914. Germany could not hold its tenuous
position as a great power in Central Europe and at the same
time strive to become a world power. The resultant
disasters of the first half of the 20th Century are
testament to the failure of European statecraft to maintain
a cooperative effort for peace.
Unable to fathom the inconsistency of alliance with
Russia and his own desire to make Germany a world power,
Kaiser Wilhelm II allowed the reassurance treaty with Russia
to lapse in 1890. The result allowed France to escape
isolation and form an entente with Russia and the United
Kingdom. Wilhelm II's ambitions and Bismarck's successors
eventually all viewed war as inevitable in maintaining a
great-power status--these policies eventually led to
disaster.2 A dilemma confronted the military which had to
devise a strategy for a two-front war which was unwinnable
2 Chancellors Georg Leo von Caprivi (1890-1894), Prince
Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst (1894-1900), Bernhard
von Bllow (1900-1909), and Dr. Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg
(1909-1917) all had varying qualities of ability as
statesmen but were no match for the genius of Bismarck. See
Craig, Europe, 1815-1914, pp. 357-360; Taylor, pp. 328-329,
372-373, 460-461.
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and required rapid, provocative mobilization (which was the
same for all major European countries involved).
Increasingly, a military solution was sought when only a
diplomatic and political solution was applicable. German
foreign and security policy became more and more one
dimensional with only a military option as an answer.
Germany's inability to drive a wedge between Britain
and France and obtain a guarantee of British non-involvement
prior to World War I further complicated matters. Germany's
drive to be a world power by participating in imperialism,
building the High Seas Fleet to counter Britain's Grand
Fleet, and an inability to comprehend the effect of the arms
build-up on Britain's fear of German hegemony on the
Continent, all contributed to alienation between Germany and
the Untied Kingdom and a closing of ranks (of sorts) between
the United Kingdom and France. This fact combined with the
fatalistic view of the inevitability of war with Russia, a
"blank check" to Austria-Hungary, and an inability to
combine limited "bluff" tactics in diplomacy with the
Schlieffen Plan left Germany with virtually no political
maneuvering room prior to World War I. 33
The other European powers certainly share a portion
of the blame for World War I. The United Kingdom had
suddenly emerged f73m its period of "splendid isolationism,"
the Russians overplayed their assumed role as protector of
3-3 Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, pp. 4-39;
Craig, Force an,' Statecraft, pp. 40-44.
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the Slavs, Austria-Hungary was overly concerned with and
failed to move quickly enough during the Balkan Crisis, and
France had not forgotten its defeat in the Franco-Prussian
War which resulted in a high degree of revanchism. World
War I was caused by the conditions and requirements which
defined great-power status in Europe at the time. Those
conditions and requirements led to an over-emphasis on
military and strategic factors while all other elements of
statecraft (such as diplomatic cooperation and political
settlements) took a secondary role in decision-making. This
concept of statecraft was not compatible with the rigid
alliance system and inflexible political and military goals
which had developed prior to World War I by all the European
nations involved.1 '
Arguments abound concerning how much German foreign
policy during World War I directly contributed to the
outbreak of World War II. One argument promotes the thesis
that World War II grew out of the imperialist war aims of
Wilhelm II prior to World War I. Another theory, especially
popular in Germany, is that there is no connection between
German foreign policy objectives in World War I and World
War II. The late Andreas Hillgruber, a leading historian of
German foreign policy, believed both arguments were flawed,
"'Craig, Force and Statecraft, pp. 40-44; Craig, Europe,
pp. 435-448; Taylor, pp. 511-539; and H. Stuart Hughes,
Contemporary Europe: A History (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1976), pp. 24-44.
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and it is more of a combination of the two theories that
contributed to World War 11. 35
C. GERMAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND THE CAUSES
OF WORLD WAR II
Hillgruber argues that once World War I had begun and it
became apparent that an easy victory could not be obtained,
Chancellor Hollweg's policies shifted to a strategy of
survival. Hollweg believed that if Germany could resist
being totally defeated by the Triple Entente, then the
German accomplishments of 1870 could be maintained and the
country's potential for growth could not be stopped.
However, as the war dragged on German policies were
increasingly influenced by the military leaders, chief of
whom was quartermaster-general of the German Army at the
time, Erich von Ludendorff. There was a fundamental shift
in war aims after Lundendorff consolidated power in 1917 by
using Chancellor George Michaelis as a puppet for
Ludendorff's own policies. Ludendorff believed victory was
paramount, and any other outcome was equal to a loss for
Germany. He also contended that the great powers were in a
permanent state of war with periods of cease fires enroute
to the next major war. This assertion seems to give
credence to the theory that World War II was a continuation
IsHillgruber, 41.
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of World War I and Germany's attempt to dominate the world
through force or the threat of force if required.2'
However, Hitler's foreign policy objectives were not
initially world-wide in scope. His long-range goal of world
power was rooted first in an Ostraum (expansive eastern
sphere dominated by Germany) in the East. This was in
contrast to the Mitteleuropa concept of Bismarck. Hitler's
foreign policy objectives were fixed by the 1920s and
included the erection of an eastern sphere and the complete
domination of Russia based on the gains that Germany made
during World War I but which were denied by the Treaty of
Versailles in 1919.27
From an economic and strategic power base in the vast
stretches of Eastern Europe, Hitler could then make a bid
for world power. Hitler recognized that in order to obtain
this position in Eastern Europe he had to avoid a general
war. This requirement meant limited war objectives through
short Blitzkriegs (lightening wars)--not a full-scale drive
for immediate hegemony in Europe and the world. However,
Hitler underestimated the resilience of the Soviet Union and
Great Britain's interest in maintaining a balance of power
I-Ibid., pp. 43-44.
"
7 Ibid., p. 47.
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on the Continent. Hitler's miscalculations led once again
to a two-front war in Europe and a World War. "
Yet Hitler cannot shoulder all the blame for World War
II. His foreign policy objectives probably would have
failed earlier had it not been for the favorable conditions
presented by the state of international relations in the
1930s. The Treaty of Versailles isolated Germany, made
recovery from World War I difficult, and hindered any chance
of a successful shift to a democracy. Hitler's maneuvering
room was expanded with the Anglo-German Naval Treaty (1935),
Italy's Abyssinian War (1935), and the Spanish Civil War
(1936). After the Rhineland occupation (1936) France was
forced to follow the United Kingdom's lead in foreign
policy, and deep-seated antagonisms between the British (and
the West) and the Soviets prevented a coordinated effort to
contain Hitler. In addition, the United States opted for
isolationism after World War I and did not accept the
responsibility required to make the collective security
system work as envisioned by Woodrow Wilson. The West
18A.J.P. Taylor, a renown British historian, argues that
Hitler did not want to destroy the French or fight the
British. He simply wanted the West to acknowledge that
Germany had been victorious in the East during World War I.
See Taylor, "Hitler: A 'Traditional' German Statesman," in
Robert G.L. Waite, ed., Hitler and NAZI Germany (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 94; and
Hillgruber, pp. 49-55. Hillgruber argues Hitler wanted "to
create a world power to stand beside the other world powers"
(an indication that Hitler did not desire to destroy the
West).
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initially allowed Hitler to obtain many of his objectives,
because they allowed him too much maneuvering room.
In summary, German foreign policy was not simply a
continuation of German war aims from World War I which
resulted in World War II. Hitler's objectives were limited
in scope initially, and he did not want to embroil the world
in general war. Unfortunately, Hitler's objectives and
miscalculations cannot excuse German responsibility in the
conflagration which claimed 30-40 million lives.
Beyond Germany's part in the causes of World War II, one
must recognize that there was a failure of the international
system after 1919 due to a lack of collaboration by the
winning powers, the exclusion of two great powers from
European relations (both Germany and Russia), and the
voluntary withdrawal from an active role in Europe by the
United States. U.S. participation in Europe may have
provided a stabilizing force between the wars. Also, there
was a loss of commonality and diplomatic language between
the European nations with the introduction of novel politics
and ideologies. National Socialism and Communism were new,
and methods to deal with these political concepts were
unknown. One finds it difficult to play the game if the
other side does not play by the rules.1'
However, this is not an acceptance of the argument put
forth by A.J.P. Taylor that Hitler's goals were immoral only
"'Craig, Force and Statecraft, pp. 49-58.
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because they rested on a change in the status quo or that
Hitler did not view the actual use of force as a means to
obtain political goals:
If Western morality seemed superior, this was largely
because it was the morality of the status quo; Hitler's
was the immorality of revision ....
. "force" apparently meant to him (Hitler] the
threat of war, not necessarily war itself.
2
1
Certainly the international situation contributed to
Hitler's ability to carry out his foreign policy goals, but
in the end it was Hitler's foreign policy, which advocated
aggression and expansion in pursuit of political gains and
an eventual position as a world power through the
establishment of an Ostraum in the East, that caused World
War II:
In one important respect . . the explanation of the
war is extremely simple, . . . Of the two expansionist
powers, Italy was not by herself strong enough to risk
or embark on a great war. Germany was; and unless
German expansion halted of its own accord without
breaching the limits set by the vital interests of other
strong and determined states, then war was bound to
come. German expansion did not halt, . . .21
D. SUMMARY OF THE FAILURE OF GERMAN FOREIGN
POLICY TO 1945
The rise of Prussia as a great power from 1640 to 1848
exemplified Germany's predicament in Central Europe.
Prussian survival was consistently in jeopardy as the armies
2 OTaylor, pp. 95, 96.
2 3P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in
Europe (London: Longman Group, 1986), p. 300. Italics added.
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of Europe marched across the German states in the continuous
struggles that tested the resilience of the strongest powers
on the Continent. Out of those struggles Prussia
established itself as one of the great powers by building an
effective army, bureaucracy, and theory of state. The army
was the key to the whole and provided Prussia with the
necessary foundation which prevented the country from being
swallowed by its neighbors.
The Prussian state, built on the efficient military
foundation necessary for survival in Central Europe, unified
all of Germany between 1864 and 1871. Under the masterful
leadership of Bismarck, German unification was achieved
without the simultaneous engagement of all of Europe in a
Continental war. Bismarck then constructed a complicated
alliance system in order to maintain peace in Central Europe
and Germany's hard-won gains. However, Prussia's tise as a
great power and German unification reinforced the militarist
foundation upon which Germany based its survival and
position in Europe. One fact emerged as a central theme of
German foreign and security policy which was best described
by Bismarck himself in a speech to the German parliament:
"Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions
of the day decided--that was the great error of 1848 and
1849--but by blood and iron. "122 German liberalism gave way
under the authoritarian leadership of Prussia.
2 2 Palmer, A History of the Modern World, p. 513. Italics
added.
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William II's rejection of Bismarck's complicated
alliance system, the Kaiser's new course to gain a world-
power status, the rise of German industrial and economic
might, and the rigid alliance system all contributed to
World War I. Within 20 years, due to Hitler's misguided
objectives and a certain degree of maneuvering room provided
by the international community, Germany plunged Europe into
World War II. Underlying and contributing to both of those
unfortunate conflicts was the foundation of German foreign
policy which was based on the Prussian past and the struggle
to define Germany's position in Europe: faith in the power
of the army and a belief that any goal can ultimately be
attained with the point of a bayonet.
The difference between today and the disasters of the
early 20th Century is that the FRG has evolved as a
democracy since 1945, and West Germany--the leader in German
unification--has actively participated in the peaceful
restructuring of Europe. This is in sharp contrast to the
instability created by the balance of power system prior to
World War I and the failure of democracy, isolation of
Germany, and weak international system of the inter-war
years. The Germany of today has spent 45 years establishing
a viable democracy and has confronted and conquered the
failings of German foreign policy which was based on the
Prussian past.
Exactly how did the FRG establish a democracy since
1945, and how did the country exercise a workable foreign
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and security policy during an era of profound restraints?
An examination reveals that from 1945 to 1985 the FRG built
a workable foreign and security policy under the most
restrictive of conditions--during the heart of the Cold War.
At the same time the FRG established an economic base that
contributed to Germany's emergence as a world power between
1985 and 1990 as the Soviet threat receded.
E. FRG FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, 1945-1985
West Germany's foreign and security policy since 1945
took a different course when compared to Germany's policies
between 1871 and 1945--alignment and integration with the
West. The centerpiece of that change was established by
Konrad Adenauer (FRG Chancellor, 1949-1963) between 1945 and
1955: active participation in the NATO alliance and Western
institutions. Although constrained by the bipolar order
which developed in Europe after World War II, the FRG
demonstrated a growing degree of flexibility between 1945
and 1985 considering the circumstances which existed during
that period. A review of the FRG's foreign and security
policy from 1945 to 1985 reveals that West Germany increased
its influence in European affairs by building a stable
democracy, faithfully participating as the key European
member in NATO, and establishing a strong economy second to
none in Europe.
However, the FRG was consistently restrained in
realizing its full leadership potential due to several
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factors: the age-old problem of geography, the Soviet
threat, and the need to counter the Soviet threat with a
strong alliance with the West. The geographic dilemma faced
by Prussia and Germany in the past expressed itself in the
form of armies marching across the landscape or in two-front
wars. Germany's position in Central Europe between East and
West at the end of World War II, and for 45 years of Cold
War, highlighted the same geographic quandary that plagued
Prussia and Germany for centuries. For the Ger-ans who had
been unified since 1871, the geographic dilemma uf the Cold
War expressed itself in the worst of all possible forms:
division of the country.
Against the backdrop of an unfavorable geographic
position, the FRG faced a Soviet threat which restricted
freedom of action, ensured the division of Germany, and
required alliance with the West as the only effective
counter. As long as alliance with the West was required and
the Cold War ptsisted, Germany's division was fixed.
As the early years of tension between East and West
settled into decades of Cold War, the uncompromising
policies set forth by Adenauer and the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) slowly gave way to the policies of the Social
Democrats (SPD) which involved recognition of the Eastern
bloc countries including East Germany. This new eastern
policy (Ostpolitik) provided the FRG with a degree of
maneuvering room by maintaining a commitment to the West
while reestablishing contacts with the East. However, such
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a policy probably could not have been effective at the
beginning of the Cold War. Adenauer was the first to
recognize and have the foresight to see that initially West
Germany had to deal from a position of strength which was
only obtainable by alliance with the West.
1. Adenauer Takes a Side, 1945-1955
The period between 1945 and 1955 established the
boundaries of the Cold War in Europe. For the FRG it was a
period of consolidation and limited choices in foreign and
security policy. However, even in the first years after the
war--from the low-point of defeat in 1945 to the
establishment of the Federal Republic and the initiation of
rearmament in 1955--there were a number of options in
foreign and security policy that the FRG did not choose to
exercise. In retrospect, the FRG's foreign and security
policy alternatives (alliance with the West and rejection of
a see-saw policy or alliance with the East) seem logical,
but it took the strong leadership ability of Konrad Adenauer
eventually to forge a West German consensus of alliance with
the West. The alliance and integration with the West was a
first in modern German history and established the
foundation of the FRG's position in Central Europe for the
next 45 years.23
There can be little argument that Winston Churchill,
Harry Truman, and Joseph Stalin established the preliminary
2 3 Walter F. Hahn, "NATO and Germany," Global Affairs
(Winter 1990): pp. 4-6.
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foundations of the Cold War at Potsdam in 1945 by
determining the occupation conditions of defeated Germany
without addressing the long-range structure of European
recovery. One can argue that the United States and the West
won the war but lost the peace due the West's reluctance to
force Stalin out of Eastern Europe and what he considered
the just spoils of war. 2 4  However, one must also be
reminded that the horror of World War II inflicted a general
weariness of fighting and the West had been in an alliance
with the Soviets against a common enemy, the Germans. These
two factors contributed to an initial paralysis by the West
to counter Stalin's expansionist tendencies, but as time
passed Stalin's policies eventually awoke the West to the
threat posed by the Soviet Union. This threat eventually
led to a :onsensus that consolidated the West in a policy rf
containment spearheaded by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
btalin's aggressive policies contributed to the
formation of NATO and U.S. involvement in Europe with the
Iran and Turkish Straits crisis (1946), the Greek civil war
(1947), the P ague coup (1948), and the Berlin blockade of
June 1948-May 1949. These events, along with the Korean War
(1950), convinced the West that the Soviets intended to
2 4 Lincoln Gordon, "The View From Washington," in Lincoln
Gordon, J.F. Brown, Pierre Hassner, Josef Joffe, Edwina
Moreton, eds., Eroding Empire: Western Relations With
Eastern Europe, The Breokings Institute, 1987, p. 71.
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expand into Western Europe and ensured U.S. commitment to
Europe through the Truman doctrine (March 1947), the
Marshall Plan (June 1947), the North Atlantic Treaty (4
April 1949), and the integrated command (1950).25
For Germany, Potsdam was the low-point of diplomatic
maneuver. Defeated and occupied, Germany as well as much of
Europe, was forced to sacrifice autonomy in the post-war
era. 26 Konrad Adenauer acknowledged his worst nightmare,
the Potsdam agreements, in 1953:
Bismarck spoke about his nightmare of coalitions
against Germany. I have my own nightmare: Its name is
Potsdam. The danger of a collusive great power policy
at Germany's peril has existed since 1945, and it has
continued to exist even after the Federal Republic was
founded. The foreign policy of the Federal Government
has always been geared to an escape from this danger
zone. For Germany must not fall between the
grindstones. If it does, it will be lost. 2'
In the above statement, Adenauer indirectly acknowledged
Germany's geostrategic dilemma between East and West that
existed since 1648; whicn confronted Kaiser Wilhelm II,
Chancellor Hollweg, and General Helmut von Moltke (German
chief of the general staff in 1914); and confounded Hitler
and his plans for eventual European hegemony.
2 5Pierre Harmel, "Forty Years of East-West Relations:
Hopes, Fears, and Challenges," Atlantic Community Quarterly
25, no. 3 (Fall 1987): p. 260. See also Lawrence S. Kaplan,
NATO and the United States: the Enduring Alliance (Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1988), pp. 1-52.
2 David Calleo, "Germany and the Balance of Power,"
Wolfram F. Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979,
Westview Press, 1980, p. 6.
2 7 Josef Joffe, "The View From Bonn: The Tacit Alliance,"
in Eroding Empire, D. 141.
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Germany's position in Central Europe and the danger
of the great powers making a deal at the expense of Germany
remained a prime concern of the FRG until the "two plus
four" settlement in 1990. In sharp contrast to the
situation that existed in 1945, the Germans in 1990 decided
on the terms of internal unification and then influenced the
"big four" to accept the external terms of unification
almost as a fait accompli. Adenauer, however, first had to
deal with the problems at hand after World War :T, and his
answer to escape the crushing effects of a divided Europe
was to ensure that the FRG was not in the middle. West
Germany elected to be pro-West in the Cold War rather than
remaining neutral or aligning with the East.
Adenauer believed that the only chance of recovery
for Germany and the prevention of Soviet hegemony on the
continent was through alliance with the West.2 8 Adenauer
was a Realpolitiker--he preferred the ideas of Machiavelli
who said, "One should not see the world as it should be, but
as it is."''=
Observing the European situation as it was,
Adenauer's initial options for Germany were limited:
alliance with Russia, alliance with the West, or possibly a
2
0Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "West German Foreign Policy,
1949-1979," in West German Foreign Policy, p. 16-17; and
Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Adenauer's Ostpolitik," in West German
Foreign Policy: 1949-1979, p. 128.
2
*Hans-Peter Schwarz, p. 128.
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neutral position between the two competing poles in Europe.
As already mentioned, a position between the two was
unacceptable, and this fact explains West Germany's
rejection of such neutrality schemes as that offered by
Stalin in 1952. If neutrality virtually guaranteed Soviet
hegemony in Central Europe, then alignment with the Soviets
was equally unacceptable for the same reason. Therefore,
Adenauer chose alignment with the West as the best and
perhaps the only method of regaining German strength and
sovereignty.
In Adenauer's view, German rearmament was a crucial
element to ensure sovereignty and pull the FRG into the
Western alliance. In the process he had to convince not
only the West German population and the opposition SPD, but
also his own party (the CDU) that rearmament and alignment
with the West was more important than unification. The CDU
was not convinced until after the start of the Korean War in
1950, and the initial Bundeswehr forces (the West German
Army) were finally formed in 1955. The opposition party,
the SPD (Social Democrats) did not agree to follow the
Western approach until 1959 at Bad Godesberg. 3 0
3°Marc Cioc, Pax Atomica, Columbia University Press,
1988, pp. 14-15. For a study on German rearmament, see
Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, Princeton
University Press, 1988. SPD change on security policy is
explained in Werner Kaltefleiter, "German Foreign Policy:
The Domestic Political Framework," in Security Perspectives
of the West German Left, Pergamon-Brassey's International
Defense Publishers, 1989.
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Interwoven in the complexities of alignment with the
West and FRG rearmament was the question of a valid and
credible strategy against a possible Soviet invasion. MC-
14/1 (NATO Military Committee directive) called for a
forward defense of Western Europe with large conventional
forces in accordance with the goals of the Lisbon Conference
of 1952. However, the cost of such a massive rearmament was
more than Western Europe and the United States were willing
to pay and still ensure economic recovery and prosperity.
This move led to an increased reliance on nuclear weapons to
counter the Soviets and a new strategy of deterrence, MC-
14/2 (massive retaliation)--the implementation of which (if
ever actually used in war) threatened the very existence of
the Federal Republic.
In summary, between 1945 and 1955 Adenauer anchored
the Germans to the West for the first time in German
history. However, his Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) was
severely restricted by his foreign policy goals: freedom,
peace, and unity (in that order). Freedom was paramount, so
that left little maneuvering room in foreign policy to
obtain German unity as the "big four" continued to squabble
over the precise terms of unification. 32  The Hallstein
3 1 Numerous proposals and counter-proposals were made by
the West and the USSR on German reunification. Disagreements
persisted over free elections, what organization would
supervise the elections, neutrality or alliance alternatives
for Germany, rectification of the 1945 German borders, and
rearmament. Geneva conferences between the "big four"
foreign ministers failed to make any progress on the German
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Doctrine (1955) further tied the FRG's hands in respect to
contacts with the East by making it illegal to establish
diplomatic relations with any country that recognized the
German Democratic Republic (GDR).32  While establishing a
solid Westpolitik (Western policy), the West Germans also
had to deal with rearmament and face heavy-handed U.S.
pressure to accept nuclear weapons on German soil as well
as train the Bundeswehr to utilize such weapons. Although
accepted in the end, the strategy which involved weapons of
mass destruction on German soil resulted in heated debates
in the Bundestag (lower house of the FRG parliament) in the
late 1950s which severely challenged the new democracy.
2. Rearmament--Atomic Cannon Fodder? 1956-1963
The rearmament of the FRG proceeded as planned
beginning in 1956 and was essentially complete by 1965.
Rearmament also presented a unique problem: how to
effectively integrate the new Bundeswehr in a democracy and
at the same time suppress the Prussian militarist past which
aided in the disasters of the Third Reich. Although the
cycle of doubt concerning rearmament and the relation of the
army and German society continued over the years, it is
generally agreed that the Bundeswehr's integration into the
...Continued...
problem in 1955 and 1959.
2 2 J.F. Brown, "Eastern Europe's Western Connection," in
Eroding Empire, p. 43. This policy existed until 1967 and it
did not include the Soviet Union. The FRG did not recognize
the GDR until 1970.
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West German democracy has been successful. 3 3  This period
was also characterized by the great nuclear debates in the
late 1950s, and a continuation of Adenauer's Westpolitik.
The Soviets continued to provide the FRG with the threat
that required an active link with the West, but by 1963
(after the Berlin Crisis of 1961) a change in the direction
of West German foreign policy began to occur.
The adoption of MC-14/2, (NATO Military Committee
directive, 1956-1967) provided a critical test of the FRG's
commitment to the West's strategy, led by the United States,
against the Soviet Union. This strategy, which utilized
allied troops as a trip wire for massive retaliation against
the Soviet Union with both tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons, brought into question the role of the Bundeswehr as
possible cannon fodder in the event of war in Europe.
Furthermore, the introduction of large numbers of tactical
nuclear weapons for use on German soil ensured that large
areas of West Germany would be destroyed as exemplified by
NATO's Carte Blanche exercise in 1955.3 4  This problem set
off the nuclear debates in the Bundestag between the SPD and
the CDU/CSU between 1957 and 1961. The SPD finally gave in
33Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross; and Dr. Ose,
representative of the FRG Ministry of Defense responsible
for education in the Bundeswehr, "The integration of the
East German Army (NVA) into the Bundeswehr," lecture at the
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1 August
1990.
34 Cioc, pp. 29-32. The exercise revealed that Germany
comprised the main battlefield while the rest of NATO was
left virtually untouched.
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and accepted alliance with the West and NATO strategy, but
arguments continued to flare over the use and stationing of
nuclear weapons on German soil--arguments which persist to
this day. 3 5
In the end, the FRG arrived at a consensus on
defense due to the need for U.S. involvement in Europe to
counter the Soviet threat: Hungary (1956), the Suez crisis
(1956), and the Soviet H-bomb (1956); Sputnik (1957); the
second Berlin crisis and the Berlin Wall (1958-1961), and
the Cuban Missile crisis (1962). 3 4 However, the inability
to regain political maneuvering room with respect to
unification and Eastern Europe (exemplified by the building
of the Berlin Wall as a symbol of the increasing division of
the two Germany's) eventually led to a reevaluation of the
FRG's Ostpolitik and the downfall of the conservative
coalition in Bonn.
3. Adenauer's Policies Decay, 1963-1966
From 1963-1966 Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's government
continued Adenauer's basic strategy of strict association
with the West, in particular stressing the U.S.-FRG link.
This was in contrast to the path that France under President
Charles de Gaulle took during the same period. De Gaulle
"
9For an analysis of the era (1953-1967), see Cioc, Pax
Atomic.
3 4The Soviets threatened London and Paris with nuclear
attack during the Suez crisis of 1956. See Josef Joffe, The
Limited Partnership (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1987), pp. 120-121.
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slowly pulled France out of the integrated military command
of NATO because he questioned the U.S. commitment to Europe
in the age of nuclear parity between the Soviets and the
United States. Erhard's foreign policy (and later that of
Kurt-Georg Kiesinger) lost credibility, because he
consistently supported U.S. policy while the United States
became embroiled in Vietnam and failed to support the
Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF).3 1 In addition, the
Hallstein Doctrine had become too cumbersome--relations with
the East had to be improved as detente was breaking out
between West and East. The Erhard and Kiesinger governments
held on to Adenauer's policies too long, and Moscow and East
Germany used the Hallstein Doctrine to "cast Bonn in the
role of the ultimate cold warrior. ''3 6
In security policy the FRG increasingly faced the
dilemma of not onlj the "coupling" problem (would the U.S.
use its nuclear weapons to defend Germany), but also the
fear--which existed until July 1990--that the United States
and the Soviet Union would make a deal over Germany's
head.3"  This was exemplified in the failure of the
3
'Hanrieder, pp. 22-25
3 OJoffe, "The View From Bonn," p. 144. Footnote 14 on p.
144 explains the Hallstein Doctrine.
3 9The meeting between Chancellor Kohl and President
Gorbachev in the Caucasus on 15-16 July 1990 was a victory
for the FRG in the "two plus four" negotiations. Gorbachev
conceded that Germany could be part of NATO and the USSR
would reliquish occupation rights. Kohl and Genscher (the
German foreign minister) were instrumental in obtaining the
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Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) in 1965 which was abandoned
by President Johnson in favor of the nonproliferation treaty
(NPT) and later the SALT negotiations. 40  Both the Erhard
government and the Grand Coalition governments had
misgivings about the NPT.'1
In summary, Adenauer's refusal to engage in
Schaukelpolitik (see-saw policy) and the establishment of
the Hallstein Doctrine along with Erhard's continuation of
these policies left the FRG with no maneuvering room for
relations with the East. However, these policies did
strengthen the FRG and provided a strong foundation from
which the Kiesinger and later the Brandt governments could
undertake a new Ostpolitik (eastern policy) which was
supported by the West. Behind the scenes Erhard's Foreign
Minister, Gerhard Schroeder, actually paved the way for the
... Continued...
agreement--thus insuring that no deal would be made over the
Germany's head. See "Way Free for United Germany to be
Member of NATO," Der Tagesspeigel, 15 July 1990 in The
German Tribune, 22 July 1990, p. 1.
4°Catherine Kelleher, "The Defense Policy of the Federal
Republic of Germany," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R.
Viotti, eds., The Defense Policies of Nations (John Hopkins
University, 1982), pp. 273-274. The Soviets made it clear
that they would not participate in the NPT if NATO adopted
the MLF.
'
1Hanrieder, pp. 25-27. The Erhard government did not
want to accept the NPT because of a possible loss of
bargaining power with Moscow, and the FRG wanted to maintain
the possibility of participation in an allied force of co-
ownership.
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Grand Coalition and the beginnings of the SPD's
Ostpolitik. 42
4. Time to Initiate a Change, 1966-1969
The Grand Coalition (1966-1969) changed crucial
parts of Adenauer's Ostpolitik. The Coalition provided the
first steps to the two-state theory by establishing
communications with the GDR through a mutual renunciation of
force agreement and acceptance of the GDR as the
effective--but not legitimate--government of East Germany.
The Coalition also shelved the Hallstein Doctrine, began
opening relations with Eastern Europe, and recognized the
need to address the border question. 4 3  Unfortunately, the
formation of the "new Ostpolitik" under the Grand Coalition
was still half-hearted and did not go far enough to reassure
the finality of the Eastern borders. 4 4  In addition, the
foreign policy of the Grand Coalition still did not
recognize the existence of the GDR which remained a
stumbling block in East-West relations.
In security policy the scene was still dominated by
the need to prevent Soviet aggression which was embodied in
a new strategy (1967) called "Flexible Response" (MC-14/3).
FRG security still relied heavily on the nuclear weapons
guarantee provided by the United States, but as the Soviets
4 2 Karl Kaiser, "The New Ostpolitik," in West German
Foreign Policy, 1949-1979, pp. 146, 149.
4"Ibid., p. 149.
44Joffe, "The View From Bonn," pp. 145-147.
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reached parity in nuclear weapons the old strategy of
massive retaliation came into question. It was only natural
for the United States to seek a credible strategy that did
not ensure the destruction of all of the continental U.S. in
order to defend Western Europe. However, the new strategy
of flexible response was questionable from the time of its
inception. Josef Joffe effectively addresses the paradox of
nuclear alliances:
Nuclear weapons have become the ultima ratio . . .
because they leave neither users nor targets behind.
From this inescapable fact it follows that nuclear
alliances, were they to obey only the pure logic of
deterrence, rest on the frailest of foundations.
Protectors will not make good on their pledges if the
price of loyalty is annihilation. 45
Yet Germany had little control over the situation because of
the Soviet threat and U.S. treatment of the FRG as a "junior
partner" in decision-making. The Nuclear Planning Group
(NPG) was established in the late 1960s to assure European
and German participation in the nuclear decision-making
process. 4 0 However, to this day conflict still exists as to
when to employ nuclear weapons. The United States would
prefer to wait as long as possible to buy time at the
expense of German terLitory, yet the quick use of nuclear
weapons ensures mass destruction on West German soil. In
addition, the United States would prefer to keep the war
limited to Europe while the FRG would prefer (should
4'Joffe, The Limited Partnership, p. 46.
4OKelleher, pp. 270, 275.
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deterrence fail) a quick escalation to global war with a
nuclear exchange over the heads of the European countries.
In summary, the Grand Coalition set the groundwork
for the Ostpolitik of the SPD but did not go far enough in
establishing relations with Eastern Europe and the GDR. In
security policy the Grand Coalition accepted the NATO
doctrine of flexible response, but in the age of nuclear
weapons and the Soviet threat even this new strategy had its
limits should deterrence ever fail. The problem of nuclear
strategies continues to this day, and there was little that
the Grand Coalition could do to change the situation. In
foreign policy, however, the Grand Coalition did provide the
needed steps for a significant break from Adenauer's
Ostpolitik and the introduction of the SPD's Ostpolitik.
5. The SPD's Ostpolitik, 1969-1982
The SPD's Ostpolitik from 1969-1982 embodied the
following foreign policy objectives: 1) shelving of the
Hallstein Doctrine, 2) the abandonment of German unity
through Alleinvertretungsanspruch (the FRG claim to sole
representation of both East and West Germany), 3)
recognition of the GDR and the eastern borders, and finally
4) the pursuit of an active detente policy in solving the
German question.4" The new policy toward the East was a
culmination of German frustration with the status quo. Over
the long term the Social Democrats believed that the only
4'Kaiser, p. 147.
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means of changing the status quo and the division of Germany
(and Europe) was first to accept it and then attempt to
change and improve the internal conditions in the GDR and
the plight of the East German people. More important, these
objectives were to be obtained only through peaceful means.
The paradox of establishing meaningful links with
Eastern Europe and the GDR was that the threat also came
from the East. In essence, inner-German detente required
regional detente, and regional detente required global
detente. By the late 1970s global detente between the
superpowers broke down, and eventually Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt was unable effectively to balance defense and
detente and still hold the SPD/FDP coalition together. 4 0
rhe need to counter Soviet SS-20s with NATO's
proposed intermediate range nuclear force (INF) and the
desire to maintain detente in the face of a growing Soviet
threat caused a split between the conservative and left-wing
factions of the SPD as well as an exodus of many SPD members
to the Green party in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Essentially, Schmidt was unable to accommodate a growing
left-wing fringe element in the late 1970s when he clearly
had to sacrifice some elements of detente (especially with
the Soviet Union) in favor of NATO's INF deployments to




downfall in 1982, and the return of the CDU/CSU/FDP
coalition.1"
In the final analysis, the SPD's OstpolitLu: gave the
FRG more maneuvering room in foreign and security policy.
The SPD's Ostpolitik allowed the Federal Republic to deal
with the German question of unity through a long-term
solution, and Ostpolitik gave the FRG a unique foreign
policy role in Europe--a Western European bridge to Eastern
Europe via the FRG. While in power, the policies of the SPD
were tempered by the coalition FDP (Free Democrats). Led by
the FRG's Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FDP
played a key role as a balancer of SPD Ostpolitik (and later
Kohl's CDU/CSU policies). The FDP tended to tilt "either
left, when in coalition with the CDU/CSU, or right, when
joining forces with the SPD." 0  Therefore, Genscher
"emphasized alliance obliqations over detente, Ostpolitik,
and arms control" near the end of the SPD's period of
government (1974-1982). Likewise, Genscher championed the
"See William E. Griffith, "The Security Policy of the
SPD and the Greens in the FRG," pp. 1-20; and Werner
Kaltefleiter, "German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Political
Framework," pp. 21-39, both in Security Perspectives of the
SPD and Greens in Opposition (Pergamon-Brassey's
International Defense Publications, 1989).
50 Josef Joffe, ". ie View From Bonn: The Tacit Alliance,"
in Lincoln Gordon, ed., Eroding Empire: Western Relations
with Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institute, 19C7), p. 173.
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goals of detente and Ostpolitik as part of the CDU/CSU/FDP
coalition after 1982.B1
FRG foreign and security policies, free of some
constraints, allowed Chancellor Schmidt and later Chancellor
Helmut Kohl (both with the balancing influence of the FDP
under Genscher), to utilize the FRG's greater power
potential. Unfortunately, the conditions for the
implementation of a "two plus four" process for German unity
(like that of 1990) did not yet exist. The "big four"
controlled German sovereignty through occupation rights, the
GDR was legitimized and recognized by the FRG, and the Cold
War in general all prevented substantial progress toward
German unity in any forr, other than the two states and one
nation theory.
Bonn's polic.es still were constrained by the Soviet
threat and the neea for the U.S. link to counter that
threat.52  The paradox was that East-West tension could not
aid Bonn's effort to improve detente, and an independent
course of active ditente brought fears of a new Rapallo or
Finlandization of Germany by Western allies.5 3 The delicate
balancing act continued under the new conservative coalition
from 1982 to 1985, but the threat of the FRG leaning further
toward detente at the expense of defense was over with the
91 Ibid.
9
2David Calleo, "Germany and the Balance of Power," in
West German Foreign Policy, p. 12.
"
3 Kaiser, p. 155.
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introduction of INF. The disruptive peace movements
initiated by the West German far left against INF (which
threatened the FRG's commitment to NATO) lost momentum and
dissolved after the deployment of Pershing Ils and GLCMs
(ground-launched cruise missiles). The conservatives
reconfirmed the NATO security bond and the Western link
through the INF deployment.
6. The CDU Back in Power, 1983-1985
With the CDU back in power, one may have expected a
major change in the Ostpolitik introduced by the Social
Democrats over a decade earlier. However, the CDU/CSU/FDP
conservative coalition--under the leadership of Chancellor
Helmut Kohl (beginning in 1983) and the balancing influence
of Foreign Minister Genscher--continued ties with the GDR
and actually strengthened relations with East Germany. In
addition, a firm FRG commitment to NATO also was
reconfirmed.
In foreign policy relations with the East the Kohl
government increased high-level visits to East Berlin on a
scale unseen before in the history of inner-German
relations. This policy is in stark contrast to the mostly
dissenting votes by the CDU/CSU in the early 1970s against
the SPD's Ostpolitik and the Eastern Treaties. 4 This close
5 4"Although the majority of the CDU voted against the
treaties embodying the SPD Eastern policy while in
opposition, they took up that policy with alacrity after
assuming power." Jonathan Dean, Watershed in Europe:
Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation (Lexington:
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relationship with the GDR naturally upset the FRG's allies
because of possible coercion by the Soviet Union, but even
at the height of superpower tensions in 1983 during the INF
deployment crisis, Kohl and Genscher dealt with the GDR, the
Soviet Union, and the allies in an effective manner.
Kohl reaffirmed NATO commitments and reassured the
allies through a positive stand for INF deployment in the
face of an intense Soviet intimidation campaign against INF.
It can be deduced that once again the Soviets were
responsible for ensuring the West German commitment to NATO
by aiding Kohl and the CDU by splitting (unintentionally)
the SPD party which led to a conservative election victory
in 1983. 5
In summary, the Kohl government between 1983 and
1985 effectively dealt with the problems of detente and
defense in a balanced manner. West Germany showed the
ability to display a substantial amount of leadership by
continuing an active detente policy with the GDR, resisting
intimidation by the Soviets, and reaffirming the NATO
commitment with the deployment of INF. The FRG's influence
...Continued...
D.C. Heath and Company, 1987), p. 242. For more background
on the Hallstein Doctrine, see Gordon, Eroding Empire, pp.
43, 57, 85, 128, 132, 144, 147. For background on the FRG-
GDR Treaty of 1973, see Treaty on the Relations Between the
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973).
"Dean, p. 84.
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was definitely on the rise but not yet as prevalent during
the period as the influence displayed by the FRG in 1989 and
1990.
F. SUMMARY OF THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE TO 1985
Through the historical perspective, the evolution of
Germany's position in Central Europe and its role in
European relations shows several important phases which
distinctly separate the character of European statecraft of
yesterday from the situation that exists today. The rise of
Prussia as a great power, and the role Prussia played in the
unification of Germany and the maintenance of the balance of
power established the foundation upon which German foreign
and security policy was based until after 1945. Germany's
survival in Central Europe was based on the Prussian model
which included a highly efficient and regimented
bureaucracy, a theory of state, and an army second to none
(the latter providing the key to the whole). The two World
Wars were the result of German attempts to define itself as
a European and world power in the same context that
established Prussia as one of the great powers: the use of
force and adherence to expansionism as a method to obtain
political gain and territorial objectives.
The two World Wars demonstrated the horrible outcome of
Germany's search in the first half of the 20th century for a
position in Central Europe and its role in European
relations. After World War II the centerpiece of the
50
quagmire in Central Europe was still Germany. The division
of the Central European power after the war did not solve
the problem, but it did allow time for West Germany to take
a different course and develop a responsible role in
European relations. In the context of division and
bipolarity the FRG established a democracy, integrated with
the West, and reemerged as a European and potential world
leader.
While many pessimists, such as John Mearsheimer, still
harbor great distrust in regard to a unified Germany in
Central Europe and the end of the Cold War, this distrust
appears largely unfounded after examining the course that
German foreign and security poIicy has taken since World War
II.10 During the post-war era West Germany slowly gained a
degree of influence in Europe in the reilm of foreign and
security policy, and the FRG accomplished those goals
through a successful integration with the West--not by
pursuing a unilateral "see-saw" policy. The FRG attained
unity through cooperation, not through the threat of force.
If one examines FRG foreign policy during the Cold War, it
is not overly optimistic to assume that Germany's leadership
'John Mearsheimer argues that hypernationalism may
reemerge both in Eastern and Western Europe, Germany will
probably arm itself with nuclear weapons, and the world will
miss the stability of the Cold War. Mearsheimer, "Why We
Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic Community
Quarterly (August 1990): pp. 35-50.
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role in Europe will be more responsible than the policies of
the German past prior to 1945:
A larger Germany will not become Greater Germany. It
will not engage in international politics on its own
account and at its own risk, but only within the larger
institutional and organizational framework into which
the Federal Republic of Germany . . . has grown during
the past forty years.B7
The FRG did not have the leadership position and maneuvering
room that was attained in the last few years, but this was
due to the bipolar situation in Europe exemplified by the
geographic position of Germany, the threat posed by the
Soviet Union, and the need for a strong U.S. commitment to
defend against that threat.
Germany's relative strength in European affairs
increased dramatically with the breakdown of bipolarity and
released West Germany from many of the constraints that
characterized the Cold War. The evolution of diplomatic
relations in Europe between 1985 and 1990 maximized the
FRG's mission as a catalyst and bridge for Western values to
flow from West to East. More important, the imperceptible
changes that occurred between 1985 and 1988 led directly to
the revolutionary events of 1989 and 1990, and those events
clearly demonstrated Germany's emergence as a leader in
Europe and potentially a leader in the world.
7
"Theo Sommer, "Waiting to See What Sort of Figure the
New Nation Will Cut on the World Stage," Die Zeit, 21
September 1990, in The German Tribune, 7 October 1990, p. 4.
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III. GERMANY'S EMERGENCE AS A LEADER, 1985-1990
One might speculate on how historians will look back on
the events of 1989 and 1990 one hundred years from today.
No person can predict the future, but it seems likely that
renown historians will reach a consensus that the
revolutions of 1989 and 1990 that swept across Eastern
Europe will rank among the many great turning points of the
past. History books may reflect that consensus with
chapters entitled "The French Revolution of 1789, The
European Revolutions of 1848, The Communist Revolution of
1917, the NAZI Revolution of the 1930s, and The European
Revolutions of 1989." However, the events of 1989 and 1990
cannot be analyzed in isolation from the changes which
occurred in the years just prior to the collapse of the
Berlin wall and German unification.
Each of the above mentioned revolutions had a period of
transition before the monumental episodes occurred. The
same holds true for the revolutions of 1989 and 1990 and
Germany's unification and reemergence as a European and
world power. An examination of the sequence of events which
led to Germany's unification and new leadership position
would not be complete without first analyzing the subtle
changes that developed in European and world relations from
1985 to 1988.
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A. THE SEEDS OF A NEW ERA IN EUROPEAN STATECRAFT, 1985-1988
On 9 July 1990, President George Bush declared the 16th
meeting of the seven industrialized democracies as "the
first economic summit conference of the 'post-postwar
era.'' The West finally admitted that perhaps the Cold
War was "officially" concluded. The end of 45 years of
tense confrontation interspersed with short periods of
detente did not occur in a vacuum void of a transitional
period. Arguments continue to persist concerning why the
Cold War ended and who should get the credit. One assertion
is that the U.S. policy of containment, instituted after
World War II, forced a change in Soviet foreign policy:
The Cold War has dominated American foreign policy
for four decades. For all of this time the American aim
has been to encourage fundamental changes in the Soviet
Union's relations with the rest of the world. For forty
years the West has waited for signs of such changes.
Now they have begun to appear. 5 9
Another argument gives substantial credit to Soviet
President Michael Gorbachev for the dramatic change in East-
West relations:
He [Gorbachev] holds out a vision of a greatly
demilitarized East-West relationship in which the
balance between competition and cooperation will have
Swung sharply toward the cooperative pole in an
increasingly interdependent world. .... 6*
54R.W. Apple, Jr., "A New Balance of Power," The New York
Times, 12 July 1990, p. A-1.
!oMichael Mandelbaum, "Ending the Cold War," Foreign
Affairs 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): p. 16.
•
0Abraham S. Becker and Arnold C. Hordic, Managing
U.S./Soviet Relations in the 1990s (Santa Monica: The Rand
Corporation, 1989), p. 31.
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None of the leaders in the principle countries of the
alliance are as politically radical, visionary or
adventurous as Gorbachev.61
Both arguments have merit and both may thus be correct.
The policy of containment forced the Soviet Union to make
fundamental concessions in foreign policy, but those changes
may not have occurred in a peaceful context or as rapid as
they did without the visionary and bold policies executed by
Gorbachev--policies which eventually had a direct and long-
lasting impact on the FRG and the GDR.
1. Gorbachev's New Course, 1985-1988
Gorbachev embarked on a bold campaign to achieve a
new era of East-West detente. Gorbachev's primary means of
attaining the goals of perestroika (a restructuring of the
Soviet economy) was through the relaxation of tensions. The
INF Treaty in 1987 eliminated intermediate range nuclear
forces from Europe, contributed to world detente, and opened
new doors to regional detente. The treaty also increased an
already strong inner-German detente, which Chancellor Kohl
and East German leader Erich Honecker had refused to give up
even during the breakdown of East-West relations during the
INF crisis of 1983. More important was an obvious change of
course in Soviet foreign policy initiated by Gorbachev. His
reversal on the INF issue was monumental and possibly
signaled his acknowledgement that past Soviet foreign policy
O2Richard K. Betts, "NATO's Midlife Crisis," Foreign
Affairs 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989): p. 36.
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decisions had not been in the best interests of either the
Soviet Union or the world. It appeared as if Gorbachev
recognized Stalin's contribution to the creation of NATO,
the effect of Sputnik on the U.S. arms buildup under
Kennedy, and the negative impact of the SS-20 deployment on
detente in Europe.6
2
In addition to new and aggressive arms control
initiatives exemplified by the INF Treaty, Gorbachev also
embarked on a diplomatic campaign to win the favor of
Western Europe and increase the Soviet Union's political
influence in the major countries of NATO. Initially,
Gorbachev's focus was on the United Kingdom and France.
This was probably due to Gorbachev's displeasure with the
FRG's decision to back the INF deployment and a fear (among
his top advisors in 1985 and early 1986) of German
revanchism.62
Beginning in mid-1986, Gorbachev's diplomatic
efforts shifted to improving relations with the FRG. He
placed most of his efforts in high-level meetings with
members of the opposition party, the Social Democrats (SPD),
and the conservative coalition partner, the Free Democrats
(FDP). Between April 1986 and July 1988 the majority of
2 David M. Abshire, Preventing World War III: A Realistic
Grand Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 159.
Also see Jonathan Dean, Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the
East-West Military Confrontation (Lexington: Lexington
Books, 1987), p. 86.
"Soviet-West German Relations: A New Chapter (Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, 1988), p. 1.
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high level meetings between West Germany and the Soviet
Union included prominent members of both the FDP and SPD:
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP chairman),
Hans-Jochen Vogel (SPD chairman), Johannes Rau (Prime
Minister of North-Rhine Westphalia and deputy chairman of
the SPD), Willy Brandt (SPD honorary chairman), and Oskar
Lafontaine (Prime Ainister of the Saarland and the SPD's
1990 Chancellor candidate).
Bonn, with its powerhouse economy and undisputed
weight in Europe's 1992 unification goals, became the focal
point of Gorbachev's effort to change the economic burden
imposed by the Eastern European countries. Bonn also
provided a trade partner for the Soviet Union in need of a
technology fix. As a result of Gorbachev's new policies,
the FRG's foreign and security policies entered a stressful
period as the Kohl government adjusted to the new era in
East-West relations that emerged.
2. The Effects of Gorbachev's policies on the FRG
The constraints imposed on West Germany's foreign
and security policies were due primarily to the Soviet
Union's threatening posture. With the reduction in bipolar
tensions a certain amount of stress was placed on the FRG's
foreign and security policies, because the basis of the Kohl
government's approach was a continued drive for change in
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the GDR through peaceful means while at the same time
insuring the maintenance of strong ties with the West:
The inner-German policy of the Kohl government . is
premised on continued German membership in NATO and a
genuinely close alliance relationship as an
indispensable requirement for a long-term German effort
to influence developments in the GDR.6 4
Gorbachev's European initiatives and the INF Treaty improved
the goal of peaceful change in the GDR, but the maintenance
of a strong NATO commitment began to erode.
The INF Treaty created another situation in which it
appeared that the superpowers had made a deal over the
German's heads--just as had occurred during the MLF and NPT
controversy of the 1960s. It seemed inconceivable to all of
the European governments that the United States would
eliminate all INF weapons in Europe for which those
governments (especially the FRG) had fought so hard to
obtain. Beyond the political price that Western Europe paid
for the INF deployment in 1983, there was still the problem
of intra-alliance coupling and an overwhelming Soviet
conventional superiority. 90
In addition, the INF Treaty added the increased
impetus in some circles of the German government and in




SNF (short range nuclear forces) from German soil.66 The INF
Treaty and proposals for the elimination of SNF did not bode
well for the FRG's security policy which had vested a great
deal of energy into the maintenance of strong NATO ties
through SNF and INF coupling. Arguments against NATO
strategy were logical with the elimination of INF (and not
SNF), since a nuclear response with only short-range weapons
meant that the age-old axiom applied: the shorter the
range, the deader the Germans. Adjustments in NATO strategy
had to be investigated if the FRG's strong alliance ties
were to be maintained.
Gorbachev's arms control and diplomatic initiatives
also had the effect of increasing the SPD's influence as the
opposition party in the FRG's government. Although the
long-range effects of the SPD influence was minimal, SPD
policies did become a matter of concern--especially in the
area of security. The SPD advocated radical changes in
security policy and a firm break from the SPD compromise
platform of alliance with the West which was laid down in
Bad Godesberg in 1959. The new SPD changes laid down in
1987 included the following immediate, unilateral goals: 1)
replacement of the Soviet threat with a "security
partnership" with Moscow; 2) Strukturelle
Nichtangriffsfahigkeit (the structural incapacity to
66William Kaltefleiter, "German Foreign Policy: The
Domestic Political Framework," in Security Perspectives of
the West German Left (McLean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey's
International Defense publishers, 1989), p. 38.
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attack--meaning a purely non-nuclear, defensive strategy);
3) intensification of arms control, including a nuclear
weapons free zone in Germany), 4) restructure of the
integrated command to include a European second pillar
(under Franco-German leadership), and 5) continued contacts
and negotiations with Eastern bloc ruling parties, and the
subordination of contacts with dissidents in those
countries. While some of the above proposals have a certain
amount of validity after German unification, they should be
part of an agreed upon NATO strategy--not a unilateral
attempt to change East-West relations as proposed by the SPD
in 1987.
It appeared that Gorbachev's European initiatives
and foreign policy toward the FRG (especially in arms
control) had perhaps overburdened the leadership of West
9
Germany since the INF Treaty in 1987.5- However, as the
events of 1989 and 1990 clearly show, the Kohl government
demonstrated a remarkable degree of resilience and
leadership on the road to German unification.
B. THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION AND GERMANY'S EMERGENCE AS A
LEADER, 1989-1990
On L October 1990 the unification of East and West
Germany was complete after 45 years of division.
Unification signaled a new era of East-West relations and a
O'Kaltefleiter, p. 37.
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new era of German leadership on the Continent. As a result
of Germany's new leadership role in Europe, Germany also
takes on a leadership role in the world.
One must not forget that unification took place in the
context of an Eastern European revolution against communism
which began in Poland in July 1989 and then spread across
Eastern Europe to Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
finally Rumania in December of 1989. Some of the
revolutions in Eastern Europe may eventually fail, and non-
democratic, hard-line governments may reemerge. For
example, the outlook for Rumanian democracy does not appear
optimistic. Such a reversal does not, however, seem likely
in the case of East Germany which is now part of united
Germany. The GDR has been dissolved and is presently being
integrated into the solid economic, political, and
institutional structure of the FRG. The German people, both
East and West, decided their best interest was in
unification: one state and one nation. The chance of Erich
Honecker (the former GDR communist party leader) returning
to reestablish a communist East Germany is indeed extremely
remote.
This section focuses on the events of 1)89 and 1990 in
relation to the emergence of united Germany. The factors
which restrained the Federal Republic's diplomatic
maneuvering room--such as Soviet intentions and the need for
the U.S. nuclear and conventional commitment--still remain,
but those factors have been severely muted. The events of
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1989 and 1990 provided the needed stimuli to vault Germany
into the limelight of European security affairs by reducing
the Cold War bipolarity and creating a new era of "super
detente" required for Germany's new leadership position.
The progression of events that led to unification
exemplifies the new leadership that Germany has obtained.
As events unfolded in 1989 and 1990, it became clear that
neither superpower (or their allies) was in control of the
German question any longer. As Christoph Bertram,
Diplomatic Correspondent of the German weekly Die Zeit noted
in the Spring of 1990:
West Germany's NATO allies as well as the Soviet Union
have made repeated attempts to chart a course for the
unfolding events: at the Soviet-American Malta summit
of December 1989, at repeated top meetings of the EC
[European Community], in bilateral talks and--at the
instigation of the Soviet Union--at a special convened
meeting in Berlin of the Four Powers' Allied Control
Council and, more recently, at the Ottawa East-West
Conference in February 1990.40
The Bonn government increasingly took over the de facto
unification as the "big four" continued to debate over the
details of how a united Germany would fit into the future
security equation of Central Europe--a debate which
gradually became irrelevant in the political context that
emerged during 1989 and 1990:
. . . The rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers
have not only been diluted or transferred to the two
German states over the decades; more important, they are
essentially rooted in the right of conquest and reflect
66Christoph Bertram, "The German Question," Foreign
Affairs 69, no. 2 (Spring 1990): p. 58.
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a world very different from the political realities of
today.6'
The political value of economic potency and geographic
position is bound to soar as the previously dominant
assets of power--the ultima ratio of military force--are
scaled down or withdrawn from Europe.70
Early in 1990 arguments continued to persist that
projected the -chedule for German unity over a period of
years. In January 1990, for example, Dr. Koch, a Bonn
government representative, believed that the economic and
political situation in the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
was so severe that the unification process would be
stretched out over a period of five to ten years. 7 2 Many
experts shared Koch's argument by stressing t' t unification
would be slowed due to the technical difficulties of
monetary union and which article of the FRG Basic Law (23 or
146) would apply to unification. 7 2
Even in early 1990 those opinions on the speed of unity
seemed pessimistic in light of rapidly changing events that
suggested otherwise. The following months proved those
opinions to be incorrect: monetary union was approved and
"'Ronald D. Asmus, "A United Germany," Foreign Affairs
69, no. 2 (Spring 1990): p. 69.
7°Josef Joffe, "Once More: The German Question,"
Survival 32, no. 2 (March-April 1990): p. 136.
7
"Michael Koch, Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School
on German Unification, 26 January 1990. Dr. Koch is a
Federal Republic Consul to the United States.
'12 Bertram, p. 49; Forest Studebaker, Unpublished notes
from lecture on 12 April 1990 at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California.
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implemented by July 2990; article 23 of the FRG Basic Law
was used for political unification; and all-German elections
will take place in December 1990.7 3  One might question why
so many experts in the field failed to admit the emerging
reality of rapid unification. Perhaps the failure to
visualize rapid unification was due to the ingrained
mentality of the Cold War, but more likely it was a simple
failure to observe and understand that the German people
were making the difference. Chancellor Helmut Kohl best
described the East G-rman plight as early as 22 August 1989
during the East German exodus from Eastern Europe:
From what the people (East Germans) now reaching the
West are sajing, we know that it is above all the
rigidity of the system there and the lack of any hope
for change that is leading them to turn their backs on
East Germany .... 74
The German's saw unification as the only means of stemming
the disruption caused by East German economic and political
turmoil as well as solving German and European long-term,
East-West problems.
13For details on monetary union and initial SPD
opposition, see Ferdinand Protzman, "Germanys Take Up
Approval of Pact on Economic Union," The New York Times, 14
May 1990, p. A-l; and Serge Schmemann, "Opposition in Bonn
Adds a New Hurdle to Union," The New York Times, 22 May
1990, p. A-6. For Article 23 of the Basic Law see Bertram,
p. 49; and Captain Michael Freney, Lecture at the Naval
Postgraduate School, 26 April 1990. For Kohl's push for
December elections see Ferdinand Protzman, "All German Vote
Could Come in 1990," The New York Times, 15 May 1990, p. A-
1.
"4"West Germany Closes Its Embassy in Prague," The New
York Times, 23 August 1989, p. 2.
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A concise review of events from December 1988 to the
present is required to emphasize the rapidity of change that
has taken place. This resulted in German unity almost as a
fait accompli, and with German unity the architectural
foundation may well be set for the future European security
order.
1. The United Nations Speech, December 1988
Perhaps the first indication that Germany, in
particular the FRG, was becoming the centerpiece of events
for 1989 and 1990 was Gorbachev's United Nations speech on 7
December 1988. His announcement of unilateral troop
reductions in Europe was more than just a gesture of good
will and continued glasnost for President Bush's
inauguration in January."5 Not only did the announcement by
Gorbachev demonstrate a degree of proof of Soviet "new
thinking", but it also signaled the beginning of a new
battle for public opinion which eventually centered on the
FRG. Bush became concerned that the Soviets were attempting
to play the "German card" that would exchange German
neutrality for unification.'6
7Bernard E. Trainor, "Soviet Leaders Debating Shape of
a Future soviet Army," The New York Times, 31 July 1989, p.
A-4. The announced reduction of 500,00 troops in the Soviet
Army and a withdrawal of 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe
still left the USSR with a potent offensive force. See also
Michael R. Gordon, "Congress Inspects a Soviet Pullback,"
The New York Times, 9 August 1989, p. A-6.
'*Jim Hoagland, "Europe's Destiny," Foreign Affairs 69,
no. 1 (1990): p. 43.
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Bush's fear concerning the FRG's role in NATO began
to materialize in May 1989 during the Lance debate."
Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, bowing to political
demands within the government, allowed Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher to push for immediate negotiations on
short-range missiles (SNF) in Europe. A heated debate
ensued, and a compromise was reached at the NATO summit in
late May to put off modernization of Lance until 1992. The
NATO summit (most such summits are well-orchestrated events)
revealed a new strain in the Western alliance.7 0
The Lance debate again demonstrated the balancing
influence of Genscher and the FDP in West German domestic
and foreign policy. While Kohl attempted to hold firm to a
NATO commitment for the upgrade of SNF, Genscher swung to
the left, emphasized detente, and advocated a new approach
to East-West zelations through the rejection of NATO plans
to upgrade SNF. It appeared that the Genscher approach
pacified the left in the FRG during the crisis. Certainly
Genscher's call for negotiations was more in tune with the
political and military realities emerging in East-West
relations. A cooperative atmosphere was rising between East
7 7 Lance is part of NATO's SNF (short-range nuclear
force). The elimination of Lance would have required major
changes in N)TO's nuclear strategy dating back to 1967--a
change that NATO was not prepared to make in May 1989.
16For details on the Lance debate, see James A. Markham,
"Bush Arrives for Talks With a Divided NATO," The New York
Times, 29 May 1989, p. A-6; and "NATO Chiefs Agree to a
Compromise in Missile Dispute," The New York Times, 31 May
1989, p. A-i.
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and West and the Lance upgrade seemed to have little value
after the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces
(INF). SNF, if employed in war, primarily insured the
destruction of East and West Germany--the shorter the range
the deader the Germans. In addition, SNF alone did not
provide coupling to the U.S. strategic arsenal as did INF,
so the West's continued reluctance to use SNF in arms
reduction did not appear to be in German interest.
The West naturally felt that Gorbachev was
attempting to single out the FRG and sever the West German
link to NATO. Perhaps Gorbachev did have a master plan
directed at the FRG and playing of the "German Card." If
so, that plan became more apparent with his visit to West
Germany in mid-June 1989.
2. The Joint Declaration and the Strasbourg
Address, June-July 1989
There was no doubt of the FRG's importance in
Gorbachev's "new thinking" after his West German visit in
June 1989, and the West Germans themselves began, perhaps,
to envision a new leadership role for Bonn in superpower
relations. In the West German streets crowds shouted,
"Gorby! Gorbyt," and in some government offices the new word
was "Fuhrungsrolle--a new leadership role.""9
"*Serge Schmemann, "Bonn Wooed From 2 Sides," The New
York Times, 18 June 1989, p. A-19.
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The Joint Declaration signed by Kohl and Gorbachev
emphasized continued arms control efforts, suggested the
right of states to determine their own sovereignty, and
indicated a new era had emerged in German and Soviet
relations. The new vision included:
Unqualified respect for the integrity and security of
every state, which has the right to choose freely its
own political and social system,
. . . In the desire to establish a lasting
relationship of reliable good-neighborliness, they (the
FRG and USSR] intend to take up the good traditions of
their centuries-old history. .... 00
The Joint Declaration, combined with Gorbachev's vague hints
that the Berlin wall did not have to last forever, signaled
the possibility for German unification in the distant
future. Gorbachev stated:
The wall was raised in a concrete situation and was
not dictated only by evil intentions, . . . East Germany
decided this as its sovereign right, and the wall can
disappear when those conditions that created it fall
away, . . .83
Gorbachev's Strasbourg address in July of 1989
Jarred open the door to unification by declaring the right
of Eastern Europe to determine its own future. One key
statement in the address was as follows:
. . . The affiliation of the states of Europe to
different social systems is a reality, . . . Any
interference in internal affairs, any attempts to limit
a Joint Declaration by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, Bonn, June 13, 1989,
text furnished by the German Information Center, New York.
8'Serge Schmemann, "A Gorbachev Hint for Berlin Wall,"
The New York Times, 16 June 1989, p. A-i.
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the sovereignty of states, both of friends and allies,
no matter whose it is, is impermissible.0
2
While the above statement can be interpreted as a
reiteration of the status quo in Eastern Europe, it can also
be regarded as an initial opening for dramatic change in
some of the Eastern European governments:
Gorbachev's phrasing was ambiguous since it could
apply to both capitalist and communist countries. But
even the suggestion that Soviet bloc nations such as
Poland or Hungary might eventually elect noncommunist or
capitalist-oriented governments would have been regarded
as ideological heresy in the Kremlin just a few years
ago. 3
Skeptics dismissed Gorbachev's statements as typical Soviet
propaganda with hollow meaning and no chance of actually
occurring, but the Hungarian and Polish situation forced the
world to reconsider Soviet sincerity with respect to Eastern
Europe.
4
Prior to his Strasbourg speech, Gorbachev may have
been in control of events. He almost created a serious rift
in NATO with his cooperative arms control initiatives which
resulted in the Lance debate, and he made positive inroads
9 2 Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the Council of Europe, 6
July 1989, in the British Broadcasting Corporation; Summary
of World Broadcasts, 11 July 1989, p. 3.
*"Michael Dobbs and Edward Cody, "Gorbachev Seeks Talks
on Europe," The Washington Post, 7 July 1989, p. A-4.
04poland ended 40 years of one-party rule on 24 August
1989 by electing Tadeusz Mazowiecki to be Prime Minister, a
Catholic Solidarity member. See John Tagliabue, "For Poland,
New Era and New Premier," The New York Times, 25 August
1989, p. A-4. The Hungarians had opened the border with
Austria in May and dismantled the barbed wire fence between
the two countries by mid-July 1989.
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with the West German public during his successful visit to
Bonn in June. For the most part, Gorbachev's success had
required little real sacrifice by the Soviet Union in
Eastern Europe. There were no serious arms control
concessions and Eastern Europe was still under Soviet
domination, but after his address it soon became clear that
the pace of change in Eastern Europe represented a loss of
control by the Soviet Union.
The Soviets would have preferred that Eastern Europe
remain in the socialist camp, the Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) not dissolve, and German unity not occur (at least not
as a member of NATO). However, Gorbachev's reforms required
Western cooperation, and that cooperation could only be
obtained by a relaxation of tensions and an end to the Cold
War. As Michael Mandelbaum stated in the Spring of 1989:
Ending the Cold War requires ending the Soviet threat to
Western Europe, which requires ending Soviet subjugation
of Eastern Europe, which means allowing the people of
that part of the world to decide freely how to govern
themselves. The principal requirement for the end of
the Cold War, in short, is self determination for
Eastern Europe.05
Therefore, Gorbachev chose not to suppress the changes in
Eastern Europe in order to pursue a new course which might
eventually aid the Soviet Union's desperate economic
predicament.
OsMandelbaum, "Ending the Cold War," p. 21.
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Inaction on the part of Gorbachev led to an
unbridled chain of events in 1989 and 1990 which included
German unification--all of which were beyond Soviet control
by any means other than the use of force. The door swung
wide open to new possibilities for unification starting with
the East German exodus from Eastern Europe in the summer of
1989, the fall of the Berlin wall (9 November 1989), and
continued through to monetary union (1 July 1990) and German
unification (3 October 1990). Change increasingly came on
the FRG's terms as the Soviets forfeited Eastern Europe.
3. The Exodus and Race to Monetary Union,
August 1989-July 1990
The Hungarians opened the border with Austria in May
1989, and in late August the Hungarian border guards no
longer tried to stop the exodus of East Germans crossing
into Austria. By mid-September, 1989, the Austro-Hungarian
frontier was completely removed, and tens of thousands of
East Germans fled to the West through Hungary as well as via
the West German embassies in Prague and Warsaw--the GDR was
in a crisis situation.*'
Gorbachev met with East Germany's General Secretary,
Erich Honecker, in East Berlin for the 40th anniversary of
the founding of the GDR on 6 October 1989. Honecker
OSee David Childs, "East Germany: Coping With
Gorbachev," Current History 88, no. 541 (November 1989): p.
388; Serge Schmemann, "Refugees in Prague to Leave for
West," The New York Times, 4 October, 1989, p. A-i; and
Ferdinand Protzman, "Bonn Closes Office to Would-be
Emigres," The New York Times, 9 October 1989, p. A-3.
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expected firm backing for the status quo from the Soviet
leader, but instead Gorbachev gave Honecker a vote of no
support with the following declaration: "Life punishes
those who delay.''""
These events subsequently led to the ouster of Erich
Honecker on October 18, mass demonstrations in the GDR, and
Egon Krenz's (Honecker's successor) desperate gamble to save
the East German Communist Party by opening the Berlin wall
on 9 November 1989.0 However, Krenz's position and that of
his successor, Hans Modrow, could not stem the tide of
events because of basic problems in the communist system
centered primarily )n poor economic and political conditions
(especially when compared to the FRG).0 9
Chancellor Kohl's solution for making the GDR more
livable was simple and straight forward--unification. In
Kohl's Ten-Point Program for overcoming the division of
Germany presented on 28 November 1989, he gave Gorbachev a
considerable amount of credit for events that had
transpired, but by this time it was no longer clear that
S7Hoagland, p. 38; and "German-NATO Drama: 9 Fateful
Months," The New York Times, 17 July 1990, p. A-6.
''Anne-Marie Burley, "High Stakes Poker at the Berlin
Wall," The New York Times, 13 November 1989, p. A-19; and
"Egon Krenz's 46 Days as the East Berlin Party Chief," The
New York Times, 4 December 1989, p. A-12.
'Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Urges Reform for East
Germany," The New York Times, 4 October 1989, p. A-7.
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either superpower had any control over events.' 0  It
appeared that the Bonn government and the German population
had taken control of the unification process.*"
Further evidence that Bonn controlled the German
situation was the formation of West German sister parties in
the GDR (in particular the SPD and CDU) as well as the GDR
acceptance (after the March elections in the GDR) by Lothar
de Maiziere (Prime Minister of the GDR) for a speedy
monetary union which took place on 1 July 1990.92 With the
completion of a monetary union, German unity was a fait
accompli.
O0 Helmut Kohl, "A Ten Point Program for Overcoming the
Division of Germany and Europe," presented to the Bundestag
on November 29, 1989, text furnished by the German
Information Service. The Ten Point Program was greeted with
considerable skepticism by most Germans and the "big four."
'
1 Flora Lewis, "It's Wake-Up Time," The New York Times,
13 February 1990, p. A-21; and Jima Hoagland, "Europe's
Destiny," Foreign Affairs, 69, no. 1 (1990): p. 41. Hoagland
suggests that Kohl purposely kept his 10-point plan to
himself to stake out the right of Germans to decide for
themselves.
92Kohl and de Maiziere signed the State Treaty for
monetary, economic, and social union on 18 May 1990. The
FRG's Bundestag (lower house) and the GDR's Volkskammer
approved the Treaty on 21 June, and the FRG's Bundesrat
(upper house) approved the Treaty on 22 June 1990. See Kohl
and de Maiziere, Statements by the Chancellor of the FRG and
the Prime Minister of the GDR on the signing of the State
Treaty, Bonn, 18 May 1990, text furnished by the German
Information Center, New York; "Bundesrat Approves Currency
Union Treaty," The Week in Germany, 29 June 1990, p. 1; and
"Intra-German Monetary Union in Effect," The Week in
Germany, 6 July 1990, p. 1.
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4. German Leadership at the Superpower Level: From
Ottawa to Unif -ation and the Gulf Crisis
In addition, an increased degree of control by the
Bonn government .3t the superpower level was apparent at the
Ottawa conference on 13 February 1990. The West Germans
ensured that plans for unification were resolved by the
Germans first, and then discussed by the four major powers
(the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and
France). Initially, the United Kingdom, France, and the
Soviet Union preferred that German unity be discussed among
the "big four" without German participation (a "four plus
zero" process), but the United States insisted that the
Germans be included in unification talks. After the
inclusion of the Germans in the process, both Kohl and
Genscher insisted that the German question remain confined
to the two Germanys and the "big four", thereby excluding
the need for a consensus (which might complicate
unification) by all 16 NATO nations or all 35 nations of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).9 3
The final outcome was a compromise in the German's
favor which left the issues of internal unification
(economic, political, and legal issues) up to the FRG and
GDR to decide. After the issues of internal unification
were agreed upon by the Lwo Germanys, then the external
issues corcerning European security (the size of the German
'
3 Thomas L. Friedman, "Steps to German Unity: Bonn as a
Power," The New York Times, 16 February 1990, p. A-1.
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army, NATO membership, and border guarantees) would be
discussed by all six countries. The future of Germany was
no longer at the mercy of the "big four"--Germany was
virtually free to decide the course of unification:
. the Big Four, once the undisputed overseers of
Germany's fate, found themselves having to negotiate
with Bonn as a real equal. West Germany used its weight
in world affairs, as well as the political momentum of
change within its borders and in East Germany, to help
shape many of the terms of the Ottawa framework. 9 4
With the superpower acceptance of "two plus four" and the
GDR's increased dependence on Bonn's economy, the
unification process can really be described as one plus four
(Bonn plus the big four) or perhaps four versus one (Bonn
plus the West vs. the Soviet Union). One point is clear,
the Germans increasingly took control of the unification
process.
From February to 16 July 1990, the Soviets refused
to accept a united Germany in NATO. No progress was made at
the 31 May Washington summit between Bush and Gorbachev.
However, the reality of monetary union, the tough stance by
Kohl and Bush on German membership in NATO, and financial
concessions by the FRG government to facilitate the Soviet
troop withdrawal from East Germany finally convinced
Gorbachev that German unification as a member of NATO was
inevitable and in the best interests of Europe and the




agreement for German unification as part of NATO, and on 12
September the foreign ministers of France, the United
Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Federal
Republic and the German Democrat Republic signed the treaty
that cleared the way for German unification on 3 October
1990."9 All that is left in the unification process is the
completion of free and fair all-German elections (scheduled
for 2 December 1990)--and the redrawing of the European
map.9"
Finally, Germany's new leadership position in Europe
has been recognized through the events of the Persian Gulf
Crisis which began on 1 August 1990 with Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. The WEU (Western European Union) decided on 21
August to send ships to the Persian Gulf to aid in the
enforcement of the U.N. (United Nations) embargo of Iraq.91
The FRG and now a united Germany was criticized from the
outset of the crisis from some quarters in the United States
"9R.W. Apple, "Bush and Gorbachev Discuss new Ideas on
Germany," The New York Times, 1 June 1990, p. A-i; Apple,
"Bush Hails Decision; Others Hail Bonn," The New York Times,
17 July 1990, p. A-7; Schmemann, "Gorbachev Clears Way for
German Unity," The New York Times, 17 July 1990, p. A-1; and
Hermann Dexheimer, "The New Europe: Germans Regain Chance to
Decide Their Own Destiny," The German Tribune, 23 September
1990, p. 1.
"6Although there are some constitutional details to be
worked out, the all-German elections are still rcheduled for
2 December 1990. Ada Brandes, "New Vote Ruling Divides the
Electoral System," Kolner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 10
October 1990, in The German Tribune, 21 October 1990, p. 3.
" Alan Riding, "More Europeans tr- Join Gulf Force," The
New York Times, 22 August 1990, p. A-7.
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for not contributing enough money or men and material to the
effort. U.S. politicians such as Senate Republican John
McCain and Democrat John Kerry described Germany's
contribution to the Persian Gulf as "contemptible tokenism"
(for the most part the criticism has been bipartisan).'"
Germany's Basic Law was interpreted in the past as
prohibiting German military participation in out-of-area
conflicts, and the B-nn government was never criticized.9"
Article 87a of the Basic Law stipulated that the Bundeswehr
was to be used for the defense of the FRG only, and the
majority of German officials interpret out-of-area crises as
not falling under defense of the FRG. However, there are
others in Germany, such as Rupert Scholz, that feel the
Basic Law does allow the use of the Bundeswehr in out-of-
area crises, because article 24 of the Basic Law affirms
Germany's commitment to collective security systems which
includes Germany's membership in the U.N. and any collective
action that the U.N. might undertake. 0 0
94R.S. Apple, "Bonn and Tokyo Are Criticized for Not
Bearing More of Gulf Cost," The New York Times, 13 September
1990, p. A-1.
"'The WEU sent ships to the Persian Gulf in 1987 to
protect shipping in the Iran-Iraq War. Germany, citing
constitutional limitations, sent naval forces to the
Mediterranean Sea as a demonstration of political
solidarity. Abshire, Preventing World War III, p. 127.
10 OScholtz is a former FRG Minister of Defense and
teaches constitutional law at the University of Munich.
See, Rupert Scholz, "Constitution Does not Forbid Use of
German Troops Overseas," Die Welt, 13 September 1990, in The
German Tribune, 23 September 1990.
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The Persian Gulf Crisis (1990) prompted Kohl and the
German government to investigate changing the German
Constitution in the near future to clarify Bundeswehr
participate in out-of-area ventures either under the U.N. or
WEU flag. In the meantime, Germany has contributed 3.3
billion Deutsch Marks (DM), equivalent to approximately 2.2
billion U.S. dollars, and naval and land troop carriers to
the Persian Gulf effort.1 0 ' Once again, the harsh criticism
aimed at Germany (and somewhat unwarranted given the
problems of unification) is an indication of Germany's
recognized position as a rising European and world economic
as well as military leader.1 0 2
C. SUMMARY OF GERMANY'S EMERGENCE AS A LEADER, 1985-1990
Between 1985 and 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev defined a new
course in European statecraft based on cooperation rather
than confrontaton in an effort to restructure a faltering
communist system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
This new course laid the foundation for the events of 1989
and 1990 and Germany's emergence as a leader in Europe.
The rapid pace of events from December 1988 to the
present began with Gorbachev's implementation of "new
thinking" and continued through to the Soviet forfeiture of
10"Fridhelm Kemna, "Cash, Material Support for Mission in
Gulf," General-Anzeiger, Bonn, 17 September 1990, in The
German Tribune, 30 September 1990, p. 2. One U.S. Dollar
equals 1.49 DM. The Week in Germany, 9 November 1990, p. 4.
0 2
"Bonn and Tokyo as Global Police," The New York Times,
22 October 1990, p. A-14.
78
Eastern Europe. These events resulted in Bonn's new-found
political power in shaping the future of German unification
and in turn the future of European security itself. The
speed of events and the amount of influence exerted by Kohl
and the Bonn government in the unification process testifies
to Germany's new leadership position. In addition,
Germany's recognition--and the recognition by many in the
United States--that Germany has a degree of responsibility
in out-of-area security problems also is indicative of a new
era that requires responsible German leadership.
One might draw a comparison of the events of 1989 and
1990 with the Revolutions of 1848. The Revolutions of 1848
began in France and within months spread like an unstoppable
tidal wave across Europe. A surge of liberalism, socialism,
and democracy swept outward from France and sequentially
engulfed Hungary, Austria, Prussia, Northern Italy, and
finally Czechoslovakia. The unquestioned rule of absolute
monarchs that had governed for centuries was brushed aside
completely or left to share power with the people. A
parallel of the 1848 Revolutions occurred in Eastern Europe
during 1989 and 1990 with a transitional introduction set
forth by Gorbachev's new policies between 1985 and 1988.
Unfortunately, the tides of revolution in 1848 receded
as fast as they had appeared, and they all reversed
themselves within 4 years into a stifling wave of reaction.
The counterrevolutions began on 7 June 1848 when Prague was
recaptured by General Windischgratz (a leading general of
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the Hapsburg Empire) and ended in France on 2 December 1852
when Louis Napoleon (nephew of Napoleon Bonaparte) declared
himself Emperor of France. °1 0  One can only hope that a
repeat of history does not occur in the case of the
Revolutions of 1989 and 1990 in Eastern Europe.
In any event, if such a reversal does occur, it seems
impossible that the five new federal states of the old GDR
will ever turn back to the old ways. The GDR has
disappeared. The destiny of eastern Germans lies in
integration with the West--a decision of similar magnitude
as to that of Adenauer who vested West Germany's future in
an anchor to the West between 1945 and 1955. In 1990 the
German people chose to confront the uncertainties of the
future as one state and one nation in a united Germany tied
to the West, but also axtending its economic and political
influence to the East.
As Germany attained unification, a united Germany also
became a new European power and potentially a strong new
leader in European and world relations. This was
demonstrated in the events of 1989 and 1990 when the "big
four" slowly ceded the initiative of the unification process
as Germany regained sovereignty. With the recognition that
' 
0 3Melvin Kranzberg, ed., 1848, A Turning Point?,
Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, pp. IX-XIX; Gordon A. Craig,
Europe, 1815-1914, pp. 123-142; and Russel H.S. Stolfi,
lecture notes on the Revolutions of 1848 in Modern
Revolution and Terrorism (NS-3902), presented at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 10-11 October
1990.
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Germany has gained a new leadership role, it is imperative
to examine just where the Germans stand on European and
world security issues. Germany, as a leader in Europe,
will have a growing influence in security questions both in
Europe and the world. The best method of determining what
positions the Germans may advance on security issues is to
analyse the security policies of the government and
political leadership of East Germany just prior to
unification as well as the security policies of the major
West German political parties during and after the
unification process. From the analysis of German positions
on security, combined with "big four" positions, an
assessment might then be made on what course the United
States should pursue in order to best contribute to the
erection of a stable security structure in Europe for the
next decade and beyond.
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IV. GERMAN POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN AND WORLD SECURITY
On 9 November 1989 many citizens of the world who grew
up during the era of the Iron Curtain viewed live, late-
night news broadcasts of East and West Germans standing upon
the Berlin wall in front of the Brandenburg Gate. In the
background--behind the procession of commentators that took
turns trying to describe the event of recent German
history--one could see several young Germans chip away at
the graffiti-covered wall with small screw drivers. Another
man held large chunks of the monolith in his left hand, and
in the right hand he brandished a sledge hammer high in the
air as a symbol of triumph.
Less than one year since those images danced across the
television screens of the world, German unification was
consummated at the Reichstag and the Brandenburg Gate. No
Berlin wall ) irred the scene as it has since August 1961.
To date the transition from two states to one nation has
been without major turmoil. There is no doubt that economic
hardship lies ahead for some segments of the German
population in the 5 new states, but the unification process
has been remarkably stable given the short time period in
which it occurred.
Behind the scenes of a country that obtained unity after
45 years of division is the larger question of how unity
affects the future of European security and aspects of world
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security. Having acknowledged the new German leadership
role, an analysis of the German positions during and after
the "two plus four" process on factors which might affect
European security is necessary in order to draw some
conclusions on potential future security arrangements in
Europe. The areas of interest covered in this chapter
include the following: the pace of German unification;
united Germany's commitment to NATO or neutrality; the
future of nuclear weapons, NATO strategy, and conventional
defense in Germany; the role of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and the role of other
multilateral or bilateral relations (in particular the role
of the EC, WEU, UN, and possibly a new era in bilateral
relations with the United States, Soviet Union, France, and
Britain). The important contribution of the previously
mentioned factors to European security must be summarized
prior to an in-depth analysis of German positions on each
factor.
First, one might question the importance of the
unification timetable and its possible effects on European
security since unification is already complete, and there
appears to be little change (at the present) to European
stability and security structures. There are several
potential consequences of rapid unification which may still
affect Germany and the other powers involved in European
security: 1) rapid unification might still turn out to be
destabilizing politically, economically, and militarily
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(German discontent with the economic or political situation
could possibly lead to violent reactions which in turn could
spill over into other European countries); 2) as of this
writing (November 1990), rapid unification almost certainly
will assure that the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition remains in power
in the upcoming all-German elections in December, and as a
result affect which political party has the greatest
influence in security matters; 3) rapid unification surely
prevented a slide toward German neutrality over the short
term by taking advantage of the poor Soviet bargaining
position; and 4) rapid unification has strengthened the
argument to keep NATO in place and downplay the untried
collective security aspect of CSCE in order to maintain a
degree of stability in a European situation which has spun
almost out of control in Eastern Europe--the outcome of
which is still unknown.2 0 4
Second, German positions on NATO membership or
neutrality remains relevant over the mid-to-long term. The
importance of maintaining Germany in NATO is paramount,
since there is no NATO without Germany. This being said,
NATO must make fundamental changes, but the stability that
NATO has provided in the past is a far better alternative
when compared to a prospective neutral Germany which might
end up being dominated by Soviet influence (since the Soviet
1 0 4 Asmus, pp. 68, 69; Serge Schmemann, "Kohl in a Hurry,"
New York Times, 16 May 1990, p. A-1.
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Union is still a military superpower) or returning to a
Bismarckian "see-saw" policy and floundering about like a
loose cannon in Central Europe.
Third, German positions on the role of nuclear weapons,
NATO strategy, and conventional defense in Central Europe
will play a truly decisive role as NATO reshapes its
strategy and force levels. MC-14/4 will be a sign of
changing realities in regard to new NATO strategies in
Central Europe which take into account German desires on
nuclear weapons, strategy, and troop levels. NATO changes
are both a recognition of the fading Cold War, and the
realization that Germany is growing up in the international
community. Some experts on German affairs, such as George
C. McGhee (former U.S. Ambassador to the FRG) saw this fact
over a year and a half ago during the Lance debate:
They [the West Germans at the time] are much more
prepared to state their case forcefully now. . . . And
why shouldn't they be? These matters are life and death
for them, even more than for us, and they're big boys
now, in case you haven't noticed.
They aren't willing to have us treat them like little
boys any more.1 0 6
Fourth, how the Germans view the role of CSCE over the
mid-to-long term is important, because (as previously
mentioned) a quick transition away from the collective
defense of NATO to the ultimate collective security goal of
CSCE may not be in the interest of the West or European
1 0OGeorge C. McGhee as quoted in R.W. Apple, "Bonn Flexes
Its Muscle in Relations with Washington," The New York
Times, 22 May, 1989, p. A-7.
85
stability in genex 1. This is especially relevant given
collective securit 's dismal record exemplified by the
failure of the League of Nations and the troubled history of
the U.N. The success of the U.N., and the future of
collective security both in Europe (perhaps the
establishment of a CSCE security structure) and the world
may rest on the outcome of the Persian Gulf Crisis.
Finally, where the Germans stand on the role of other
multilateral or bilateral relations is important when
considering the future shape of security in Europe. In
particular how do the Germans view the role of the EC, WEU,
U.N., and possibly a new era in bilateral relations with the
United States, Soviet Union, France, and Britain? The
German view of multilateral relations and cooperation with
the other European countries and the U.S. is extremely
important because of Germany's leadership role in Europe.
Is there still a continued drive to unify Europe through the
EC, or are European fears that the Germans may embark on new
bilateral relations with the Soviet Union valid?
This chapter examines the above mentioned areas of
concern by analyzing the stated government position of the
GDR prior to unification, and the stated political party
positions of West Germany prior to and after unification
(most of the former East German parties have merqd iith the
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West German parties creating all-German parties). 10 6 The
analysis of West German party positions, which have the most
influence in the political decision-making process of the
newly united Germany, reveals that changes in NATO and East-
West relations may have to be made.
A. EAST GERMANY
At the outset of the process of unification diplomacy in
the 10-point plan, both East and West Germany had an equal
say in the "two plus four" talks and therefore European
security. In reality, however, the GDR was forced to forego
sovereignty to the FRG in the hope of improving conditions
in East Germany. However, an examination of the GDR's
position on unification and security issues prior to
unification is still required in order to understand the
stance of the 16.4 million German citizens who now live in
the five new federal statas--a population that makes up
almost one fifth of all Germany and which will increase its
political influence as integration continues over the next
several years.
1. German Unification
In spite of an underlying fear of a market economy,
the East Germans indicated a desire for rapid unification in
three ways. First, the election results of 18 March 1990
10
"Christian Democrats Unite," The Week in Germany, 5
October 1990, p. 2; "East/West Social Democrats Merge," and
"Greens Form Election Coalition," The Week in Germany, 28
September 1990, pp. 1, 2.
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demonstrated East German support for Chancellor Kohl's West
German conservative government and rapid unification. This
occurred even though the Social Democrats were expected to
win a majority in the GDR elections and indicated East
German voters are similar to any "normal democratic
-lectorate: they voted with their pocketbook."1 0 7  Second,
the GDR's ability to form a government and then agree to a
quick monetary and political union was another indication
that East Germany was prepared for unification under Bonn's
direction. °0
Finally, the result of state elections in the five
new federal states on 14 October 1990 shows continued
support for Kohl and the conservative leadership of the Bonn
government. The elections were the first held since
unification on 3 October and indicate how the East Germans
will probably vote in the December all-German elections.1 0 9
Although the east's position on unification and choice of
government seems clear, East Germany's rosition on a unifieu
1 0 7 The CDR election results were as follows: 48% for the
Alliance for Germany (conservative sister parties of the FRG
CDU), 22% SPD. The polls prior to the elections predicted
the SPD would take 50% of the vote. See Henry Kamm,
"Conservatives Backed By Kohl Top East German Vote Solidly
But Appear to Need Coalition," The New York Times, 19 March
1990, p. A-1; Josef Joffe, "Deutsche Mark Uber Alles," The
New York Times, 20 March 1990, p. A-19.
1 0
*Serge Schmemann, "East Germany Agrees on New
Coalition," The New York Times, 9 April 1990, p. A-C; Kohl
and de Maiziire, "German States Merge Economie6," and
Dexheimer, op. cit. in note 95, p. 76.
10 9John Tagliabue, "Germans in East Back Kohl's Party,"
The New York Times, lb October 1990, p. A-i.
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Germany's choice for NATO membership or neutrality has
vacillated more and apparently changed in response to
pressure from Bonn.
2. NATO or Neutrality?
There appeared to be a general trend toward
neutrality in the GDR. While favoring the removal of Soviet
troops, the public in the GDR had been exposed to 40 years
of anti-NATO rhetoric which made it extremely suspicious of
the Western Alliance.1 1 0  This could account for the slow
shift in position by the GDR from an initial support of
neutrality to the GDR's acceptance of a united Germany in
NATO.
On 1 February Hans Modrow (then the Prime Minister
of the GDR) proposed that a German confederation be
established and that the FRG and the GDR be militarily
neutral. This proposal was immediately rebuffed by most of
the West German political spectrum. The West German FDP
(Free Democratic Party) Chairman Otto Graf Lambsdorff
actually accused Modrow of "bridling the horse from
behind." 1 1 1  On the following day, however, Modrow conceded
at a meeting with Chancellor Kohl that neutrality was no
longer a condition for unification. Modrow's plan is
'I0 Asmus, p. 69.
1 1
'"Bonn, Parties Welcome Gorbachev's Statement on Unity,"
The Week in Germany, 2 February 1990, p. 1.
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believed to have been an attempt to retain some Communist
Party (SED) influence prior to the March elections. =
Modrow's successor, Lothar de Maiziere, went
head-to-head against Gorbachev in late April 1990 over NATO
membership versus neutrality. De Maiziere stressed that
NATO had to change its structure (perhapF. Oecome "more
political"), but a united Germany could not be neutral: "We
do not want to play the role of a buffer zone. 1' 3  De
Maiziere continued to maintain his position for membership
in NATO vice neutrality. At the Warsaw Treaty Organization
(WTO) meeting in Moscow on 7 June 1990 Gorbachev proposed
that a united Germany be part of NATO and the WTO (a
proposal which amounted to neutrality or no change in the
status quo). The absence of an independent comment either
for or against this proposal by the Germans or any other
participants suggested that the GDR as well as her Eastern
neighbors believed that a united Germany must be firmly tied
to NATO." 4
1 2 Jorg Bischoff, "Modrow Backs Down on the Question of
Neutrality," Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2 February 1990, in The
German Tribune, 11 February 1990, p. 1. Some West Germans
believed that Modrow took his orders from Moscow.
"
3 Francis X. Clines, "East German, in Moscow, Calls for
Changes in NATO," The New York Times, 30 April 1990, p. A-6.
"4Craig R. Whitney, "Soviets Flesh Out View On Germany,"
The New York Times, 11 April 1990, p. A-l; David Binder,
"Bush Meets East German Leader and Pushes NATO Membership,"
The New York Times, 12 June 1990, p. A-6; and Francis X.
Clines, "Warsaw Pact Pronounces the End Of Ideological
Conflict With West," The New York Times, 8 June 1990, p.A-l.
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To summarize, the GDR position appeared finally to
be against neutrality and for NATO membership, with the
condition that NATO must change its structure significantly
(i.e., become less of a military alliance and "more
political"). In addition, de Maiziere believed that NATO
should exist side by side with. the WTO and CSCE with the
ultimate goal of supplanting both of the alliances with a
collective security system.1 1 5 One must remember, however,
that the GDR's position in the two plus four talks was not
truly that of an equal--for the East Germans "money talks,"
and the price of prosperity was unity with the West and
consensus with Bonn (especially with the conservative
coalition). That consensus appears to be continuing as
Germany marches toward elections in December. What then is
the position of the political parties in the FRG?
B. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
As indicated earlier, the Bonn government became the
primary spokesman in the "two plus four" talks for the two
Germanys and was already a power of equality in NATO.-1
The following section analyzes the views of the political
parties of Germany in some or all of the areas affecting
European security: unification; NATO or neutrality; nuclear
weapons, strategy, and conventional defense; CSCE; and
" sBinder, op. cit., note 114, p. 90.
114The FRG is recognized as the key to NATO's existence.
There is no NATO without Germany, and this is precisely why
the future of Germany is so important.
91
possible bilateral or multi-lateral arrangements. The
parties analyzed include the CDU/CSU, the FDP, the SPD, and
the two fringe parties, the Greens and the Republicans.
1. The CDU/CSU
a. Unification
The CDU/CSU under Chancellor Helmut Kohl's
leadership was the first organization to formally propose
German unification. Chancellor Kohl, former Minister
President of Rhineland Palatinate, is a leader from the FRG
southwest who followed the normal path of advancement
through state politics into national Federal German
politics. He became Chancellor in 1982 after the vote of
"no confidence" for Helmut Schmidt's SPD/FDP coalition.
Kohl is generally looked down upon by many Germans and has
previouly been regarded as a mispoken "country bumpkin."
This label may have applied to Kohl's tenure in office
between 1982 and 1988, but his performance during the
unification process revealed ingenious personal qualities
that might be considered on a level with those of Bismarck
and Adenauer. Kohl's impressive decision-making and
leadership ability has been one of the prime factors behind
German unification and the rise of German influence during
the unification process.11
"'
1 Donald Abenheim, interview by the author at the Naval
Postgraduate School, 1 November 1990.
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Kohl first suggested a confederation leading to
unity in his 10-point program on 28 November 1989.21 This
plan, which supported a slow evolution for unity, was
quickly overcome by the rapid pace of change in the GDR and
between the two Germanys. There was a continuing exodus of
East Germans flowing into the FRG, and the GDR monetary and
political base was rapidly deteriorating. Kohl adapted to
the changing situation and opted to support plans for rapid
unification by shifting support for long-term confederation
to short-term unification. Just after the 18 March election
in the GDR it appeared that Kohl was not in favor of 1990
all-German elections and quick unification. This may have
been in response to surveys which showed that both East and
West favored unity but opposed a rapid pace.-2 -
However, several factors prompted Kohl to push
for all-German elections by the end of 1990 and rapid
unification of the two Germanys: 1) the continued exodus
of 3,000 East Germans per week and the threat of more if GDR
expectations were not met (it was 2,000 per day prior to
Kohl's announcement of monetary union); 2) the overall state
of the GDR economy which many increasingly believed was on
the verge of collapse; 3) the conservative loss to the SPD
1 2Helmut Kohl, "A Ten-Point Program for Overcoming the
Division of Germany and Europe," presented to the Bundestag
on November 28, 1989, text furnished by the German
Information Center, New York.
1 1 3 Serge Schmemann, "Kohl Is Reported Intent On Slowing
Unity With the East," The New York Times, 20 March 1990, p.
A-1.
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in local elections in Lower Saxony and North-Rhine
Westphalia; 4) the uncertainty concerning the Soviet Union's
Eastern Evopean policies (a possible right-wing backlash
and Soviet military intervention in Eastern European); and
5) the fact that more delays simply made unification more
expensive in the long run.'12 0  Clearly, Kohl's position on
quick unity was motivated as much by domestic economic and
political concerns as it was by the desire for one German
nation. It appears that the gains made by the CDU/CSU and
for Germany as a whole have thus far outweighed the threat
of instability due to rapid unification. Unification has
occurred without any major incidents, and the political
assimilation of the five new states in the east has
proceeded smoothly. In addition, the fear that instablity
caused by rapid unification might lead to right-wing
extremists gaining power and redefining the eastern borders
through military force has not materialized and does not
seem likely in the future.
b. NATO or Neutrality
The CDU/CSU were (and continue to be) firmly
against neutrality and supported a unified Germany as a
member of the NATO alliance from the outset. Kohl
3.
2 Ferdinand Protzman, "All German Vote Could Come in
1990," The New York Times, 15 May 1990, p. A-l; Serge
Schmemann, "Kohl in a Hurry," The New York Times, 15 May
1990, p. A-l; Serge Schmemann, "Opposition in Bonn Adds A
New Hurdle to Unicn," The New York Times, 22 May 1990, p. A-
1; and "SPD Calls for Changes in Currency Union Treaty," The
Week in Germany, 25 April 1990, p. 1.
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characterized a united Germany that is neutralized and/or
demilitarized as a product of "old thinking," and only a
united Germany firmly anchored in the NATO alliance would be
acceptable and stabilizing. 2 2 1  This is a reiteration of the
rejection of Schaukelpolitik (see-saw policy), and of the
CDU's commitment and anchor to the West first begun by
Chancellor Adenauer in the 1950s.- 2 2
However, there appeared to be some disagreement
in the CDU/CSU as to the conditions of a united Germany in
NATO, especially in respect to the territory of the GDR.
This disagreement centered on whether the GDR should be
demilitarized with only territorial troops in the east or
whether NATO institutions (including the integrated command)
should extend into the GDR.
3-2 This has consistently been repeated by Kohl and noted
supporters of the coalition go,,rnment. See Helmut Kohl,
"Europe--Every German's Future," statement by the Chancellor
of thi Federal Republic at the World Economic Forum, Davos,
03 February 1990, official translation by the German
Information Service; Kohl, Statement by the Chancellor in
the German Bundestag on His Meetings with General Secretary
Gorbachev and Prime Minister Modrow, 15 February 1990,
translation of advanced text by the German Information
Service; Dr. Jurgen Ruhfus, "East-West Relations: A German
View," address by the Ambassador of the FRG to the
Diplomatic Press Club, Washington, D.C., 5 February 1990,
text by the German Information Center; and "Way Cleared for
United Germany to be Member of NATO," Der Tagesspiegel,




2 2Karl Kaiser, "The New Ostpolitik," Wolfram F.
Hanreider, ed., West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979,
Westview Press, pp. 146-149.
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In March there was a debate betwecn Foreign
Minister ,ans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP member) and Defense
Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg over the possible stationing of
Bundeswehr troops in the GDR after unification. It
appeared that Genscher, backed by Kohl, put to rest any
prospects of extending NATO institutions or NATO-assigned
Bundeswehr troops into the GDR thereby handing Stoltenberg a
defeat.1 2 3  However, in May a senior West German military
representative to the United States hinted that perhaps the
Genscher plan (no NATO institutions or Bundeswehr troops in
the GDR) was only transitional, and later NATO-assigned
Bundeswehr troops would be stationed in the former territory
of the GDR.
The disagreement as to the status of the former
GDR territory and NATO membership has since been settled.
The territory in the East will not be available for the
stationing of NATO troops until after the Soviets withdraw
in 1994, but the area will be protected under Article 5 of
NATO Charter which ensures collective defense if attacked.
After Soviet troops withdraw in 1994, Bundeswehr troops only
1 
2 3Manfred Holken, "The West Must Not Act As If NATO Was
an End In Itself," Suddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 21 February
1990 in The German Tribune, 4 March 1990, p. 3. One has to
question why this disagreement took place between Genscher
and Stoltenberg on 2 February. Prior to this Stoltenberg
agreed that no NATO units or systems should be deployed
forward to the present territory of the GDR. See Dr. Gerhard
Stoltenberg, "Western Security Policy and European
Restructuring," Address by the Federal Minister of Defense
at the 27th International Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, 3
February 1990, p. 9.
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may be stationed in the area (no foreign NATO troops). In
addition, no nuclear weapons can be stockpiled in the
east. 1 2 4  Monetary concessions were also made by the Bonn
government to the USSR as a condition for NATO membership.
Germany agreed to pay the USSR 12 billion DM (8 billion U.S.
dollars) for the upkeep of Soviet troops in the east until
1994 as well as for the cost of relocating the troops back
in the Soviet Union.2 2 5
The 370,000 troops of the Western Group of
Soviet Forces (WGS) stationed in the five new federal states
are not in good condition. Moral is extremely low and the
general feeling among the Soviet soldiers is that there is
nothing waiting for them back in the Soviet Union but misery
and hardship. This seems to be a reasonable assumption on
the part of the Soviet soldiers since they have witnessed
the higher standard of living available in the former GDR
relative to conditions awaiting them in the USSR. Many
troops in the WGS ranks have already defected to Germany,
and that number is likely to rise in the future, especially
if economic conditions in the Soviet Union continue to
deteriorate. The German aggreement to fund the stationing
1 2 4
"The Details," Nordwest Zeitugn, Oldenburg, 13
September 1990, in The Week in Germany, 23 September 1990,
p. 3; and Thomas Friedman, "Four Powers Give Up Rights in
Germany," The New York Times, 13 September 1990, p. A-i.
1 2 sManfred Schell, "Bonn, Moscow Agree on Fund to
Maintain Soviet Troops," Die Welt, Bonn, 10 September 1990,
in The german Tribune, 16 September 1990, p. 1.
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of the WGS for the next four years in the five new federal
states, aid in the transportation costs of the WGS back to
the Soviet Union, and cooperate with the Soviets in the
building of adequate housing in the USSR for those troops is
a small price to pay for the stable relocation of a large
army back into a potentially volatile Soviet internal
situation.12.
c. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional
Defense
When considering NATO's strategy, the CDU/CSU
position on three primary factors which have formed the
foundation of NATO strategy since the mid-1950s must be
analyzed: nuclear weapons, strategy (forward defense and
flexible response), and conventional force levels. There is
certainly strong disagreement in the CDU/CSU and in NATO as
to the future stationing of nuclear weapons on German soil
and the use of such weapons. The INF controversy, the Lance
missile debate of 1989, President Bush's decision to forego
Lance modernization on 4 May 1990, and continuing calls for
the elimination of all SNF from the Federal Republic are
indicative of a trend toward the total denuclearization of
Germany. As previously mentioned in this paper, NATO's
stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany has been a
cornerstone of U.S. and NATO strategy since the 1950s, and
1 2 Donald Abenheim, interview by the author, 1 November
1990; and Dr. Ose, FRG Minister of Defense responsible for
the education of the Bundeswehr, lecture at the Naval
Postgraduate School, 1 August 1990.
98
many strategic planners believe the actual stationing of
weapons in Germany is the only means of "coupling" the U.S.
arsenal to Germany and providing an extended deterrent.
Currently, the U.S. is pushing for the
deployment of a new tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM)
in Germany since the elimination of all SNF seems probable
in the near future. While the United States firmly backs
the stationing of nuclear weapons in Germany and a first-use
policy of "last resort," conservative CDU/CSU members
(normally strong supporters of U.S. nuclear policy) are now
split over the future of nuclear weapons including TASM in
Germany.2127
The deputy CDU leader, Heiner Geissler,
Parliamentary CDU leader, Alfred Dregger, and CDU general
secretary, Volker Ruhe, all advocate the end of part or all
of the following policies: an temination of NATO's first-
use doctrine and the elimination of all short-range nuclear
weapons from German soil; the elimination of the layer-cake
defense (the 8-Corps Army belt across the FRG-GDR frontier);
a reevaluation and end to forward defense; and a large
reduction of the Bundeswehr to less than 400,000 men as well
1 2 7 For the U.S. position see Robert Pear, "Cheney Backs
New Nuclear Arms for NATO," The New York Times, 5 May 1990,
p. A-i; Robert Pear, "NATO Sees New Cuts in Short-Range A-
Arms," The New York Times, 11 May 1990, p. A-4.
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as conscripts serving less than one year.1 28  Even hardline
supporters of the traditional NATO policies of flexible
response and forward defense, such as Stoltenberg, advocate
the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons in
Germany. 22, Most of these measures are in the process of
becoming reality, and indeed many of these issues--subjects
of heated and divisive debates in the past--are secondary to
the political reality and primary focus by the Germans on
unification.
In general, the replacement of short-range
nuclear weapons with TASM is not being received well in
Germany. The feeling is that TASM is not going to be
accepted in Germany although the CDU and CSU are presently
maintaining a low profile for political reasons concerning
'"kSM.130 In adCition, Germany renewed a pledge
1 2 6Karl Feldmeyer, "Looking For New Yardsticks For the
New Europe," Handelsblatt, Dusseldorf, 6 April 1990), in The
German Tribune, 15 April 1990, p. 2.
1 2 9 Robert Pear, "NATO Splits on Removing Nuclear
Artillery From West Germany," The New York Times, 10 May
1990, p. A-10.
1 3 0 Donald Abenheim, "Problems of Military Integration
and Legitimization in Germany," lecture at the Naval
Postgraduate School," Monterey, California, 31 May 1990;
Donald Abenheim, interview by the author at the Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 31 May 1990.
Other senior German military officials argue that TASM is a
possibility (based maybe in Germany or at sea) but must not
be discussed at this time due to the political situation and
emotion it invokes in the FRG.
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not to produce nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons as
part of the unification compromise. 331
Stoltenberg also acknowledged that the cohesive
purpose of forward defense (which aids in binding Germany
both militarily and politically to the alliance) remained
unchanged, but the "translation of this political purpose
into military defense planning will always have to be
adjusted to the changes in the political and strategic
situation in Germany and Europe."" 3 2  This implies that a
forward defense might still be accomplished with a "meeting
engagement" strategy with smaller conventional forces. 1 3 1
This seems to be the only logical strategy given the limit
of 370,000 Bundeswehr troops allowed under the terms of
unification.134
All of this implies that the CDU/CSU is at a
minimum advocating the reduction and possible elimination of
some or all nuclear weapons in Germany; the reevaluation of
the first use policy, flexible response, and forward
defense; and significant reductions in the Bundeswehr
(already agreed upon) with a transition away from forward
defense to a meeting engagement. Also, there is a push to
1 X3 "Two Plus Four Agreement," The Week in Germany, 14
September 1990, p. 1.
1 3 2Stoltenberg, "Western Security Policy," p. 16.
'
3 3David Yost, Unpublished notes from lecture on 2 May
1990 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
'"4"The Details," The German Tribune, p. 3.
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reduce maneuvers (including low-level flights), and reduce
the degree of readiness.2-3 5  One thing is certain, some
CDU/CSU positions on security matters continue to be
confusing because of internal differences in the party,
domestic political concerns, and the rapid pace of change in
the European situation.
d. CSCK
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), initiated in 1975 at Helsinki, has received a
renewed emphasis in the past few years. The CSCE
participants include the United States and Canada and all of
Europe (less Albania). The conference provides a regional
forum for the discussion of security issues which in the
past has emphasized arms control, human rights, and economic
liberalism, but the conference also has the potential to
provide a regional security structure in the future (much
like the collective security structure of the U.N.)
The CDU/CSU position on CSCE, which parallels
the position of the United States, is that the conference
provides a method by which the other countries, including
the Soviet Union, can have a voice in an evolving Europe.
The CDU/CSU currently does not view the CSCE as a
'
3 5
"NATO Ministers Adjust Policies to Changes in Eastern
Europe," The Week in Germany, 25 May 1990, p. 1. NATO also
quietly canceled 1990's Wintex (exercise for nuclear weapons
use), see Michael Gordon, "NATO to Cut Back Training
Programs and Unit Readiness," The New York Times, 24 May
1990, p. A-i.
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replacement for the present security structure (NATO), but
only as a bridge for dialogue between NATO and the East.1 3 6
e. The EC, Bilateral, or Multilateral Arrangements
The unending question during this time of change
is the role of the European Community (EC) in the European
unification process or possible new bilateral agreements
such as a Soviet-German entente or increased Franco-German
cooperation. In addition, how might Germay (as a new
European leader) approach out-of-area problems such as the
Persian Gulf Crisis?
The primary goal of the EC has been the
integration of Western European by "deepening" the
institution through monetary, economic, and ultimately
political union. After those goals were accomplished then
the EC planned to "widen" the institution to include all of
Europe. Once the ultimate objective of political union is
reached in the distant future, the theory is that there will
be little incentive for war and many of the competitive
issues that created conflict in the past will be eliminated.
Deepening the EC in Western Europe first made sense during
2-3 Peter Corterier, "Quo Vadis NATO?" Survival 32, no. 2
(March-April 1990): p. 151; Kohl, "Europe--Every German's
Future," and Ruhfus, "East-West Relations." Both Kohl and
Bush called for the CSCE to negotiate treaties guaranteeing
the mutual security of NATO and the WTO as well as protect
human rights. There was no mention of CSCE as a pan-European
security structure. See Paul Lewis, "Bush and Kohl See NATO
Role For the Germans," The New York Times, 18 May 1990, p.
A-1; and Werner Kaltefleiter, "Defense minister Stoltenberg
Puts His Views," Rheinischer Merkur, 7 September 1990, in
The German Tribune, 16 September 1990, p. 2.
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the Cold War, but now that the iron curtain no longer exists
the widening of the community to include Eastern Europe may
need to occur first or even simultaneously.
At the present time it appears that Franco-
German cooperation is increasing as EC integration continues
toward 1992, but the "widening or deepening" of the EC
continues to be of major concern. Realizing the need to
bind a future united Germany with the West even ac the
possible expense of France's long-sought goal of leadership
in Western Europe, France called for speeding the economic
and monetary union of the EC by 1 January 1993 with the
eventual goal of political union in the near future.12 7
Included in this proposition was the possible strengthening
of common foreign and security policies (such as a European
pillar), but the proposals seem unlikely to have a major
effect on the present European security arrangements.1 3
One also has to question Germany's overall stand
on European integration and the widening versus deepening
question. Some have suggested that Germany is actually in
favor of widening the community prior to deepening even
though Germany has stated a willingness for deepening the
1 37 Alan Riding, Europe Seeking Greater Unity by 1993,"
The New York Times, 21 May 1990, p. A-6.
1'2 Later in the next month the French Foreign Minister,
Roland Dumas, said "no country was yet prepared to delegate
some sovereignty in foreign affairs and security." Sheila
Rule, "Europeans Split on European Unity," The New York
Times, 21 May 1990, p. A-7.
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economic, monetary, and political bonds of the EC first. 3'
Kohl has indicated his desire to deepen the ties in the EC,
but his statements and those by other officials indicate
that Eastern Europe must not be left out.1 40  In addition,
there has been a new hesitation by the major economic powers
of Europe concerning full economic and monetary union. Karl
Otto P'h I, president of the West German Bundesbank,
expressed concern about economic stability and Europe's 1992
goals at a recent EC meeting in Rome.1 41
It is not clear whether Germany will abandon
parts of the Western integration process in order to widen
the EC to Eastern Europe. The extension of the EC beyond
the Elbe River to east Germany was logical and has already
occurred since currency union and political unification.
However, the widening of the EC past the Oder-Neisse border
to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union is a
different situation. When Germany unilaterally gives loans
to the Soviet Union or promises to cooperate fully to aid
13
"
3 Walter F. Hahn, "NATO and Germany," Global Affairs
(Winter 1990), p. 18. Hahn quotes an unspecified Economist
article.
1 4 0 Hans-Hagen Bremer, "Franco-German Relations Enter New
Era," Hannoversche Allgemeine, 19 September 1990, in The
German Tribune, 30 September 1990; "Deciding the Terms of
Unification Requires a Clearer Approach," Der Tagesspiegel,
Berlin, 1 April 1990, in The German Tribune, 8 April 1990,
p. 1. While indicating that Germany is tied to the EC Kohl
and Ruhfus also indicated that the EC "must not end at the
Elbe." See Kohl, "Europe--Every German's Future," p. 2, and
Ruhfus, "East-West Relations," p. 2.
' 
4 1 Alan Riding, "Hesitation Now Greets Europe's Unity
Plans," The New York Times, 1 October 1990, p. C-i.
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the USSR in revitalizing its trade and economic base, this
is a form of widening rather than deepening the
community. 4 2  One can also interpret such overtures by the
Germans as temporary necessities to gain the long-sought
unification of East and West Germany.
In the final analysis it seems that deepening of
the community will occur in conjunction with some type of
associate membership and loans to ensure the success of
democracy in the near future for many of the Eastern
European countries. This does, of course, have the
following implications:
Germany outside the Community is unthinkable. But a
unified Germany inside the EC would alter the balance of
power among the 12 and quite possibly leave Britain and
France more open to adding new members from the
East. . . .43
In some ways it does not really matter whether widening or
deepening takes place first, because in both cases Germany
will have to assume a leadership position. The important
aspect of the process is a continued cooperative effort by
all members of the EC--a cooperative effort to which the
CDU/CSU has agreed. CDU/CSU strengthening of multilateral
relations is evident within the EC, and the CDU/CSU also is
14
2 Bernard Stadelmann, "Bonn-Moscow Treaty Forges new
Relationship," Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 14 September 1990,
in The German Tribune, 23 September 1990, p. 1.
14 3Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War," Foreign
Affairs 69, no. 1 (1990), p. 12.
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strengthening unilateral defense cooperation with the
French.
Franco-German defense cooperation, although not
much more than symbolic in the past, may provide a model for
a new European army. Although Franco-German defense
cooperation has been described largely as a token,
considering the rapid change in East-West relations there
may be more discussion on Franco-German cooperation in the
near future.1 4 4  In the meantime, the Franco-German Brigade
may provide an excellent model for the integration of the
NATO command down to the corps level. Military integration
is a West German proposal and has been accepted in principle
by the United States as a means of making foreign troops in
Germany more acceptable to the German public in the
future.145
Many Europeans still fear that the possibility
exists for a new "Rapallo" with the Soviet Union despite
efforts to reaffirm Germany's anchor to the West through
NATO, the EC, and the Franco-German Brigade. None have been
more accusatory of Germany than Nicholas Ridley of the
1 4 4 For an excellent article on Franco-German defense, see
David Yost, "Franco-German Defense Cooperation," Washington
Quarterly 11, (Spring 1988). France and Germany reaffirmed
their commitment to the Franco-German Brigade, see "Bonn,
Paris Reaffirm Policy on European Unity," The Week in
Germany, 21 September 1990, p. 2.
1 4 OMichael R. Gordon, "NATO Weighing New Look With Mixed
Allied Forces," The New York Times, 23 May 1990, p. A-6. A
prominent FRG defense official also agreed with the unified
army concept.
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United Kingdom and his comparison of Kohl and Hitler.1 4 6
Although the possibility of the CDU/CSU formulating a new
entente with the Soviet Union comparable to that of 1939
seems unlikely, the West does occasionally question CDU/CSU
intentions when examining some government statements
concerning the Soviet Union.1 4 7  Kohl's reference to new
Soviet-German relations provides just such an example:
In keeping with the joint statement previously
signed, we reaffirmed our goal of establishing a lasting
relationship of reliable good-neighborliness, thus
taking up the good traditions of our centuries-old
history.34 0
However, a Soviet-German entente or new Rapallo under the
present CDU/CSU/FDP coalition and the present conditions
seems far less likely than under a possible SPD/Green
coalition. One must not dismiss the fact that relations
between Germany and the Soviet Union will improve, but such
improvements are not likely to occur at the expense of
Germany's link with the West.
Finally, the CDU/CSU, despite constitutional
limitations, is beginning to explore new methods which would
2
'4Zee page 9.
14 7 The fear of a Soviet-German entente similar to that
of 1939 is exemplified by the West's relunctance to allow
Germany to provide direct aid to the Soviet Union until the
July 1990 economic summit of the seven industrialized
nations. See R.W. Apple, "A New Balance of Power," The New
York Times, 12 July 1990, p. A-1.
14 OKohl, Statement in the German Bundestag, 15 February
1990, p. 2; and Helmut Kohl and Mikhail Gorbachev, "Joint
Declaration," Bonn, 13 June 1989, text furnished by the
German Information Center, New York.
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allow German participation in out-of-area military
situations such as the Persian Gulf Crisis. There is
disagreement as to which institution should be used (NATO,
the U.N., or the WEU), but there is general agreement that
German participation in out-of-area problems should be done
multilaterally. Unilateral German action would probably be
unacceptable to the rest of the world given Germany's past,
but many Germans know that they can no longer "shirk" the
responsibilities of a European power. 149
The Kohl government has proposed changes to the
German constitution after the December elections to allow
German troops to participate in out-of-area deployments
under the U.N. flag. In the meantime, Kohl offered 3.4
billion DM (2.2 billion U.S. dollars) and military equipment
to the Persian Gulf effort. 15 0
f. CDU/CSU Summary
In summary, the CDU/CSU accepted the realities
of a changing European situation and adjusted accordingly.
'
4 9Kemna, "Cash, Material Support for the Gulf,"
General-Anzeiger, 17 September 1990, in The German Tribune,
30 September 1990, p. 2; Rupert Scholz, "Constitution Does
Not Forbid Use of German Troops Overseas," Die Welt, 13
September 1990, in The German Tribune, 23 September 1990, p.
5; and Werner Kaltefleiter, "Defense Minister Stoltenberg
Puts His Views," Rheinischer Merkur, 7 September 1990, in
The German Tribune, 16 September 1990, p. 2.
0 9 "Bonn Pledges DM 3.4 Billion to Aid in Gulf Crisis,"
The Week in Germany, 21 September 1990, p. 2; "Christian
Democrats Unite," The Week in Germany, 5 October 1990, p. 2;
and "NATO Ministers Offer U.S. Further Aid in Gulf Crisis,"
The Week in Germany, 14 September 1990, p. 2.
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The CDU/CSU shifted to a policy of rapid unification to
protect a possible deterioration in the party's political
position in the FRG as well as to compensate for the decline
of the GDR both politically and economically. In taking the
route to quick unity, the CDU/CSU and Europe have gained
thus far despite the possibilities of instability in the
region.
The CDU/CSU are firmly against neutrality and
continue to anchor Germany firmly in NATO, but they also
agree that NATO should begin to emphasize more its political
aspect. In addition, the CDU/CSU have made some concessions
with the Soviets on the stationing of NATO troops and
weapons on east German soil as well as monetary payment for
the housing and relocation of Soviet troops in the
territory. However, this is not out of line with the
political situation at the time of German unity.
There is disagreement even in the CDU/CSU over
the role and stationing of nuclear weapons on west German
soil. This could lead to NATO's withdrawal of all short-
range nuclear weapons and the inability to introduce TASM.
The CDU and CSU also concede that the strategies of flexible
response, forward defense, and the no-first-use policy must
all be reviewed. At a minimum it appears that there will be
changes in strategy concepts to signify modifications in
policy. Flexible response may change its name to measured
response and forward defense will change to a sideways layer
cake capable of exercising a "meeting engagement" with any
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potential enemy. The CDU/CSU also agreed to substantial
Bundeswehr troop reductions as well as a reduction in the
conscription period.
The CDU/CSU view the CSCE process as important
in disarmament, the expansion of free trade structures, and
as vehicle to improve human rights, but they do not believe
CSCE is the answer to a new pan-European security system.
They prefer to use CSCE as a link between NATO and Eastern
Europe.
The CDU/CSU are in favor of deepening ties
within the EC, but they do not want to completely forsake
the new democracies in the East. This will probably result
in both a widening and deepening of the EC over the years,
which should not have a negative effect on security in
Europe as long as cooperative efforts continue toward future
European integration.
There are new opportunities for Franco-German
defense cooperation, and it is possible that the Franco-
German Brigade will serve as a model for a larger integrated
army at the corps level in Europe. Soviet-German relations
will improve, but a new Soviet-German entente under the
CDU/CSU government at the expense of links with the West
seems unlikely despite some unclear statements by Kohl.
For the most part, the CDU/CSU remains committed
(with the possible exception of nuclear weapons) to the
traditional aspects of security in Europe through a strong
alliance with the West--in other words, there is not a
ill
substitute for the stability NATO has provided throughout
the history of the institution. It appears, however, that
the FDP and SPD have different views than do the CDU/CSU
concerning the mid-to-long-term European security goals.
2. The FDP
a. Unification
The FDP, under the leadership of the Federal
Republic's Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was in
favor of early elections for several weeks prior to Kohl's
suggestion for December 1990 all-German elections in mid-
May.1 5 3 The main controversy between the FDP and Chancellor
Kohl was over the conditions of sovereignty and unification.
Genscher had initially responded positively to a proposal in
early May by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard
Shevardnadze, that the question of sovereignty be solved
after unification. However, on 10 May Genscher yielded to
Kohl and agreed that all aspects of German unity (both
internal and external) had to be solved prior to actual
unification. 1 2  The sovereignty issue was, as previously
mentioned, solved on CDU/CSU terms prior to unification.
b. NATO or Neutrality
Genscher and the FDP are firmly committed to a
unified Germany in NATO, and it was the Genscher plan which
153 -Serge Schmemann, "Kohl in a Hurry," The New York
Times, 16 May 1990, p. 1-6.
1 5 2 Serge Schmemann, "Ally Yields to Kohl on Pace of
German Unity," The New York Times, 11 May 1990, p. A-5.
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called for a lightly defended east German territory with no
NATO structure extending into that area. This plan had been
gaining strength in the West for some time.1 5 3  The Western
allies' acceptance of the Genscher plan was reiterated in
Secretary of State Baker's 9-point plan presented to the
Soviets on 4 June 1990.154 The plan ended up being the basis
of the compromise reached during the "two plus four" process
on 12 September 1990.2.85
However, Genscher's statementE indicate that
mid-term FDP goals are to transform NATO into a more
political institution which will play a major role in
disarmament, European unification, and confidence building.
Long-term goals are to expand CSCE responsibilities,
transform both NATO and the WTO into cooperative security
structures and then transform these structures into "an
interlocking system of mutual collective security." 5  This
is, perhaps, an indication that Genscher sees in the distant
future the dissolution of the blocs completely (as has
1 52Peter Corterier, "Quo Vadis NATO?" Survival 32, no. 2
(March-April 1990): p. 151; "Coalition Disagrees on Role of
NATO in a United Germany," The Week in Germany, 2 February
1990, p. 1.
1 94 Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Will Press the Soviets To




5 5 Serge Schmemann, "Gorbachev Clears Way for German
Unity," The New York Times, 17 July 1990, p. A-i.
1 54Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Speech by the Foreign Minister
of the Federal Republic at the Meeting of the Western
European Union, Luxembourg, 23 March 1990, p. 3.
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already happened to the WTO), and the establishment of a
collective security system.
Having committed a unified Germany to the NATO
alliance, the FDP is firmly against neutrality. During "two
plus four" this FDP policy included opposition to both a
stated neutral Germany or a united Germany that belonged to
both NATO and the WTO.5 7  Once again, the stand against
neutrality must be qualified with the fact that the long-
range FDP vision advocates some type of collc=tive security
arrangement in Europe.
c. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional
Defense
Genscher advocated both Germanys renounce the
manufacture or possession of nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons.1 ' 6  This was nothing more than a
reaffirmation of the non-proliferation treaty and the FRG's
commitment not to build NBC weapons as a condition for
rearmament and entering the alliance in 1955. However,
there are indications that Genscher is in favor of the
immediate removal of all nuclear weapons from German soil,
1l 7 See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "The Future of a European
Germany," Speech by the Foreign Minister of the Federal
Republic at the Conference of the American Society of
Newspaper editors, Washington, D.C., 6 April 1990, p. 5; and
"Genscher: Germany Will Not Be a Member of Two Alliances,"
The Week in Germany, 20 April 1990, p. 1.
1 5OGenscher, "The Future of a European Germany," p. 5.
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and there also are signs that he will oppose any replacement
weapons such as TASM.2 5 9
The FDP position on conventional Bundeswehr
forces was to cut back troop levels to under 350,000 and
reduce conscription from 15 to 12 months. When one examines
Genscher's call for troop reductions, his position on
nuclear weapons, and the actual military limits placed on
Germany as part of "two plL four" it seems safe to assume
that the FDP is headed toward a policy of denuclearization
in Germany, possibly a no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and
a definite change in flexible response and forward defense.
d. CSCE
As already mentioned, Genscher believes that the
CSCE institutions and responsibili'Les should be expanded.
He views CSCE not as .ust a bridge between the two
alliances, but the f:amew-rk for a future all-European
collective security system. In the near-term, Genscher has
called for a CSCE European verification agency to safeguard
peace in Europe, but he has consistently failed to elaborate
on what action CSCE will take should a treaty violation
arise. -6o
1 5 3 Genscher has gotten the "last laugh" on the Lance
debate, and he is for immediate negotiations on remaining
short range nuclear forces. His aides have also indicated
that "deploying the missile called the TASM is
'ridiculous' ." Set Hoagland, "Europe's Destiny," p. 44-45;
Genscher, Speech at the meeting of the WEU, p. 5; and Serge
Schmemann, "Now, NATO is in Search of a New Self," New York
Times, 8 June, p. A-4.
1 OGenscher, Speech at the WEU, p. 4.
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e. EC, Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements
Genscher is in favor, like the CDU/CSU, of
strengthening EC integration. 1 1z  He has stressed the
importance of Franco-German ties, and he includes CSCE as
another means of reinforcing the Atlantic link along with
NATO. X 6 2  Finally, chances are remote that the FDP might
support some new Soviet-German entente, but the possibility
does exist. Genscher spoke of "reactivating the once so
varied and fruitful bonds between Germans and Russians.'. 3
This might be more significant should Germany feel
threatened by the Soviets in the future and there was no
longer a U.S. nuclear or conventional guarantee.
The FDP has not been straight forward about out-
of-area issues such as the Persian Gulf Crisis. While Kohl
was clear about attempting to change the German
Constitution, Genscher made vague statements concerning an
increased U.N. role in the future with no real mention of
-62Riding, "Hesitation," New York Times, 1 October 1990.
1
2 Genscher, "The Future of a European Germany," p. 2;
"Genscher Calls for Unity and a New International Order,"
The Week in Germany, 12 October 1990, p. 1.
1 6 3Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "New Approaches to East-West
Security Cooperation," Speech by the Foreign Minister of the
Federal Republic at the Meeting of the Institute for East-
West Security Studies, Potsdam, 11 June 1988.
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what part German troops might actually play in world
security matters."'
With only about 10% of the FRG vote, it does not
seem as though the FDP's position on security matters counts
for much, but it must be stressed that the FDP is the swing
party in a coalition government and they could very well
side with th, Social Democrats (SPD) after the December
elections. In addition, it appears that Genscher is playing
the political center--leaving open the option to side with
either the CDU/CSU or the SPD--until he can determine what
is best for himself and his party. Having covered the
positions of the ruling coalition, one can now examine the
major opposition party, the SPD, to determine how its view
of security might affect the future security in Europe
should an SPD/FDP coalition come to power in the next German
elections or at some time in the future.
3. The SPD
a. Unification
The SPD, in maintaining its traditional
Ostpolitik (two states, one nation), was late in supporting
the call for German unification. In December 1989, Willy
Brandt "made it clear that the end of the Wall means
1 6 4John Tagliabue, "Kohl Vows to Widen Role in Gulf
Effort," The New York Times, 14 September 1990, p. A-1;
"Genscher Calls for Unity and New International Order," The
Week in Germany, 12 October 1990, p. 1.
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Ostpolitik is dead. '1' 6 5  This statement impliE that
unification would take place with the goal being one state
and one nation, but the SPD favored a slow unification
process. Some members actually worked to delay the CDU's
call for monetary union by 1 July, unification by October,
and all-German elections by December 1990.
This move was strongly supported by the SPD
choice for Chancellor, Oskar Lafontaine, and Gerhard
Schroder, the newly elected Premier of Lower Saxony. Their
plan was to undermine the unification process and capitalize
on the growing dissatisfaction with unification in order to
gain public support and votes. However, in the process of
taking this approach, the SPD in West Germany had clearly
broken from the policy of rapid unification advocated by the
SPD in East Germany.26 6 This could become a factor when
all-German elections are held in December and more east
German SPD members opt for the conservative coalition and
Kohl's policies--as already indicated by the 14 October
election results in east Germany.16'
1 6 Johannes Gross, "Mistrust and Misapprehension
Surrounding Unification," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3
January 1990, in The German Tribune, 14 January 1990, p. 5;
Josef Joffe, "Once More: The German Question," Survival 32,
nAo. 2 'March-April 1990): p. 134.
164Serge Schmemann, "Opposition in Bonn Adds A New Hurdle
to Union," The New York Times, 22 May 1990, p. A-6.
1 47John Tagliabue, "Germans in East Back Kohl's Party,"
The New York Times, 15 October 1990, p. A-1.
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b. NATO or Neutrality
One finds it difficult to trace the SPD's
policies concerning membership in NATO or neutrality during
the 1980s. The SPD's Ostpolitik has gone through several
phases in the 1980s, and most recently there has been a
shift away from alliance membership followed by a decision
to remain in NATO.x48
Lafontaine stated in March 1990:
• . .the process of German unity must go hand-in-hand
with disarmament and it was 'anachronistic' when CDU/CSU
politicians call for a united Germany in NATO.1 '"
Yet by the end of April Lafontaine had reversed his position
and claimed that the SPD backed a united Germany in NATO
until the blocs could be disbanded. At the same time,
opponents of this policy stressed that the "Western
alliance, under U.S. leadership, would play a role for only
a transition period until a European federal state was
established." 1 7 0  This is representative of the trouble that
the SPD continues to have in establishing a coherent policy
that satisfies all factions in the party. One thing is
198See William E. Griffith, "The Security Policy of the
SPD and the Greens in the FRG," in Security Perspectives of
the SPD and Greens in Opposition, Pergomon-Brassey, 1989, p.
1-20; and Peace and Security, Resolutions by the Party
Conference of the Social Democratic Party of Germany,
Nuremberg, 25-29 August 1986.
1'6"Lafontaine: Kohl Policy Detrimental to Unity," The
Week in Germany, 2 March 1990, p. 1, italics added.
1 7
"Lafontaine: United Germany Should Remain in NATO,"
The Week in Germany, 27 April 1990, p. 2.
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clear: NATO is seen as only a transitional institution by
the SPD enroute to an all-European security system.
c. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional
Defense
The SPD "Progress 90" Commission clearly states
the SPD's position concerning nuclear weapons, strategy, and
conventional defense reductions. Some of the more important
security policies set forth by the SPD in the report include
the following: the removal of all ABC weapons from German
soil; the elimination of atomic deterrence, forward defense,
flexible response, and the first-use policy; a reduction of
the personnel strength in the Federal Republic by a half;
and a defensive restructuring of armaments and armies in
Europe through the CSCE process (basically, a structural
inability to attack). 1 71 However, if a structural inability
tu attack is adopted by NATO and the Bundeswehr, then one
has to question how the territory of the GDR can be defended
if it is not occupied by foreign NATO troops and Bundeswehr
forces are limited. With limited forces available to defend
the Central front, NATO must retain some ability to maneuver
an offensive force into the east German area if attacked.
In addition, the Progress 90 report calls for
the end to low-level flights, drastically reduced maneuvers,
and a limit on basic military service to a 12-month maximum.
1 1
"The Disarmament Demands of the Progress 90 Working
Group of the SPD," presented to the press in Bonn by
Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, 21 March 1990.
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Many of these last points are shared by the FDP and many
CDU/CSU members. Some of the SPD policies represent a
drastic departure from the NATO norm at a time of
questionable stability, but many of them match Genscher's
view on security such as the eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons from German soil and the long-range goal of an all-
European security system. These policies are not totally
unrealistic goals over the long-term, but one has to
question any immediate implementation of these concepts
until long-term stability in Europe (particularly in the
Soviet Union) is attained. In conclusion, it appears that
the SPD defense policies from 1982 to 1989 diverged away
from the platform of consensus that existed between the Left
and the Right between 1959 and 1982. In 1989 and 1990, the
SPD defense policies again shifted toward the center in many
areas and back to a platform of consensus while at the same
time the CDU/CSU also moved from the Right toward the
center.
d. CSCE
The SPD has endorsed the CSCE process not only
as a means to improve confidence building measures and arms
control, but also as a probable framework for an all-
European, collective security system. Unfortunately, as is
the case with most supporters of an all-European CSCE
security system, the SPD fails to detail a collective
security structure which might be capable of solving
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conflicts which may erupt between two or more states in
Europe. Instead references are made to some vague utopian
model:
The process of German unity must be coupled with the
building of a united European security system. The
system can be built up in layers. The completion of the
united federal state must be paralleled with the setting
up of the first level of the European security system,
in which the forces of the participating European states
are bound.1 7 2
Should advocates of all-European, collective security
systems continue with vague descriptions of a European
security order as described above, NATO will probably
continue to thrive for some time in the foreseeable future,
since not all of Europe is willing to accept a CSCE
collective security structure that has not yet been defined.
This is not to say that CSCE's contribution to
the building of cooperative security institutions in Europe
is insignificant. Rather, the question of a well-defined
collective security system is yet to be answered in detail.
On the subject of a detailed, collective security system is
where one finds divergence between the SPD and CDU/CSU
concerning CSCE's role. While the CDU/CSU advocates a
cautious approach to the collective security aspect of CSCE,
the SPD seems willing to mortgage the future of European
security on untested and vague security theories. Once
again, the future of European collective security through
the CSCE institution may have great potential pending the
'"
2 Progress 90 Commission, p. 2.
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outcome of the Persian Gulf Crisis. The UN goal of
punishing aggressors and preventing the unlawful use of
force is on trial in the desert of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Iraq--the outcome has profound implications for both world
and European collective security.
e. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements
There has not been much said by the SPD since
their 1986 resolution on security concerning a European
pillar and multilateral arrangements. The Eurpean pillar
was a concept put forth by John F. Kennedy in 1961
advocating the "recognition of NATO as a genuine partnership
in which Europe and America would meet as equals rather than
one serving as a ward of the other." 1 7 3  Upon two pillars
(one in America and one in Europe) would be built a bridge
across the Atlantic of common economic and political
interests. This concept requires the participation of the
United States as an equal which in turn requires sincere
cooperation between the European countries (especially
Germany and France). In the 1986 resolution, the SPD called
for the strengthening of the European pillar, and in 1987
the SPD also called for greater European unity under Franco-
German leadership.2 4  To some extent this is happening
1 7 2Lawrence Kaplan, NATO and the United States (Boston:
Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 82.
"
1 4
"Peace and Security," 1986, p. 3; and William E.
Griffith, "The Security Policies of the Social Democrats and
the Greens in the Federal Republic of Germany," in Security
Perspectives of the West German Left, p. 1.
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naturally with the passing of bipolar Europe, and the
recognition by France and Germany that Western Europe must
strenghten multilateral bonds in order to ensure cooperation
in the absence of a common threat which joined the alliance
for four decades.
More disturbing is the possibility of a new
Soviet-German entente. This was advocated by Egon Bahr and
Horst Ehmke in 1983 and 1984:
Although favoring continued West German membership in
NATO, it [the new strategy] advocated continued detente,
and a "security partnership" (Sicherheitspartnerschaft)
with the Soviet Union..7 5
While this statement can be dismissed as old SPD policy, one
cannot dismiss the possibility of the SPD resurrecting such
a concept given the party's inconsistency on policies in
recent years (for example, the SPD wavering on unification
even after the process was a fait accompli).
The SPD affirms a need for the United States
security role in Europe only as long as the Soviet threat
exists, and their continued push for an all-European
security system in an era of neo-detente brings into focus
the fear of a new "Rapallo" like the one suffered in 1980-
1981 during the Polish crisis.2 7  More important, if all




1 7 Timothy G. Ash, "Mitteleuropa," Daedalus 119, no. 1
(Winter 1990), pp. 16-17.
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loses credibility, the Germans may look to the Soviets for
their security needs. The other option would be to build
their own ABC weapons which does not seem likely at this
time.
Finally, the SPD does not appear to favor
out-of-area participation by Germany through monetary
contributions, and the party has not taken a stand on troop
involvement. Lafontaine cited the cost of unification and
party opposition to any contributions other than those made
to multilateral institutions as reasons for Germany's non-
participation in the Gulf Crisis. 1 77
f. Summary of the SPD
The -.st German SPD advocated slow German
unification ;n nas pursued a policy of strict opposition to
the CDU/CU/FDP policy for quick monetary and political
union as well as an all-German vote in December. This
course was pursued in hopes of profiting from the growing
public sentiment against the cost and hardships of
unification. However, it might have been just as
destabilizing to not pirsue unification aggressively in the
face of the massive migration of East Germans into the FRG.
The CDU/CSU forced the flow of capital and economic reform
east while the SPD failed to take any serious initiatives
"'"Lafontaine: SPD Against Direct Financing of U.S.
Gulf Policy," The Week in Germany, 14 September 1990, p. 2.
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for unification. This position appears to have hurt the SPD
politically.2-1
The SPD continues to support NATO membership,
but with the eventual goal of eliminating both blocs in
favor of a pan-European collective security structure. The
SPD advocates the elimination of the status quo: of nuclear
weapons, nuclear deterrence, nuclear first-use, forward
defense, flexible response, and they advocal. massive
reductions in the Bundeswehr along with a structural
inability to attack. Many of the SPD defense policies have
moved towaid the center of Geman politics since 1989 and are
not that far removed from the CDU/CSU/FDP coalition which
has moved to the Left.
The SPD has in the past been in favor of
security arrangements with the Soviet Union and a
redefinition of the threat. They have also been in favor of
strengthening Franco-German ties and strengthening a
European pillar, but little has been said recently in regard
to these points. The SPD appears to be extremely reserved
concerning out-of-area involvement. This policy is simply
inconsistent with Germany's need to establish a leadership
role commensurate with its economic and European political
influence.
1 7 The CDU/CSU defeated the SPD in four of the five new
German states in the former GDR on 14 October 1990. See "CDU
Confirms its Position as the New Lander go to the Polls,"
The German Tribune, 21 October 1990, p. 1.
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In conclusion, the SPD policies are not far
removed from some of the policies of Genscher and the FDP
and some policies of the CDU/CSU. Nevertheless, it seems
unlikely that the FDP, which has taken a middle-ground
stance on many issues, will abandon the CDU/CSU coalition
given the recent conservative successes in Germany, and the
fact that the SPD has been inconsistent during the
unification process and on policies in general over the last
ten years has weakened severly weakened the party.
4. The Greens and the Republicans
a. The Greens
If anything characterizes the Greens, who are on
the far left of the FRG political spectrum, it is their
inability to agree on anything but ecological measures.
There is a continued split between the left-wing hardliners
(the Fundis) and the more pragmatic faction (the realos) in
the party. 2 " The inability of the Greens to reach a
consensus has left them out of the mainstream of popular
opinion during the unification process (the party refused to
support unification as late as 22 July 1990).110
The Green's security policy is by far the most
radical in the FRG. They are for total ecological,
industrial, and societal restructuring; the demilitarization
21 "Greens Trade Insults at Birthday Party," The German
Tribune, 28 January 1990, p. 4.
280OMartin Winter, "Struggling Greens Slow to Jump on All-
German Bandwagon," Frankfurter Rundschau, 11 July 1990, in
The German Tribune, 22 July 1990, p. 3.
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of Germany; the closure of all nuclear power plants; and the
abolition of the Bundeswehr and the East German Army (the
NVA) along with an immediate and total withdrawal from
NATO."' The Green's radical security policies most likely
would prevent any involvement in out-of-area matters.
It appears unlikely that the Greens will have a
significant impact on European security in the near future
due to the fragmentation within the party and their views
which are too far from the mainstream of German security
possibilities at the present time. However, as
environmental issues become more important in domestic and
international politics, the Greens (or perhaps some other
environmental organization) may have a greater impact on
European and world security. The party's initial success in
the late 1970s and early 1980s was based primarily on
security issues during the INF crisis. With security in
Germany not being one of the major issues at the present
combined with the fact that most Germans are already
environmentally conscious, the Greens are left with a weak
foundation upon which to build any meaningful policies which
might contribute to the expansion of party membership.
b. The Republicans
The Republicans, the fringe party on the far
right, have for the most part been assimilated into the
'
14"Greens Approve Bundestag Election Platform," The
Week in Germany, 6 April 1990, p. 2.
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mainstream of CDU/CSU policies. 1 62  Kohl's ability to
champion the cause of German unity while still pursuing
European unity has helped in reducing the Republican
representation from 7.1% to 2% of the German vote to the
European Parliament between June 1989 and May 1990. In
addition, Republican-leader Franz Schonhuber's policies of
racial slogans have become a burden to the party. 1e 3  It
does not appear that the Republicans will be a factor in
German unity or security issues in the near future
considering that they have had little success in German
elections with the exception of Bavaria where the party
managed to obtain 4.9% of the vote (5% is required in order
to gain one seat in local state elections). 1 '4
C. SUMMARY OF GERMAN PARTY POSITIONS ON EUROPEAN AND
WORLD SECURITY
The West Germans displayed a great degree of influence
in the diplomacy and politi- of German unification, and
they continue to have a predominate role in the future of
European security. Most of the decisions concerning the
speed of unification and possible options for future
'
2 Bertram, p. 50.
193 "Racism Revived," The Economist, 19 May 1990, p. 14;
and Michael Stiller, "Millstone Instead of Milestone for
Republicans," (Suddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 15 January
1990), in The German Tribune, 28 January 1990, p. 1.
1a4 Rudolf Strauch, "CDU Confirms Its Position as the new
Lander go to the Polls," Hannoversche Allgemeine, 15 October
1990, in The German Tribune, 21 October 1990, p. 1.
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security arrangements in Europe fall on the shoulders of
four parties in Germany: the SPD, the FDP, and the CDU/CSU.
The CDU/CSU, due to the relaxation of tensions, was
forced more toward the center of FRG politics when
considering future security policies during the unification
process. The FDP is maintaining a central position with the
ability to side with either the CDU/CSU or the SPD depending
on what the FDP has to gain. The SPD has moved slightly
toward the center and some of their defense policies now
coincide with the center and the right. The SPD, however,
has only a remote chance of gaining control of the German
government through a FDP/SPD coalition in the December
elections. It seems unlikely that the FDP will opt to side
with the SPD given the success of the conservative coalition
and the present dissaray of SPD platforms and policies.
It is somewhat disturbing (but not surprising) to see
once again that the future of Europe rests on the internal
policies and interests of a handful of political parties.
However, the fact remains that Germany holds the key to the
future security of Europe, and that key is thoroughly
interlocked with domestic politics. Germany, of course, was
not the only country with a say in the "two plus four"
process. The "big four" (the United States, France, Soviet
Union, and the United Kingdom) still had occupation rights
during the unification process, and they all will continue
to contribute vital elements in the European security
structure in the future. Certainly the "big four" do not
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have the same influence as in the past, and they will now be
compelled to treat Germany as an equal, but the "big four"
are indispensable in the security security equation.
Security and stability in Europe requires an active effort
by all members of the "big four" in order to ensure
cooperation continues and conflict does not remerge.
Therefore, a concise review of the positions of the "big
four" is required in order to evaluate the influence of each
country and the possible contributions each will make to
future security in Europe.
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V. THE BIG FOUR
The unification of Germany has created a nation in the
heart of Europe with an area of 357,000 square kilometers, a
population of 78.7 million, a gross national product of 1.2
trillion U.S. dollars which towers above the next closest
competitor in Western Europe, a trade surplus of 72.8
billion U.S. dollars (higher than that of Japan), and
control of 10% of the world's trade.x1 ' These numbers
alone, apart from the arguments in the preceding chapters,
refer to Germany's new position as a European leader.
There is no doubt that the "big four" (the United
States, the USSR, France, and the United Kingdom) have lost
a considerable amount of influence to the new German nation.
The "big four's" influence over the past 45 years was based
on the results of World War II and the inability of the
victors to reach an agreement concerning the future of
Germany. The West gave the FRG space to grow and West
Germany took advantage of the opportunity which was
presented. The Soviets pursued a course which ensured that
Germany remained divided rather than give up any post-war
gains (unity was conditional on overwhelming Soviet
3-45Serge Schmemann, "Germans Move to Unite Economies,"
The New York Times, 14 February 1990, p. A-8; "Germany by
the Numbers," The Week in Germany, 5 October 1990, p. 1. For
more information see "The European Community," GIST,
Department of State: Bureau of Public Affairs, November
1989.
132
political and military influence over Germany). A
fundamental change occurred when Gorbachev redefined the
Soviet-German relationship from 1985 to the present. This
change involved a recognition by Gorbachev that the Soviet
Union had more to gain from Germany and the West by
improving relations instead of continuing the Cold War.
This new relationship in turn had an effect on the relative
influence of all the "big four" nations with respect to
Germany (especially after German unification). The "big
four's" loss of influence is not necessarily bad since
Germany has cautiously assumed its new leadership role in a
responsible manner. However, the "big four" still have
varying degrees of interests and influence in the evolution
of a new Europe.
The United States has a world superpower role as well as
an active interest in European stability which equates to an
interest in European security. A policy of isolationism
from 1821 until 1917 and between the World Wars turned out
to be costly for the United States, Europe, and the world.
The future of European security and stability will remain a
major goal of U.S. foreign policy. Therefore, the current
position of the U.S. government on security in Europe and
Europe's contribution to world security remains relevant
even though the immediate Soviet threat to the Continent
continues to recede. As the threat recedes, U.S. influence
in European security issues will diminish. The United
States can no longer be the leader of "junior partners"
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(especially in respect to Germany) as was the case in the
past.
The Soviet Union--the waning superpower--remains a
powerful military nation at the present. The USSR also
suffered the most of the "big four" countries during World
War II. Security and stability in Europe is paramount for
the USSR as that country undergoes the painful
reconstruction of 70 years of communist mismanagement and
ineptitude. However, the fundamental change in the Soviet
Union's German policy is a recognition by Gorbachev of the
important role Germany might play in restructuring the
Soviet economy and redefining the East-West relationship.
In addition, this change in policy is also indicative of the
Soviet Union's acknowledgment that a unified Germany does
not pose a military threat to the Soviet homeland any
longer.
France, once the undisputed leader in the struggle for
mastery in Europe, has a tremendous responsibility in
ensuring that Germany does not again become isolated in
European relations. French foreign policy in the past was
centered on ensuring that Germany did not become so strong
as to challenge French sovereignty or France's leadership
role on the Continent. German unification has dashed
France's hope of being the undisputed leader in Europe, but
the French still see the importance of striving to ensure
that Germany does not become isolated by moving ahead toward
EC economic union. The French may hold the key to the solid
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foundation upon which the German anchor to the West is
embedded.
Finally, the United Kingdom still has an important role
to play: not the role of the 18th and early 19th Century as
a guarantor of the balance of power, but rather a role as an
active member in the evolving European system. The United
Kingdom's preoccupation as a guarantor that no country
gained hegemony in Europe must change under the present
circumstances. In addition, the United Kingdom's reluctance
to relinquish any amount of sovereignty for the further
integration of Europe must be reconsidered. The United
Kingdom is now part of the Continent and the English Channel
can no longer be used as a moat to distance the country from
the changes which are taking place on the mainland.
Minimally, for these reasons and the fact that all of
these countries remain major powers in Europe, it is
important to analyze briefly the concerns of the "big four"
on security during and after the "two plus four" process.
This analysis utilizes the same format applied to that of
the individual party positions of the FRG and includes the
following areas of concern: unification; NATO or
neutrality; nuclear weapons, strategy, and conventional
defense; CSCE; and other bilateral or multilateral
arrangements. By analyzing German and "big four" positions
on security in Europe, one might then structure U.S.
European security policy for the next decade.
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A. THE UNITED STATES
1. Unification
The United Statt-s was firmly in favor of German
unification and self-determination by the German population
(and has been since the late 1940s) from the beginning of
the "two plus four" process.3- 4  This was the position of
both the U.S. government and the U.S. public. A poll taken
in December 1989 indicated that 67% of Americans were in
favor of German unification.' a7  U.S. support of unification
was politically advantageous for nurturing a U.S.-German
special relationship and ensuring that U.S. interests were
protected during the "two plus four" process. U.S.
interests centered on ensuring the German commitment to NATO
and guarding against a possible Soviet ploy to neutralize
Germany in exchange for unity.
2. NATO or Neutrality
The United States repeatedly emphasized that a
united Germany must remain a part of NATO, but as early as
February 1990 the Bush administration did back the Genscher
plan for a unified Germany with no NATO institutions
extended to the GDR. 2.0 This response was an indication
1 06Thomas L. Friedman, "U.S. Backing West Germany's Unity
Idea," The New York Times, 7 February 1990, p. A-10.
1 6'Robin Toner, "Survey Finds Americans Favor A Reunited
Germany," The New York Times, 1 December 1989, p. A-9.
1 84The National Security Strategy of the United States,
The White House, March 1990; and Friedman, "U.S. Backing
West Germany's Unity Idea," p. A-10.
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that the United States did take Soviet interests into
account. The U.S. insistence that Germany be a member of
NATO remained a major stumbling block between the United
States and the Soviet Union in the "two plus four" process.
The United States made some concessions, however, through
the Genscher plan and more arms and troop reductions on the
Central front, but the U.S. held firm on the most important
prerequisite: Germany must remain in NATO.
The United States earnestly highlighted NATO's
political functions instead of the organization's
traditional military role. 1 '0 This emphasis on a political
role has been underlined during the Persian Gulf Crisis.
Although the Atlantic Treaty does not allow NATO to play a
direct role outside of Europe, the organization has been
useful as a forum and a source of political unanimity.1 '0
3. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional
Defense
The United States strongly supported the
modernization of Lance and nuclear artillery, but was forced
to abandon modernization due to the political climate in
I 'The emphasis on NATO's political role has been
stressed since December 1989. In addition, the NATO summit
of 6 July 1990 called for the renunciation of the use of
force by the WTO and NATO. See The North Atlantic Council
Communique of December 1989, p. 3; "NATO Leaders Agree to
Modify Security Concept," The Week in Germany, 13 July 1990,
p. 1; and Thomas L. Friedman, "Now NATO is in Search of a
New Self," The New York Times, 8 June 1990, p. A-1.
1'9Alan Riding, "NATO, Bereft of a Military Role,
Redefines Itself as the West's Political Galvanizer," The
New York Times, 9 August 1990, p. A-13.
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Germany in early May 1990.131 In the past, U.S. proposals
for the stationing of nuclear weapons in the FRG were
accepted by the Germans, because the Soviet threat was ever-
present. The West German decision in the 1950s and early
1960s to accept the deployment of nuclear weapons on German
soil was simplified because of Khrushchev's belligerent
attitude, nuclear threats, and the building of the Berlin
wall. The same situation occurred in the late 1970s and
early 1980s when NATO deployed INF in Western Europe. The
peace activists could claim that the INF deployment was
dangerous and immoral, but the majority of West Germans
agreed that the Soviet SS-20 threat was the real danger and
required a response.
Once INF was eliminated, SNF became questionable
since the only targets for short-range nuclear weapons were
primarily in the GDR and the FRG. Finally, with the
complete relaxation of tensions in 1990, the modernization
of Lance and the maintenance of nuclear artillery on German
soil simply made no sense either militarily or politically.
The U.S. administration still supports short-range nuclear
deterrence in Germany, but it appears that there is now a
recognition that the deployment of short-range nuclear
1 92In March 1990 the U.S. was still in favor of theater
nuclear forces at the lowest possible level and modernized,
but by early May Bush was forced to abandon modernization
plans in the face of an untenable political situation in the
FRG. See The National Security Strategy, p. 25; and "Bush
Scraps European Arms Plan," The Monterey Herald, 4 May 1990,
p. A-l.
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weapons on German soil can not continue much longer. The
real problem for the United States is how to sell the
Germans on the introduction of TASM which many Americans
feel is necessary in order to maintain the vital "coupling"
component between Germany and the United States.1 ' 2  Given
the positions of the political parties in Germany, it does
not seem likely that the United States will succeed in
convincing the Germans any nuclear weapons must remain land-
based on German soil. At a minimum, the advocates for
nuclear weapons in the CDU/CSU desire that the issue
maintain a low profile to allay public emotion and reaction
against nuclear weapons deployment.
Presently the United States supports forward
defense, and nuclear first-use but only as a "last resort.
The United States and NATO have agreed that there must be a
"wide-ranging" review of NATO strategy. It seems likely
that such a review, now fully underway, will critically
evaluate the future of NATO strategy in Europe including
forward defense, first use, and the possibility of an
19 2 Thomas Friedman, "NATO Is in Search of a New Self,"
The New York Times, 8 June 1990, p. A-4. The U.S. continues
to oppose removal of Nuclear Artillery from West Germany,
but does agree that reductions can be made. See Robert Pear,
"NATO Sees New Cut in Short-Range A-Arms," The New York
Times, 11 May 1990, p. A-4.
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integrated command down to the corps level.1 9 3 In addition,
the United States agreed with the Soviet proposal and German
acceptance to limit the size of the Bundeswehr to 370,000
troops, thereby rendering the concept of forward defense
obsolete. 9'4 In the past there was a bare minimum of troops
available to man the layer cake forward defense concept.
With the sharp reductions taking place in NATO, the only
logical strategy would be that of a "meeting engagement."
All of thebe changes will soon be embodied in NATO's new
strategy, 11C-14/4, which is presently being reviewed at the
time of this writing.
4. CSCE
The United States fails to view the CSCE
institutions as replacing NATO. Rather the United States
regards CSCE as a means to bridge East and West and include
the Soviet Union in European affairs and complement
NATO--not replace it. In general, the United States feels
that CSCE, in its present form, can be used only in
"marginal matters" of security, but the U.S. has effectively
-
9 3 Pear, "NATO Sees New Cut," p. A-4; "NATO Ministers
Adjust Policies to Changes in Eastern Europe," The Week in
Germany, 25 May 1990, p. 1; and Michael Gordon, "NATO to Cut
Back Training Programs and Unit Readiness," The New York
Times, 24 May 1990, p. A-i.
1 9 4Michael R. Gordon, "Baker Has New Arms Deal For
Moscow, Officials Say," The New York Times, 18 May 1990, p.
A-6; "Two Plus Four Treaty Signed," The Week in Germany, 14
September 1990, p. 1.
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used CSCE for major gains in human rights, economic
liberalism, and arms control."95
5. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements
The United States is opposed to any kind of a
security partnership between the Soviet Union and Germany
which night jeapordize Germany's integration with the West.
This is a natural reaction given 45 years of Cold War and
past Soviet attempts to influence West German policy through
military coercion. However, the U.S. refusal to accept a
closer Soviet-German relationship is flawed in 1990 due the
changed context of Soviet internal and foreign policy. It
is not likely that the changes taking place in the Soviet
Union are all a ploy in order to spread communism throughout
all of Europe and gain hegemony on the continent as once
feared.
The United States does fully support the growth of a
"European pillar," and increased cooperation of EC members
in the integration process. 19" One must be remember that to
support these institutions (the EC and a European Pillar)
means that the United States is eventually going to have to
deal with the Europeans as an equal rather than as a junior
partner of the United States as in the past.
"'95Philip Revzin and Walter S. Mossberg, "Europe Will
Rely Less on U.S., More Own Devices," The Wall Street
Journal, 4 May 1990, p. A-l; The National Security Strategy,
p. 11; and Paul Lewis, "Bush and Kohl See NATO Role for the
Germans," The New York Times, 18 May 1990, p. A-1.
19"The National Security Strategy, p. 10.
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Finally, the U.S. continues to encourage European
participation in such out-of-area matters as the Persian
Gulf. This was the case during the 1987-1988 t''kLz ascort
in the Persian Gulf and the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis. The
United States would prefer that NATO become the -!!hicle for
out-of-area matters, but there has been no objection by the
United States to unilateral, U.N, and WEU participation in
the Gulf.1 '7
5. Summary
The United States long favored a united Germany in
NATO and accepted some concessions in order to ensure that
goal was accomplished. The U.S. European strategy
essentially continues to be that of a status-quo power which
includes: the maintenance of a nuclear presence in Germany
with short-range artillery (if possible) and at a minimum
TASM or gravity bombs; and the continued support of a first-
use policy of "last resort." However, the United States is
in the process of reducing troop and armament levels in
Europe and is also in the process of reevaluating NATO
strategy. It is unlikely that the United States will
willingly concede to remove all nuclear weapons from German
soil in the near future, but the United States must be
prepared to do so if requested by Germany. The emerging
2 "7 The WEU has been described as NATO's cousin and is
comprised of 9 nations of Europe only. The WEU has no
geographical restrictions on activities as does NATO. Alan
Riding, "NATO's Cousin Organization Will Meet on the Gulf
Crisis," The New York Times, 21 August 1990, p. A-9.
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political reality of cooperation in Europe and the decreased
military tension is not condusive to the forward deployment
of nuclear weapons on German soil. If the nuclear umbrella
and extended deterrence to Germany is to be maintained, then
the stationing of that deterrent may have to be at sea
aboard U.S. submarines or surface ships--a last-ditch
contingency unpopular with most strategic planners in the
United States.
B. THE SOVIET UNION
1. Unification
Gorbachev's visit to East Berlin on the GDR's 40th
anniversary (4 October 1989) was a clear indication that
perhaps the Soviet Union was prepared to change the status
quo in Eastern Europe."' His non-support of Erich Honecker
in a time of need sugges:s that the Soviet leader wanted to
see some positive change in the entrenched East German
leadership, but change did not necessarily mean that the
Soviets were in favor of unification. If the USSR did favor
unification, then they probably preferred to have greater
control over the process which was not what occurred after
the collapse of the Berlin wall.
At the Malta summit Gorbachev indicated that German
unification was a serious problem, but by the end of January
" 9OHoagland, p. 38; and "German-NATO Drama: 9 Fateful
Months," The New York Times, 17 July 1990, p. A-6.
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1990, the Soviets admitted that unification was possible.1 99
The Soviets continued to hold out on the German question at
the Washington summit in May 1990. It appeared that
Gorbachev was in search of a cooperative stance by the West
for his reforms in the Soviet Union as a concession for
German unity. Finally, Gorbachev accepted German
unification on 16 July 1990 after realizing that the event
was inevitable, but he did ensure that the Soviets received
a maximum of concessions from the West which included West
German aid, a non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union
and Germany, conditions for German NATO membership, and a
reassurance that Germany would not build NBC weapons.
2. NATO or Neutrality
The USSR recognized unification was inevitable, but
it also needed a cooperative relationship with Germany for
economic reasons. However, the Soviets attempted to dictate
that a united Germany must be neutral and demilitarized or
part of both NATO and the WTO, which amounted to the same as
neutrality.2 0 0 This point was an attempt to ensure that the
USSR retained a strong voice in relations with a united
Germany and in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Soviets
1
"OPhillip Petersen, "The Emerging Soviet Vision of
European Security," unpublished working draft, 12 March
1990, pp. 8-9.
2 0 Arthur Rachwald, "Soviet-East European Relations,"
Current History 88, no. 541 (November 1989); C.R. Whitney,
"Soviets Flesh Out View On Germany: After Unity, It Would
Belong to Both Blocs 5-7 Years," The New York Times, 11
April 1990, p. A-1.
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hoped to reduce the burden of bringing troops home and
ensure that they could get the best deal possible when it
became clear that German neutrality was no longer an
option. 20
It is evident that the Soviets demanded as much
monetary compensation as possible as well as limits on the
size of the Bundeswehr and stationing of NATO troops in east
Germany as a compensation to Western demands that a united
Germany be a member of NATO. Already the FRG is paying the
cost of Soviet forces that remain in the GDR. 2 02 The Soviet
strategy did yield some results. Besides the payment for
the Soviet troops in the GDR, the West reaffirmed that
Germany would not produce ABC weapons, agreed to limit the
size of the Bundeswehr, removed some short-range nuclear
weapons from Germany, revamped the NATO strategy and
structure to be less threatening, and ensured that no
foreign NATO forces would be stationed in the east.
2 0 3
However, even after the agreement for unification
was made, many Soviets believed that a united Germany needed
to be incorporated in all-European security structures.
2 0 ±R.W. Apple, "The Armies of Europe: U.S. Wants Kremlin
to Yield on the Ground, But Moscow Doesn't Appear Ready to
Deal," The New York Times, 22 May 1990, p. A-l; and Sergei
Karaganov, "The Year of Europe: The Soviet View," Survival
32, no. 2 (March-April 1990): p. 127-128.
2 0 2 Abenheim, "Problems of Military Integration." "Two
Plus Four Treaty Signed," The Week in Germany, p. 1.
2 0 3
"Two Plus Four Treaty Signed," The Week in Germany, 14
September 1990, p. 1.
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There continues to be some suspicion concerning the threat
posed by NATO and the EC by conservatives in the USSR such
as Yanayev, chief of international affairs in the
politburo. 204
3. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional
Defense
The Soviets have in the past pressed for a
denuclearized Germany in order to eliminate the U.S. link
with Germany, and the USSR will certainly continue to try to
eliminate short-range nuclear forces (as well as TASM) from
Central Europe. 205 One argument against a denuclearized and
neutral Germany which is free of the U.S. nuclear umbrella
is that Germany might someday present the unpleasant
prospect of developing its own nuclear weapons.2 0 4  For the
most part this scenario seems unlikely. First, as long as
the United States and Germany can maintain a special
relationship, then the extended deterrent will remain
credible, and second (contingent on the total loss of the
U.S. nuclear guarantee), the Germans would have to be
severly threatened by another nuclear pcwer before they
would ever denounce the non-proliferation treaty.
2 0 4 Werner Adam, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 August
1990, in The German Tribune, 26 August 1990, p. 1.
2 0 5 Stephen L. Larrabee, "Soviet Policy Toward Germany,:
New Thinking and Old Realities," The Washington Quarterly
12, no. 3 (Summer 1989): p. 45, 48.
2 0 Larrabee, p. 49.
146
4. CSCE
The Soviets view CSCE as the answer to a new
security arrangement in Europe that will turn Europe into a
"common European Home" and eliminate the two blocs.2 0 7
Gorbachev has consistently called for a pan-European
security structure. His most recent appeal was to an
appreciative U.S. public at Stanford University during his
summit trip to the United States '31 May-3 June 1990).200
Clearly, the Soviets view CSCE as a means of maintaining a
strong influence in Europe at a time of extreme weakness at
home and abroad.
5. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements
The Soviets would certainly prefer to establish a
new Soviet-German entente and strengthen bilateral ties with
a united Germany. The Soviets no longer v-ew the EC as a
military threat, but they would prefer to be part of the
economic prosperity of 1992--this is part of the Soviet
rationale behind allowing Eastern Europe to go free. 20 '
The USSR remains firmly against any Franco-German
defense cooperation (even if it is symbolic), or the
2 OKaraganov, "The Year of Europe," p. 127.
2 0
0"Gorbachev at Stanford," The New York Times, 5 June
1990, p. A-6.
2 0 Horst Teltschik, "Gorbachev's Reform Policy and the
Outlook for East-West Relations," Aussenpoitik 40,no. 3
(1989): pp. 207, 208, 213; Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Security
Perspectives on Germany," in Robbin F. Laird and Susan L.
Clark, eds., The USSR and the Western Alliance (Boston:
Unwin-Hyman, 1990), p. 205.
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replacement of NATO with a stronger European pillar or
European Defense Community.2 21  This would undermine Soviet
efforts to eliminate the blocs and create a new European
security structure which would eventually exclude the United
States. Such a European pillar would probably be effective
in resisting any Soviet attempts at coercion in Western
Europe in the future. In conjunction with the rejection of
a Western European pillar, the Soviets view only CSCE and
the U.N. as effective collective security structures to
ensure peace in Europe and the world.
6. Summary
The Soviet Union recognized that German unity was
inevitable, but they continued to press for a neutral
Germany as long as possible to gain monetary, military, and
political concessions from the West. The Soviets continue
to be in favor of denuclearization in Central Europe, for
this move would sever one of the stronger links between
Germany and the United States while the USSR seeks to
increase its influence in Central Europe through a pan-
European security structure. Finally, the Soviets may try
to form a new Soviet-German entente In the future, but in
the meantime they will attempt to stall any further
cooperative efforts in defense by the West. At the same
time, the USSR will attempt to gain access to a lucrative EC
2 1 0Adomeit, p. 205 and Larrabee, pp. 34, 47.
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marching toward 1992, which the Soviets desperately need to
save a collapsing economy.
C. FRANCE
1. Unification
France favored German unification and viewed
Germany's free choice of alliance as a sovereign right.2 2
However, unification may not be entirely in France's best
interest. In December President Mitterrand approved of
unification, but then officials in Paris clarified that he
wanted to "calm the fears of many French people over
unification, and encourage the Germans not to be distracted
from the unfinished work of building the European
Community. ,,111
For France, a united Germany presents the prospect
that the French status in Europe will fall even lower as
Germany's economy becomes stronger after unification.
2 1 3
Besides falling further behind economically, the French face
several other security problems associated with German
unification which may affect their security policies: a
21
'Serge Schmemann, "Soviets Unyielding on a New Germany
in Western Orbit," The New York Times, 6 May 1990, p. A-1.
2
3
2 Craig R. Whitney, "Unease Fills Western Allies Over
Rapid Changes in East," The New York Times, 1 December 1989,
p. A-1. In addition only 25% of the French population was in
favor of quick unification at the time. See Robin Toner,
"Survey Finds Americans Favor a Reunited Germany," The New
York Times, 1 December 1989, p. A-9.
2 1 3David Yost, "French Security Policy at a Crossroads,"
unpublished draft presented at the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, December 1989, p. 39.
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neutral Germany would put France back on the front line
again, a German-Soviet entente would require more
cooperation between the British, French, and United States
(thereby negating France's independent security policy), and
a denuclearized Germany might force France to negotiate away
its nuclear forces.2 2 4
2. NATO or Neutrality
For all of these reasons, France favors a united
Germany in NATO and a continued U.S. presence in Germany.
France accepted the Genscher plan for a demilitarized GDR,
and they also stressed that the Soviets must not succeed in
driving the United States out of Germany.2 1 5  A neutralized
or demilitarized Germany without a U.S. presence might
imperil France's second-line position that they have enjoyed
for 45 years.
3. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional
Defense
France is clearly not for any radical changes in the
nuclear strategy, force levels, or large conventional
reductions. There is a fear on the part of the French that
the elimination of all nuclear weapons in Central Europe
would result in pressure by the Germans for the negotiation
2 1 4 Ibid., p. 39.
2
.
9 Jacques Andreani, "Europe in the Process of Change:
The French View," Aldress by the French Ambassador to the
United States at the University of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
9 March 1990, pp. 6,7
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and possible elimination of France's short-range nuclear
force. West Germany's Egon Bahr has already argued for the
elimination of French short range nuclear weapons which now
only threaten Germany.2 1 6  France also refuses to negotiate
bloc-to-bloc in CFE in order to protect it independent, non-
integrated military status.2 L7
4. CSCE
The French view CSCE as a means for Eastern Europe
to participate in an all-European forum and for the Soviet
Union to have a voice in Western European affairs.2 10 While
some have argued that the French would prefer to see a less
American-dominated NATO, and CSCE given more formal security
roles, it seems unlikely that such an arrangement would
benefit French interests over the long-term. 21 9  Certainly
they prefer to see less U.S. influence in NATO, but the
complete absence of the United States would leave the
Soviets and the Germans as possible hegemonic powerhouses in
Europe.
5. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements
The French recognized that German unity was
inevitable and opted to entangle the Germans to the West
2 1 6Yost, "French Security," p. 25.
2 1 7Ibid., p. 26.
2 1aAndreani, p. 11-12.
2
,*Thomas Friedman, "Baker is Off to Europe, Ready to
Sell Soviets on United Germany in NATO," The New York Times,
2 May 1990, p. A-4.
151
through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. The French
decided to push for further deepening of the EC through
monetary union in 1993. In addition, the French have tried
and will probably continue to attempt to anchor the Germans
to the West through symbolic institutions such as the
Franco-German Brigade.2 2 0
6. Summary
The French favored German unity but have some
reservations concerning the possible effect of unification
on France's status as a European power. While not wanting
to concede any sovereignty to a strong and united Germany,
France has recognized the importance of anchoring the
Germans to the West through the EC, NATO, and other
bilateral arrangements.
D. THE UNITED KINGDOM
1. Unification
The United Kingdom, as expected, appears to be
exercising the traditional "special relationship" with the
United States. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was for
German unification but not at a pace that might upset
Gorbachev's position.2 2 1  In general, the United Kingdom
supports most of the U.S. positions in relation to European
2 2 0 Yost, p. 33, 40; Andreani, p. 9; "Who's Afraid of
Germany?" The Economist, 18 November 1989, pp. 54-55.
2 2 1
"Reactions of the Four Powers," (Dieler Nachrichten,
14 November 1989), in The German Tribune, 26 November 1989,
p. 2.
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security as long as the United Kingdom's sovereignty is not
threatened.222
2. NATO or Neutrality
The United Kingdom supported a unified Germany in
NATO, and agrees that the alliance must take on more
political functions. The British see the alliance as the
best means of assuring that the Germans stay anchored to the
West.223
The British have also been the most vocal of the
European nations concerning NATO participation in out-of-
area crises such as the Persian Gulf. Many British
officials, including Prime Minister Thatcher, argue:
S..it is time to redefine NATO's aims to include
defense against threats to security or economic
stability from places like the gulf, where they have
arisen repeatedly in the last decade.2 2 4
This non-traditional use of NATO is in contrast to the most
of the rest of Western Europe which prefers to use the WEU,
the U.N., or unilateral action. By not using NATO in
out-of-area crises, Europe has managed during most of the
Cold War to participate only in those crises which directly
affect each individual nation's interest--thereby leaving
2 2 2
"It is All a German Racket," interview of Nicholas
Ridley, The Dailey Telegraph, 13 July 1990.
2 2 3 Craig R. Whitney, "British Question Soviet Suggestion
On a Status for a United Germany," The New York Times, 12
April 1990, p. A-8; and John Roper, "Europe and the Future
of Germany--A British View," The World Today 46, no. 4
(March 1990): pp. 46-49.
2 2 4Craig R. Whitney, "Thatcher Warns Europeans On Slow
Response to Crisis," The New York Times, p. A-9.
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most of the world superpower duties for the United States to
handle.
3. Nuclear Weapons, Strategy, and Conventional
Defense
The United Kingdom acknowledged that the Lance
upgrade was overcome by events but still strongly supports
TASM and is against the total elimination of nuclear weapons
from German soil. 2 2 5  The British are against any drastic
changes in NATO's strategy and nuclear policy, and they are
considering increased cooperation with the French on nuclear
weapons. 226
4. CSCE
The British, like the United States, view CSCE
primarily as a forum for East-West dialogue and cooperation.
The United Kingdom feels that a new security system in place
of NATO is unlikely, destabilizing, and nebulous.2 2 '
5. Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements
The United Kingdom is not in favor of deepening
European integration through the EC. Thatcher views NATO as
the integrating factor for Germany, and the British (unlike
the French) do not anticipate closer political or security
2 2 Robert Pear, "NATO Sees New Cut in Short-Range A-
Arms," The New York Times, 11 May 1990, p. A-4.
2 2 6
"Who's Afraid of Germany," The Economist, 18 November
1989, p. 53-54; and "Nuclear Forces Link," The Monterey
Herald, 5 May 1990, p. A-1.
2 2
'Roper, pp. 46-49; and Whitley, "British Question
Soviet Suggestion," p. A-8.
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cooperation to occur in the EC. It is unclear, however, if
the United Kingdom is seriously changing its position on
monetary union given the most recent UK acceptance of
furthering the integration of Europe's currency and
contiruing the European integration process:
By effectively pegging the pound to the German mark,
Thatcher has ceded some of Britain's sovereignty in
making economic decisions in return for the prospect of
higher growth and lower inflation similar to what West
Germany has achieved during the past decade.
2 2 0
This is a sharp reversal from the British government's
normal policy against further economic integration and the
damaging rhetoric of Nicholas Ridley who described monetary
union as a plot by Germany to gain hegemony in Europe.
2 2 9
Perhaps the United Kingdom is beginning to accept that the
economic leader and power in Central Europe is Germany, and
it is better for the UK to join the team rather than be left
on the sidelines.
The United Kingdom may view further European
integration as an opportunity to be more influencial in the
EC through full participation, thus working to counter
excessive German influence. Finally, the United Kingdom
admits that the greatest multilateral challenge in the
2 2
0"British Tie Their Currency to Europe," San Francisco
Chronicle, 6 October 1990, p. B-i.
229"It is All a German Racket," interview of Nicholas
Ridley by Dominic Lawson in The Spectator and reprinted in
The Dailey Telegraph, 13 July 1990.
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future will be to maintain the U.S. military commitment in
NATO and Central Europe.
2 3 0
6. Summary
The United Kingdom favored unification but not at
the pace at which it occurred in order not to upset
Gorbachev or the balance of power in Central Europe. The
United Kingdom insisted that Germany be a member of NATO,
and the British continue to cultivate the "special
relationship" with the United States.
The British back the continued presence of nuclear
weapons on German soil and the present NATO strategies, but
they are open to minor revisions in order to accommodate the
changing European situation. They view CSCE as a forum
only--not as a pan-European security structure--and they may
just be starting to support the strengthening of the
monetary and eventual political union of the EC. This is an
important step by the United Kingdom on the path to
galvanizing Western Europe in the common goal of cooperation
and political union over the long term.
Finally, the British would prefer that NATO not only
become more political, but that the organization also
realize that the defense of Europe sometimes involves
out-of-area commitments. In the interest of European
defense in the Persian Gulf, the United Kingdom has
2 3 0
"Who's Afraid," p. 54-55; "Deciding the Terms of
Unification Requires a Clearer Approach," Der Taggesspiegel,
Berlin, 1 April 1990, in The German Tribune, p. 1; and
Petersen, p. 15.
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suggested that NATO adjust to the changing world situation
and commit NATO forces in out-of-area crises. In the
absence of agreement on NATO commitments, the British
continue to support the efforts of the WEU and unilateral
action in out-of-area conflicts.
E. SUMMARY OF THE BIG FOUR POSITIONS
A final analysis of the "big four" positions on security
as well as the actual outcome of the "two plus four" process
reveals that the Western nations (the United States, France,
and the United Kingdom), accomplished their security goals
in Europe during the unification process. There were some
concessions made to the Soviet Union in order to ensure
Germany remained a member of NATO, but those concessions
were a small price to pay for the success of Western policy
to date. The Soviet Union might b, considered by some as
the loser of the Cold War, but that would be the result of a
"win-lose" situation (what the West gains, the Soviets
lose). The Soviets may have lost some influence in Central
Europe in the short term, but over the long term German
unification is a "win-win" situation for both East and West
(Western gains are not necessarily equal to a Soviet loss
and vice versa). Over the long term the Soviets will gain
access to German economic and technical expertise which the
USSR sorely needs in order to reconstuct their economy.
Even in the short term the Soviets made gains by obtaining
security guarantees from Germany, financial support for the
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Soviet forces in Germany, and the promotion of a cooperative
atmosphere in Europe condusive to stability during this era
of rapid change. The West also won by ensuring that Germany
remained in NATO and anchored in Western institutions. In
addition, the same cooperative atmosphere that aided the
Soviets, also helps the West influence positive change in
Soviet and Eastern European institutions (both political and
economic).
The Western nations favored German unity as a member of
NATO, and that goal was accomplished. Germany remains
anchored to the West with some limits on the Bundeswehr and
the stationing of NATO forces in the five new federal
states, and certainly there must be changes in NATO strategy
which reflect the political and military realities of the
emerging Europe (soon to be published in MC-14/4).
The Western nations preferred that CSCE remain a vehicle
to bridge East and West for the purpose of consultations on
arms control, human rights, and the advancement of economic
liberalism, and the West rejected proposals that CSCE
rapidly replace NATO as a pan-European security structure in
the short-to-mid term. This goal has been accomplished, but
it is only a matter of time (if the cooperative atmosphere
in East-West relations persists) until Europe investigates
the possibity of a formalized collective security role for
CSCE (this is not to say that NATO does not have a role to
play in that new security structure).
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Finally, Western Europe has hesitated on European
monetary union in 1992 which may lead to eventual political
union, but there are signs that both the French and the
British are willing to sacrifice some of their long-
cherished sovereignty for the higher purpose of cooperation
toward the end goal of political union. There remains
disagreement among the Western nations on how to handle out-
of-area matters that affect Western Europe's security such
as the current Persian Gulf Crisis. The United States and
the United Kingdom prefer to change NATO's focus beyond
defense against the Soviet Union while France favors the WEU
or unilateral action. Germany, for the mom t, favors
participation only in a multilateral U.N. force. This
position is consistent with the German desire not to worry
their European neighbors with an out-of-area venture so soon
after unification. The important point is that NATO
maintain its political solidarity and a common front when
NATO interests are threatened as has been the case thus far
during the Persian Gulf Crisis.
The Soviet Union, In contrast to the West, did not
realize most of their old goals during the "two plus four"
process. The Soviets failed to prevent unification, German
membership in NATO, and the USSR has not succeded in
exporting communism to Central Europe (which seems highly
unlikely in the future also). They failed to totally
eliminete nuclear weapons from Germany (but such weapons
may become irrelavant as a coercive tool in the future), and
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they did not come out ahead in the arms control talks. The
Soviets also failed to introduce CSCE as a pan-European
security structure designed in theory to replace both blocs.
The Soviets did appear to make some gains by obtaining
help from the Germans through concessions and a small degree
of access to the EC in a round-about way. The Soviets
succeeded in challenging NATO's future existence, and the
USSR succeeded in strengthening arguments by those (both in
Europe and Germany) who call for the removal of American
forces in Europe. However, in making these gains the USSR
did not appear to significantly bolster its own ability to
influence policies in Central Europe. Finally, the
implementation of a more cooperative East-West relationship
will in the long term aid stability in Europe which is the
interest of both East and West as well as the world. Had a
major Western leader been given a list in 1983 of what the
Soviets would gain in 1989 and 1990, that leader would most
likely have been appalled by what appeared (in 1983) to be a
Soviet triumph in the Cold War. The situation as viewed
from an outside observer is that the Soviets have succeeded
in obtaining many of their old goals. However, the irony of
the situation is that the Soviets succeeded as their entire
security system collapsed.
The Soviets are withdrawing from Eastern Europe, their
army in East Germany is virtually a paper tiger, and
Gorbachev's troubles at home make the depression of the
1930s look like an economic windfall. At Stanford on 3 June
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1990, Gorbachev stated, "I will take . . . the fact that the
Cold War is now behind us. And let us not wrangle over who
won it--who won the Cold War". . .23 . One might agree
that now may not be the time to wrangle over who won the
Cold War, but it is important to clarify that the West is
not looking to the East to establish a new, utopian system
called communism that professes to cure the ills and
hardships of mankind.
The communist system is falling apart and its final
chapters are being written in the pages of history. In
order to start anew, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are
now looking West at the capitalist system they once
despised. The West, with a new power in Central Europe,
holds the only vision of hope for the 70-year experiment
that finally failed in 1989 and 1990.
2 3 1




The events of 1989 and 1990 shook Europe and shattered
the foundations of the bipolar world. Out of the debris of
the dissipating Cold War, united Germany emerged like a
phoenix from the ashes, but the final outcome of German
unification and the transformation of Europe is not yet
complete--the new entity of security remains unknown.
German unification is the centerpiece of that 2hange in
Europe, and Germany's role in the new Europe offers the key
to the future security structure on the Continent. This
thesis has therefore concentrated on Germany's role in
European security by analyzing both the past and present
German contribution to European security and European
relations. From a thorough analysis of Germany's role, some
conclusions might be outlined concerning an appropriate U.S.
strategy (geared to the changes that have taken place) over
the next ten years in Europe.
How can Germany live in peace and security with its
European neighbors? This question seemed to have slipped
from the minds of the makers of policy until the diplomatic
revolution of the late 1980s fetched it back into popular
consciousness with a startling jolt on 9 November 1989. The
fall of the border fortifications and the streams of
hundreds of thousands into the West revived an old anxiety
that had haunted Europe from 1740 until the 1970s; an
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anxiety which seemed to have been solved--much as Honecker
himself had observed in early 1989 that his wall would stand
for a century longer if need be. Now, however, Germany has
returned fully to the ranks of the powers. This event
summons images of the past that, although important and
powerful, must be measured against a more complete
historical reality that includes the evolution of German
statecraft and politics since 1945. This more complete
picture, the subject of this thesis, offers somewhat
different and perhaps more important insights.
A. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE?
Th-ough the historical perspective and an analysis of
Germany's role in European statecraft between 1648 and 1985,
both during war and peace, one finds that the evolution of
Germar.y's position in Central Europe and its role in
European relations today is fundamentally different from the
conditions that contributed to World War I and World War II.
The rise of the great powers, the balance of power systems,
and tJe two World Wars exemplify Prussian-German attempts to
attair Continental and world hegemony through the violent
applitation of force for political gain.
Prussian-Germany's rise as a great power was
characterized by a highly efficient theory of state,
bureaucracy, and army. The latter was the key to the whole
and the foundation upon which Prussia (and later Germany)
established Itself in Central Europe. The army was the crux
of survival for the Prussian state that had for centuries
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been the parade ground upon which European armies marched
enroute to victories elsewhere on the Continent.
Prussian-Germany's rise as a great power and
participation in Metternich's balance of power system
established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 gave way to
the increasingly rigid Bismarckian system and eventually to
the self-destructive, competitive alliance situation that
contributed to World War I. Between 1919 and 1939 there was
a failure of the international system and a loss of
homogeneity and common diplomatic language due to new
ideologies. Also included in the causes of World War II was
the exclusion of Germany and the Soviet Union from
meaningful participation in the international community as
well as Hitler's misguided objectives to expand Germany's
role in the world through the conquest of Eastern Europe.
The two World Wars demonstrated the abominable outcome
of Germany's attempt at European and world hegemony. Force
and armed violence were the tools which Germany used to
ensure political gain, and the results were devastating. As
a result, Germany will forever be associated with names like
"Verdun," "Stalingrad," and "Auschwitz." There is litcle
Germany can do to erase the memory of those two monumental
errors (World War I and II), and it is certainly beneficial
to mankind that those records never be erased.
After World War II and in the context of division and
the constraints of bipolarity, West Germany established a
new course which fundamentally rejected its militarist past
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and integrated with the West for the first time in German
history. West Germany established a viable democracy,
integrated the Bundeswehr into the new democracy, and slowly
reemerged as a European and potential world power.
Between 1985 and 1988 with the ascension of a new,
dynamic leader in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, the
seeds of a new era in European statecraft were sewn.
Gorbachev recognized that renewed Western resistance to
Soviet intimidation from the early 1980s onward and the
deteriorating situation inside the Soviet Union required a
significant shift in Soviet policy away from confrontation
to cooperation. The slow breakdown of bipolarity increased
West Germany's maneuvering room and initiated a sharp rise
in the FRG's position in European affairs. West Germany's
influence in Europe and the world was catapulted to new
heights as a result of the Revolution and events of 1989 and
1990 which signaled an end to the Cold War. German
unification was complete on 3 October 1990. The "two plus
four" process highlighted Germany's rise as a European
leader and potential world power as well as the relative
decline in power exercised by the "big four."
Yet Germany's role in the new Europe, which is still
emerging, is anything but that which contributed to World
War I and II. The Germany that emerged in 1990 has
demonstrated a responsible leadership role in the evolution
of European affairs. Through an analysis of the German
government and party positions during "two plus four," it is
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apparent that Germany exercised a great degree of influence
in the unification process. The outcome of the process was
characterized by a rational German approach to the problem
of both unification and European security. Germany opted to
continue to strengthen the anchor to the West through NATO
and the EC while maintaining the necessary maneuvering room
to influence economic and political developments in the
East. In addition, the analysis of the German political
party positions provided insights into the security stance
of the major and minor German parties and the relative
influence of each: the ruling CDU/CSU/FDP coalition, the
opposition SPD, and the Green and Republican fringe parties.
The conservative coalition remains the most influential
party in German politics and thus far has gained strength
from unification as the east Germans continue to support the
Kohl government. East German conservative support is an
unexpected outcome of what was largely thought to be a
Socialist stronghold in the former GDR prior to March 1990.
However, even if the conservative coalition continues in
power, changes to NATO's nuclear weapons policy, strategy,
and conventional levels must continue in order to
accommodate the political and military realities of a Soviet
threat which has declined.
Discounting a possible Soviet retrenchment and a return
to the Cold War, the NATO center will undergo further troop
reductions and strategy changes no matter which party wins
in all-German elections or gains power in the future. The
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important point is that the conservative government favors a
continuance of the Western link and a cautious approach to
radical changes in security policy which might jeopardize
stability (for example, the withdrawal from NATO in favor of
a CSCE collective security structure). This does not mean
that Germany will not continue to improve relations and
cooperate with the Soviet Union, but the risk of some kind
of Soviet-German entente at the expense of Poland, as in
1939, is not realistic today.
Finally, the rise of Germany as a power in Europe cannot
be viewed in isolation from the other influential powers:
the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and the United
Kingdom. The outcome of the "two plus four" process and the
combined German and "big four" positions on European
security indicates that the Western powers triumphed in the
Cold War, but they did so without humiliating or alienating
the Soviet Union, and in fact the Soviets made substantial
short-term gains and have the potential to reap long-term
benefits. German unity and NATO membership was attained at
the cost of some required concessions, but those concessions
are not out of line with the current political realities in
Europe. While most of the Western powers agree that NATO
must continue to exist as a military and political alliance
and Europe must continue toward integration, there are
disagreements as to the role NATO and Germany must play in
out-of-area crises.
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Having established where the Germans and the "big four"
stand on security issues, the United States--in order to
truly be a leader among equals--must devise a strategy to
ensure a continued role in Europe which is compatible with
U.S. interests as well as German and European objectives.
This thesis finally includes suggestions for the future of
U.S. security policy in Europe--a formidable task given the
world of uncertainty that has accompanied the rapid pace of
events in 1989 and 1990.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY IN EUROPE
What has the policy of the United States been towards
the Federal republic and German unity? German-American
relations in the 20th century evolved from antagonism to
alliance as a result of a struggle for world power that
ended in American victory and German defeat. But the costs
of that contest led to a new conflict that required the
United States to find common ground with its defeated
opponent. This policy of support and cooperation has led to
considerable benefits for both sides, benefits which emerge
in their full detail when one considers the dismal record of
the years between 1914 and 1945. The bond of friendship and
cooperation that formed has grown into a transatlantic
relationship in security and economy that forms an important
basis of peace.
The challenge of the present rests in preserving the
good of the past four decades in the dynamic and by no means
clear situation of the present and future. Above all else,
168
the makers of policy should take careful stock of the past
and present as they embark upon the statecraft of the
future. In this connection, the Bush administration made an
important start in its advocacy of German unity in 1989 and
1990, but this step is only a start. The events of 1990,
especially the crisis in the Persian Gulf, suggest what
perils lie ahead for collective defense and the German-
American relationship.
Germany has a unique role to play in the transformation
of the Eastern European and Soviet economies as well as
political institutions. Germany, through the continuing
process of unification and aesimilation of the five new
Federal states, must set the example for the East and then
act as a bridge for Western values to flow into Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. German unification is a test
which has both European and world implitations because of
the unique responsibility and leadership role the Germans
must exercise. Unlike the Japanese, who offer an example of
only a robust economy, the Germans offer Eastern Europe both
an economic and political model.
However, the new era in East-West relations and German
unity is not without potential dangers. Certainly this new
era has presented the fear of a renewed Soviet-German
entente, but while this entente is already occurring, one
must remember that it exists in a changed European and world
environment. The entente between the Soviet Union and
Germany is not reminiscent of the 1939 entente leading to
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the division of Eastern Europe between the two powers. Of
greater concern is possible German neutrality and isolation
from the West, a total U.S. withdrawal militarily and
politically from Europe, and instability in the USSR which
might flood into Eastern Europe and affect Western European
security.
These dangers could have severe consequences for U.S.
security and strategy. The implications of these dangers
provide a powerful rationale in favor of America's continued
superpower and global L le and effectively challenge the
neo-isolationist mentality. Now is not the time to attempt
to reconstruct an isolationist barrier and return to a
policy of avoiding "entangling alliances" across the
Atlantic.232
Therefore, modifications to the security arrangements
that now exist must be undertaken in order to reap the
positive benefits of change occurring in Europe and the
world--modifications which take into account European and,
in particular, German concerns. The day of dictating the
security issues to the Germans as a junior partner are just
about over.233 Many of these suggestions are already
2 3 2The policy of avoiding entangling alliances with
Europe was formulated by George Washington in his farewell
address in 1789 and reconfirmed by Thomas Jefferson in his
inaugural address in 1801. Kaplan, p. 1.
2 3 3Catherine Kelleher, statement at the Arms Control
Association meeting on "Security and Cooperation in Europe,"
presented on C-SPAN II, 6 October 1990.
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underway and should be reflected in the new NATO strategy,
MC-14/4, which is due to be published in the near future.
Beyond specifics concerning U.S. NATO strategy is the
question of how the United States should respo:ad to other
changes in Europe including the role of CSCE and new
multilateral and bilateral relationships.
1. U.S. NATO Strategy
The United States should continue to nurture the
vital NATO link that has created an era of stability in
Europe since 1949. NATO must downplay the military aspect
of the alliance to security in Europe and place a renewed
emphasis on the political component of NATO which has been
present but overlooked during the past 45 years of the Cold
War. This can be accomplished by reexamining the original
purpose of NATO and restructuring NATO's military policies.
Mar~y political and military experts question NATO's
political role and characterize the institution only as a
military alliance. However, NATO's political cohesion and
success in promoting common values and goals is evident in
the alliance'L survival in the face of 41 years of crisis
management: the debates over workable strategies in a
nuclear world, the withdrawal of France from the integrated
command in 1966, Soviet pressure to split the alliance and
dissolve NATO, and NATO's continued survival after German
unification and the collapse of the WTO. A simple
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examination of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty
reveals the political goals of NATO:
The Parties will contribute toward the further
development of peaceful and friendly international
relations by strengthening their free institi tions, by
bringing about a better understanding of the principles
upon which these institutions are founded, and by
promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They
will seek to eliminate conflict in their international
econotic policies and will encourage economic
collaboration between any or all of them.2 3 4
One need only look at NATO's political solidarity during
the Persian Gulf Crisis to realize that NATO, even without a
direct military commitment, can have a p.,sitive political
impact on out-of-area issues.
How-ver, in the absence of a Soviet threat and given
the political realities in Germany and Europe, it is
necessary to investigate possible adjustments in NATO's
mIlitary doctrine (i.e., nuclear weapons stationing, forward
defense, and conventional force levels). First, the United
States should reaffirm its commitment to provide an extended
nuclear deterrent to Germany and NATO. This will be more
difficult given the political situation and the reality that
massive quantities of nuclear weapons for the defense of
WEstern Europe are not aL significant as in the past.
However, since Germany has renounced the development of its
own NBC weapons, and since nuclear weapons will not vanish,
Germany requires that guarantee in order to ward off any
2 3 4 The NorLh Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 4 April
1949, in Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States
(Bosto : Twayne Publishers, 1988): p. 219.
172
threat--whether that be from a revival of aggressive Soviet
militarism or a threat from the third-world through nuclear
proliferation at some time in the future. The only other
alternative for Germany without the guarantee is to turn to
the Soviet Union for protection or build its own nuclear
force--the latter being renounced once more in "two plus
four."
Second, the United States will clearly run into
opposition against the continued stationing of short-range
nuclear weapons on German soil. The best approach for the
United States may be unilaterally to remove short-range
weapons (contingent on further conventional force
agreements) with the stipulation that during a crisis the
weapons may have to be redeployed. The United States should
continue to push for TASM but only in close cooperation with
the German government by using a low-profile, diplomatic
approach--the Germans must and will have their say in the
evolution. In the event the Germans reject the stationing
of all nuclear weapons on German soil, the United States
must be prepared to move the nuclear deterrent to sea.
Third, the call by NATO for the use of nuclear
weapons as a last resort is entirely correct. The first-use
policy :huld never be totally abandoned, because there is
always a deterrent effect to a potential aggressor who has
to take into account the unknown of a possible nuclear
response. The actual first use of nuclear weapons is
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another matter which has to take into account the
imponderables of some future, unknown act of aggression.
Fourth, the United States should continue to reduce
its NATO force levels in Germany from the present 195,000 to
perhaps a maximum of 50,000 to 75,000 troops. 2 3 5  In order
to make foreign troop-stationing in Germany more palatable,
NATO should strive to lower the integrated command down to
the corps level and perhaps create a true Western European
Army modeled on the Franco-German Brigade. This force,
largely symbolic when compared to the size of NATO forces in
the past, will provide the needed ingredient of U.S. and
European linkage on the Central Front as well as provide a
degree of stability during the next decade of change in
Eastern Europe. In addition, the force has to retain the
capability to maneuver to aid the Bundeswehr in the
protection of the former GDR territory (after 1994).
Finally, perhaps the most vexing controversy in the
futur: of NATO rests in the combination of burden-sharing
and out-of-area issues, questions that have long been at the
center of NATO diplomacy and strife. Now, however, these
issues stand at the very center of debate because of the
crisis In the Persian Gulf and the conjuncture of German
unity and U.S. internal difficulties.
2 
"This is already being considered and is commensurate
with the economic realities of the United States and the
political and military realities in Europe.
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In this connection, the experience of the FRG in
out-of-area questions has considerable importance for the
shape of future policy in the face of a possible Persian
Gulf War. The Federal Republic has enshrined its
limitations on overseas operations into the custom of its
security policy, often taking refuge behind passages in the
Basic Law that appear to circumscribe the area of operations
of the Bundeswehr. Yet a more generous reading of the Basic
Law suggests that the Germans can participate in military
tasks outside of the NATO boundaries within a system of
collective defense and security. The custom of these
military limitations adhered to the condition of a divided
nation during the era of the 1950s and 1960s--an era marked
by the colonial and post-colonial wars in Korea, Indochina,
North Africa, and elsewhere. This condition of division and
dependency circumscribed greatly the freedom of maneuver of
the FRG, a circumstance that has not disappeared entirely.
In all of this, U.S. makers of policy must be alive
to the past and present dimensions of this problem as seen
from a German perspective, sensing realistically the limits
of policy yet striving as ever to create conditions of
collective defense that reasonably include German power.
The United States should investigate the possibility of
extending NATO's role to out-of-area conflicts that affect
Western European security. However, the United States must
be aware that if such a NATO revision is achieved, certain
European interests may not (as in the past) coincide with
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U.S. global objectives. In the absence of an actual NATO
out-of-area military role, the United States should continue
to encourage European participation through the WEU, the
U.N., or unilateral action.
2. CSCE
With a solid NATO foundation, Western Europe can,
perhaps, begin to reach for the utopian collective security
goal envisioned by the U.N. and CSCE. However, the CSCE
approach should remain cautious and continue to concentrate
on arms control, the furthering of human rights, and
economic liberalism. If the establishment of common
interests and diplomatic values and institutions in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union occurs, then the European
collective security aspect of CSCE (as of yet still
undefined) should fall into place naturally. In the
meantime, the future success of the collective security
concept may stand or fall during the current Persian Gulf
Crisis--an additional rationale to not yet abandon NATO and
the success of collective defense.
3. Multilateral and Bilateral Relations
In the area of multilateral and bilateral relations,
the United States should continue to develop a special U.S.-
German relationship. Cermany is the key to security in
Europe, and the West must realize that the responsibility
and role of the German nation is critical over the next 10
years. Despite understandable criticism by the United
States concerning the Federal Republic's current out-of-area
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policies and a possible German-Soviet entente, one must
realize the Germans have their hands full with the problems
of unification. The Germans are firmly committed to the
West, but they must also act as a catalyst and jump-off
point for capitalism and Western values to move East. The
threat of communism flowing uncontrolled from East to West
is non-existent. Eastern Europe is reaching West for new
values and renewal, and the Germans must provide a stable
example for democratic and economic development in those
countries.
In out-of-area matters there may be cause for
concern should the Germans not effectively commit military
forces to a multilateral organizationi such as the UN or WEU
for the purpose of crisis management. Even after giving the
Federal Republic the benefit of the doubt concerning the
internal problems of unification, a firm German commitment
to preserving world peace through active participation in
out-or-area crises within six months to one year does not
seem unreasonable. In this regard, it appears that the
Germans recognize that the concept of "checkbook diplomacy"
will not be acceptable as a substitute for German manpower
in a multilateral force in the future.
With these points in mind, the United States should
continue to push both the bilateral and multilateral
agreements that contribute to cooperation and understanding
in Europe. The United States should support the "alphabet
soup" of European integration (the EC, WEU, CSCE, NATO and
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many others) as long as the goal of each continues to be
European integration through common values of democracy,
economic opportunity, and human rights--the ultimate goal
being peace through cooperation.
4. The Impact of the Past on the Present and the Future
The pages of history may still provide a lesson in
successful European statecraft for the present generation of
leaders. The men that gathered at the Congress of Vienna
175 years ago created a viable system that existed in
various forms and prevented major European war for 100
years--a system based on the common values of the time and a
firm commitment to cooperate in the prevention of major war.
One might suggest that according to the shopworn
measure of the past, the problem of Germany has been both
solved and arises anew. Does history repeat itself? This
question crosses the minds of millions as they watch
Germany. The argument contained in these pages suggests
that in the realn., of German statecraft and policy there has
been a profound change since 1945. Germany's previous
exaltation of power and its willingness to use military
force to expand the realm of German power has given way to a
far more effective and morally defensible stats-raft and
mutual negotiations: an advantageous statecraft based on
peaceful means.
It seems unlikely that the Federal Republic will
attempt to dominate the Continent with the traditional
conentional measures of military strength. Bonn is not
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Weimar. Germany of 1990 is not Bismarck's Reich of 1871.
Nor is it that of 1939 or 1942 (the height of Hitler's
Reich). Yet certain basic and difficult problems remain for
Germany and its neighbors. The lingering wounds of World
War II, the gap between the rich and the poor, the shifting
ground of European security, and tne uncertain future of
American power all bear within themselves the possibility
for the destructive dynamism. Yet these dangers must be
seen in their full detail. That is, one must also recognize
what has become better with the passage of time.
The makers of the Europe of the day after tomorrow
should reflect deeply on those aspects of the European state
system that have proved enduring and valuable, while
discarding all that outdated and dangerous material that
jeopardizes the future. Nationalism as an organizing force
in the affairs oi states emerged as the driving phenomenon
of Europe after 1789. The struggle for national identity in
the German case led under unhappy circumstances to a tragic
and disastrous outcome. But as Stalin said, the Hitlers
come and go, but the German nation remains. It remains now,
as before. The Germany of the 21st century must become a
full part of Europe and the wider world in partnership with
the United States. There are profound forces driving these
two nations apart which both the United States and the
Federal Republic must recognize and counteract. Many
Germans recognize that old power politics in the realm of
one nation state laboring at the expense of the other
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brought misfortune and disaster. Yet this idea is quite
strong in central and eastern Europe, and can again imperil
the peace of the world if it is set loose.
The U.S. engagement in Europe and the partnership
with Europe have been a stabilizing factor. New
forces threaten to underminc these bonds. Makers of U.S.
policy must possess the wisdom and foresight to recognize
these dangers and meet them in the present and future. A
European retreat into the narrow national egoisms of the era
1890 to 1945 might again summon forth the disasters of
nationalism and war that balanced statecraft must always
counteract today and tomorrow.
The reader may not agree with the suggestions for
future U.S. security strategy in Europe. One may find the
CSCE collective security structure vague and undefined and
the idea of an all-European army virtually unworkable.
These issues of undeniable importance are subjects of vital
future research. For some observers many of these
suggestions are probably unrealistic, if not unacceptable.
However, one thing is certain, options for NATO and future
security arrangements in Europe must be discussed, goals
redefined, and adaptations implemented--the future of NATO,





BUNDESRAT UPPER HOUSE OF THE WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENT
BUNDESTAG LOWER HOUSE OF THE WEST GERMAN PARLIAMENT
BUNDESWEHR WEST GERMAN ARMY
CDU CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION
CFE CONVENTIONAL FORCES EUROPE
CSCE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERAITON IN
EUROPE
CSU CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION
DM DEUTSCH MARK
EC EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
FDP FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
FRG FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (WEST GERMANY)
GDR GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (EAST GERMANY)
GREENS ECOLOGY PARTY OF THE WEST GERMAN LEFT
INF INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCE
MC NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE
MLF MULTILATERAL FORCE (NUCLEAR)
NATO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NBC (ABC) NUCLEAR (OR ATOMIC), BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
NPT NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NBC)
NVA EAST GERMAN ARMY
NWFZ NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE
PERESTROIKA RESTRUCTURING
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PDS PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM (FORMERLY
THE SED--EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY)
RDF RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE
SALT STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS TALKS
SED COMMUNIST PARTY (EAST GERMANY)
SNF SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCE (NUCLEAR)
SPD SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
START STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS
TASM TACTICAL AIR TO SURFACE MISSILE (NUCLEAR)
U.K. UNITED KINGDOM
U.S. UNITED STATES
USSR UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
VOLKSKAMMER EAST GERMAN PARLIAMENT
WEU WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
WTO WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION
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APPENDIX
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, DECEMnER 1988-DECEMBER 1990
This appendix presents a chronology of major events
from December 1988 to December 1990 which affected German
unification and the "two plus four" process. The
information presented has been drawn from the New York
Times, The Week in Germany, The German Tribune, and the
Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
7 December 1988: During a speech at the U.N., Mikhail
Gorbachev announces the unilateral withdrawal of 50,000
troops and six tank divisions from East Germany,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
May: Hungarians open the border between Hungary and
Austria.
29-31 May: NATO summit and the Lance debate. The FRG
Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher proposed immediate
negotiations for the elimination of Lance from West Germany.
The U.S. salvaged .' growing rift in the alliance with a
compromise to delay the decision on Lance modernization
until 1992.
13 June: Joint statement by Mikhail Gorbachev and
Helmut Kohl in Bonn. Gorbachev hints that the Berlin wall
did not have to last forever.
6 July: Mikhail Gorbachev's speech to the European
Council at Strasbourg. Ambiguous reference by Gorbachev
concerning possible changes in the status quo in Europe.
August-November 1989 (through May 1990): East German
Exodus through Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The
exodus continued after the collapse of the Berlin wall on 9
November and finally tapered off after the announcement of
monetary union in May 1990.
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7 October: Gorbachev's visit to the GDR. Erich
Honecker, the longtime, hard-line leader of the GDR,
received a vote of non-support from Gorbachev.
18 October: Honecker steps down.
9 November: Collapse of the Berlin wall. Egon Krenz,
Honecker's successor, attempted to stem the exodus by
allowing East Germans to visit the West.
15 November: Gorbachev declares, "no talks on German
unity."
28 November: Kohl's 10-point plan for the unification
of Germany.
2-3 December: Bush-Gorbachev Malta summit.
15 December: NATO Communique recognizing a new era in
East-West relations.
1990
31 January: Push's State of the Union address. Bush
proposes troop levels of 195,000 in Central Europe (225,000
in all of Europe).
13 February: Ottawa Conference. The "two plus four"
(FRG, GDR, U.S., USSR, France, and UK) agree on negotiations
for German unity.
6 March: Gorbachev states NATO membership for a united
Germany is unacceptable.
18 March: First free elections in GDR history. CDU and
its coalition gains almost half of the GDR vote.
3 May: U.S. decision not to upgrade L-nce. Bush calls
for NATO strategy review.
I8 May: FRG-GDR sign treaty for Monetary, Economic, and
Soci~l union.
31 May-3 June: Bush-Gorbachev Washington summit. No
headway made on German unity in NATO.
6 June: WTO pronounces the end of ideological conflict
with the West.
21 June: FRG Bundestag and GDR Volkskammer approve
Currency Union Treaty.
22 June: FRG Bundesrag approves Currency Union Treaty.
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5-6 July: London NATO summit. NATO members agree to
chart new course by laying the groundwork for strategy
changes: integrated (multinational) corps, smaller and more
maneuverable forces, and nuclear weapons as asset of "last
resort" only.
11 July: 16th meeting of the seven leading
industrialized nations. Agreement to allow Germany to aid
Eastern Europe.
16 July: Gorbachev drops objection to a united
Germany's membership in NATO.
6 September: Bonn and Moscow agree on funds, aid, and
timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal from the GDR.
12 September: Signing of the "two plus four"
unification treaty by the 6 foreign ministers of the FRG,
GDR, U.S., USSR, France, and the UK.
13 September: German-Soviet treaty of cooperation and
non-aggression.
21 September: FRG Bundestag and GDR Volkskammer sign
unification treaty. Kohl pledges money to Persian Gulf
Crisis and a change in constitution after December German
out-of-area participation.
3 October: German unification and forfeiture of four-
power occupation rights.
14 October: CDU victory in east German elections.
2 December: All-German elections.
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